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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with water quality management within 
a regional framework. An important and unresolved water quality 
management problem, as delimited in this study, consists of the 
interrelationships between public and private interests and the 
means for reconciling the conflicts within these interrelationships. 
Characteristics of Natural Environmental Problems 
Advamces of technology aoid resultaoit effects on human demeund 
for natural resources present the contemporary plémner amd policy 
maker with two sets of problems. One is the growing scarcity of 
natural resources. Another is the interrelationships between kinds 
and qualities of resources within the ecosystem. 
Demand for natural resources has spatial, temporal, and 
qualitative dimensions connected to any quantitative specification. 
Water is needed at specific locations for specific purposes. If 
it is not available at such a location, it must be transported, 
alternatively, the use must shift to the water supply source. 
Water is demanded for a specific time period such as the seasonal 
demands for crop growing or daily demand in urban use. The spatial 
and temporal dimensions of resource use are usually recognized in 
resource planning, but the qualitative components are often 
ignored (187). In the past, planning of v/ater resources in the 
western parts of the United States was largely a function of the 
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spatial and temporal scarcities of water. The present concern 
about water pollution in even the "water rich" Eastern states is 
mainly a function of qualitative scarcities of water. 
This qualitative scarcity should be viewed within the broader 
framework of the ecosystem. The question arises: What is the role 
and ultimate effect of natural resource use? History records man's 
growing concern with the ultimate effect of human activity on the 
physical abundance of natural resources and the reaction of nature 
on these exploits (124). However, in a dynamic society, character­
ized by aoi increase in technological innovations auid resource use, 
this is not the only problem. The interaction between resource use 
and the resource.base has become a major concern in resource planning 
1 
and policy. Boulding gave an illustrative account of the problems 
of a society in the near future when hé described a "spaceman's 
economy" where both resource-use and residuals (unwanted by-products 
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of human activity) should be carefully planned (21, pp. 3-14), The 
importance of this observation by Boulding is bedded in the fact 
that the modern day problems of environmental quality are not 
related to ah on-emd-off occurrence of a local crisis (calling for 
1 
"Resource base" in this report refers to the total amount of 
scarce natural resources which are available for exploitation. 
2 
"Residual" in this report refers to the more common concept 
"pollutsint." "Pollutant" implicates a damaging effect on other uses. 
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ad hoc measures) but in the cumulative results of all human activity. 
This argument was also presented by Ayres eoid Kneese in their 
analysis of the environmental quality (8, pp. 282-297), 
Ayers and Kneese used a Walras-Cassel general equilibrium 
model in their presentation. This procedure is not new when 
economists inquire about interrelationships and the stability of 
the resource use structures. The new procedure is the inclusion 
of residuals in their model. They base their procedure on a 
material-balance approach in resource management. This approach 
acknowledges two characteristics of resource use. First, matter 
cannot be created or destroyed but the activities of man can change 
its form (quality) and place. Second, the role of all natural 
resources is that of a service; all inputs will ultimately end up 
as residuals. 
The ultimate effect of residuals on the resource base depends 
on the quality of resources dememded and on the residual assimilative 
capacity (rate of assimilation) amd removal capacity of the natural 
environment. These properties of the natural environment emphasize 
the importaoice of time (i.e., rate of resource use) and space (i.e., 
population density) in managing the environment. Figure 1 summarizes 
these arguments. The original form of resources in the resource base 
may be changed in order to supply goods for the consumption process. 
These goods render a service amd are then discarded as unwanted 
residuals. Given enough time, the residuals may be converted into 
a useful and harmless substance in the resource base (for example. 
Figure 1. Scheme for materials flow from and to the resource base in a 
specific region (adapted from Ayers and Kneese, 8, p. 285) 
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the bio-chemical reactions on organic residuals in water). In the 
case of insufficient time, such conversions cannot take place amd 
the residual may render the resources in the resource base less 
useful for specific uses and users (i.e., change the quality of 
the resources). Residuals may, however, also be removed from the 
region under consideration, thus removing the need to pi em the 
discharge therefrom when no control is enforced from external 
sources. The residuals which are moved over space from the plamning 
sphere of one entity (i.e., a firm, region, or country) may effect 
the quality of resources of other entities (i.e., firms, regions, 
or a country). The inclusion of these residuals in the planning 
sphere of an entity from which it originates is the central thesis 
of this study. 
Qualitative scarcity of a resource may have a root in the char­
acteristics of the resource base. An example is saline groundwater. 
In terms of the environmental quality problem, this scarcity is, how­
ever, a function of another natural resource: the assimilative 
and removal capacity of the environment. Tendencies to concentrate 
economic activity either by intensive production methods or by 
concentrating the population in spyecific locations (89, pp. 493-568) 
violate the spatial and temporal accommodations for residual change 
and removal. An increase in per capita demand for services from 
natural resources (due to an increase in the level of living) may 
produce a proportional long-run effect on the emission of residuals 
(33, p. 267). If the planning of resource use excludes the 
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assimilative emd removal capacity of the environment (A.R.C.E. in 
further discussions) as a scarce resource, then a mal-allocation 
of resources may result because too few resources would be allocated 
for the control of residual emission. 
In controlling its own residuals, the firm or individual may 
be motivated to ignore negative effects on the resource base as 
long as the A.R.C.E. keeps its own internal cost of residual 
emission lower than the cost of any alternative, such as waste 
treatment amd recycling.^ This procedure may motivate firms amd 
individuals toward ignoring the A.R.C.E. in planning long after the 
2 
social costs of their actions outweigh the social benefits. A 
portion of these costs (the externality) are shifted to second 
parties, thus allowing the first party to operate under a reduced 
cost structure (i.e., the cost function shifts downward). The 
process has been described as spillover, fallout or external effects, 
and the subsequent failure of the economic system has been described 
by various authors (13), (28), (173). 
The cost of residual emission includes components such as the 
subjective evaluation of the aesthetic, nuisance and health effects 
created by the noise, odor, appearance and other characteristics of 
waste products as well as the effect it may have on production 
processes. 
2 Costs aund benefits in this report refer to both market emd 
nonmarket costs and benefits. Social costs include both internal 
auid external costs, and social benefits include both internal and 
external benefits. 
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Water Quality, Water Scarcity 
and Water Memagement 
The water quality problem 
From these brief and general considerations of natural re­
sources, emphasis is now placed on water as a major natural resource 
whose management is the focus of this study Maoiagement of water is 
approached through considerations of water quality. In the pre­
vious section, the qualitative scarcity of resources was discussed 
within the framework of the ecosystem, amd the ultimate effect of 
residuals on the resource base was indicated. Water is a resource 
which is subject to these processes. Water may be extracted from, 
for example, natural sources, used in a variety of production auid 
consumption processes smd then discarded with distinctly different 
qualitative characteristics than before. These qualitative charac­
teristics may or may not change over time depending on the kinds of 
residuals which were carried into the water sources of other users. 
Residuals entering watercourses may be either degradable or 
nondegradable (103, pp. 13-29). Degradable residuals include 
organic residuals, micro-organisms, and thermal discharges. The 
quauntity cind characteristics of these residuals are altered over 
time and space by the biochemical, chemical, amd physical charac­
teristics of the natural waters. Nondegradable residuals include 
inorgai'iic solids, inorganic chemicals, and sediment. With a given 
weight of these residuals in a water body, the level of concentra­
tion over time will depend on dilution. The degradation and dilution 
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of residuals entering watercourses is a component of the assimilative 
capacity of the natural environment. Watercourses serve also as 
agents to transport residuals from points of entry to other points 
inside or outside a region. These characteristics enable man to 
use streams for a wide variety of purposes without adverse effects 
for the next users as long as due recognition is given to the 
assimilative and removal capacity defined in time aind space. 
Concentration aoid acceleration of human activities and the 
increase in resource use due to economic growth tend to exceed the 
assimilative and removal capacity of streams. This may have two 
results. First, a larger aanount of residuals enter a stream at a 
specific location, thus extending the time period a stream needs 
to assimilate the new substances, and increasing the disruptive 
effect on the stream ecology; (for example, low dissolved oxygen 
levels due to high orgauiic loads). Second, the closer spacing of 
individuals increases the chances for spillover effects to users 
and uses downstream, and this may result in conflicts between 
members of society. The contemporary water quality problem is to 
resolve these conflicts in em efficient aoid equitable manner. 
Water scarcity emd water quality management 
In order to resolve these conflicts, special emphasis should 
be placed on an approach for the management of water resources. 
Initially, however, the meaning of water raanagsssnt should be 
analyzed. 
Maoiagement is the part of humain action in which the activities 
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of individuals and organizations are influenced toward a specific 
objective. Such influences include a mix of incentives and controls. 
In the science of economics an objective is formulated in terms of 
the maximization of an objective function subject to restricted 
amounts aoid qualities of resources. Mauiagement calls for the 
development and execution of plains. There are three major elements 
in the management process; namely, 1) planning, 2) organization amd 
coordination, amd 3) control (129, pp. 66-316; 119, pp. 34-74). 
These elements will be discussed in turn. 
Planning the use of a resource implicates scarcity. What are 
the characteristics of the present problem of water scarcity? The 
growing scarcity of water is observed in the divergence in qualita­
tive demands. The physical, biological, and chemical requirements 
of the demaind for water vary with its use demands; i.e., drinking, 
effluent transport, swimming and recreation, wildlife habitat or 
food processing. F.or each use water may possess a different 
marginal value product (184, pp. 38-39). For example, studies in 
Arizona indicated that personal income per acre-foot of water is 
$14 for grains, $80 for intensive crops, $3886 for utilities, and 
$82,301 for mauiufacturing (215, p. 10; 41, p. 51). Due to natural 
amd humam action, the qualities of water may differ in different 
locations. Nature may affect the quality of water through differ­
ences in vegetation, the characteristics of the basic materials of 
the soils amd rocks over which the water flows, as well as the 
stream ecology (165, pp. 7-99). Humam activity may cause 
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differentiations between different localities due to the variations 
in the type of economic activities, and, therefore, the chairacteris-
tics of residuals entering a water body. Water can, therefore, be 
viewed as a group name for a set of characteristics defined accord­
ing to water quality. The planning element of management should, 
therefore, aim at an optimal allocation of these scarce resources 
(i.e., the different qualities of water) between a variety of uses 
with different marginal value products. 
The organization-coordination element of water quality 
management is concerned with the establishment of structures and 
institutions within which the daily management activities can be 
carried out. These structures auid institutions should facilitate 
the recommendations received from the planning element so that 
planning proposals can be accommodated. For this reason, it is 
important that the functioning and characteristics of structures 
and institutions should be changeable depending on the management 
needs. 
Both the planning and the orgaoiizational-coordination facets 
of water quality management should recognize the close association 
of water quality management with the overall water management 
problem. Timmons indicates that: "... the effects of this use 
of water must be anailyzed in terms of other uses to which water 
may be put" ( 184, p. 49). This observation is emphasized by the 
physical structures of water management. The building of a reser­
voir may serve the purpose of flood control, the generation of 
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hydro-electricity, irrigation, recreation, wildlife habitat 
enhancement, as well as flow regulation for water quality control 
(103, p. 307). Land treatment practices may serve flood control 
(153) and water quality control (174). Water quality management 
is part and parcel of the general water management problem due to 
the special characteristics of the problem (qualitative scarcity) 
and due to the instruments available in attacking the problem. 
Some of these instruments are physical (i.e., the above mentioned 
physical structures), some are economic (i.e., payment strategies), 
and some are institutional (i.e., water rights). 
The economic and institutional instruments are closely asso­
ciated with the problem of control. Control is a dynamic concept 
which includes decision-making (i.e., the formulation of an objec­
tive) , the transfer of information concerning possible deviations 
from a plan of action, the provision of incentives for plan 
performance and the specification of penalties for deviations from 
the plan. The water quality problem is an example of a problem of 
control. The polluter, for example, has no incentive to react to 
the costs (externalities) which he imposes inadvertently on the 
downstream user, unless motivated to do so by means of penalties 
and/or other inc%^:ives (i.e., payments). 
In conclusion, water quality management is concerned mainly 
with supplying eui answer to three questions, namely: 
1) How should a set of scarce resources (i.e., different 
qualities of water) be allocated between alternative 
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uses and users? 
2) Who must pay the costs associated with the meoiagement 
of water quality? In aoiswering this question, the costs 
may fall on the polluter, next users, consumers of 
primary or secondary products, or on the taxpayer. The 
final, decision will be dependent on the efficiency and 
fairness resulting from such a decision. 
3) What structures and institutions are required in order 
to carry the plains forward as formulated, as well as 
ensure an optimal (in terms of economic efficiency) and 
fair^ allocation in terms of the scarce water resources 
over time? 
In a presidential message to the Congress of the United States, 
President Nixon stated: "The barriers to long range progress in 
the field of environmental improvement are serious and complex and 
varied. Some are technological, some are economic, some are social, 
some are political. But among the most substantial barriers to 
progress in this area are those which are institutional in nature" 
(42, p. vi). This observation supplies a background for the 
problematic situation emd objectives of this study as developed in 
the next section. 
^The concept "fair" refers to equitable treatment of all the 
users when decisions about reallocations are made. 
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The Problematic Situation and 
Objectives of This Study 
the problematic situation 
This study will concentrate on aspects of water quality in 
a rural setting. The Upper Skunk River Basin in Central Iowa 
will be used as a case study. As was previously indicated, water 
quality is effected by both natural and human action and may, 
therefore, vary from one locality to smother. For this reason it 
can be expected that the characteristics of the problem of water 
quality in Central Iowa may .depend in part on the human activities 
of this region. The kinds of residuals entering the watercourse 
and the quality of water demanded by users arc mainly functions 
of the urban and agricultural activities of the population. 
The water quality problems of Central Iowa are associated 
with the essentially rural character of this region, A few towns 
are sources of urban effluence, but the effect of agricultural 
practices.on water quality is of noteable importance. The 
increasing application of fertilizer emd herbicides, the concentra­
tion of faxm animals in feedlots, sind the danger of sedimentation 
(and associated pollutants) through runoff are examples of activi­
ties which may chsmge water quality. The linkage between these 
activities, the urbaai (and rural) dweller and other economic agents , 
The concept "economic agent" refers to any entity which may 
use water for some economic purpose, i,e,, the use is subject to 
alternative strategies which may serve the same end. 
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duc to changes in water quality, create an atmosphere of uncertainty 
for the entrepreneur and serve as irritants for the general public. 
Such a situation calls for new guidelines in planning, organization-
coordination, and control. 
From the general discussion of the problematic situation it is 
now necessary to delimit the problems under study more closely by 
means of specific hypotheses. In order to identify these problems, 
certain norms should first be accepted. 
The norms of this study 
Two norms will be used as directives for inquiry; namely, 
economic efficiency and equity. In formal terms these norms are 
as follows: 
1) Economic efficiency. 
The norm of economic efficiency will be satisfied in 
this study when social benefits are maximized. This 
will be accomplished by internalizing external costs 
in a regional social benefit maximizing model. 
2) Equity. 
• The norm of equity will be satisfied by the application 
of the concept of Pareto-optimality and associated 
compensation procedures in economic design (136, pp. 
37-59) and by the universal unanimity rule in decision­
making design (29, pp. 11-13). 
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Hypotheses to guide the rescaorch 
The following hypotheses are formulated as a framework for 
this study: 
1) The problem delimiting hypothesis. Deviations between 
the norms emd the existential situation indicate the problematic 
gaps. It is hypothesized that such gaps exist in the management 
of water quality in a rural setting, A gap between the norm of 
economic efficiency.and the existential situation exists due to 
a growing occurrence of spillover effects associated with human 
activities in rural areas. These spillovers (externalities) 
represent a flaw in the economic mechanism, thus preventing the 
development of an economic efficient organization in these areas. 
A gap between the equity norm and the existential situation exists 
due to the transfer of certain costs from first parties to second 
parties. Thus the productivity value of water resources as used 
by second parties is diminished in the form of unpaid costs of the 
first parties. 
2) The diagnostic hypothesis. The gaps that are found between 
the existential situation and the norms can be attributed to two 
causes. First, there is a vague specification of the responsibili­
ties of water users with respect to their rights eind obligations. 
Second, there is am estrangement of certain aspects of the manage­
ment process from individuals most directly associated with water 
resources (i.e., the users). These aspects are the power of 
decision-making and acceptance of responsibility for the outcome 
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of such decisions. 
The problematic gap is no larger than it is because of a growing 
public concern about environmental problems. This concern is clear 
from observations made by officials in high office as Well as through 
the growing body of research concentrating on problems of environ­
ment. Another element of importance in preventing this gap from 
growing larger is the available technology in the area of water 
quality control. 
3) The remedial hypothesis. The remedial hypothesis is that 
two strategies should be followed in solving the problem as de­
limited. First, human activities should be made reactive to inter­
relations (i.e., spillovers) by organizing and coordinating these 
activities into entities which will internalize these interrelation­
ships as well as facilitate the efficient application of modern 
technology in the control of these interrelationships. Second, 
human activities should be coordinated in asi institutional structure 
which will place a special emphasis on the responsibility of the 
individual in the management of water quality. 
Objectives of this study 
In order to understand the nature, magnitude and causes of the 
problem as delimited and to discover and develop alternative solu-
tions through testing the stated hypotheses, this study, will aim 
at achieving the follcvring objectives: 
1) To establish (in theory) the effect of spillovers (i.e., 
residuals) on the efficient smd equitable allocation of 
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water resources; 
2) to develop a model for the optimal combination of 
physical water quality control activities within a 
regional framework for the purpose of maximizing 
social benefits subject to specified quality restric­
tions (this model will use two constituents as am 
exemplary.basis; namely, BOD and sediment); 
3) to apply this model to an exemplary situation in 
Central Iowa (i.e., the Upper Skunk River Basin); 
4) to develop a framework for the control of water 
quality by means of the specification of an institu­
tional structure which will facilitate the norms of 
efficiency and equity; 
5) to suggest future research needs in water quality 
management. 
Procedures for Inquiry 
In pursuing these five objectives this study builds on 
procedures and approaches developed in earlier studies. Recently 
completed studies by Seay (174) and Jacobs (90) of the Department 
of Economics, Iowa State University, researched certain problems 
of water quality within the framework of a watershed in Western 
Iowa. Seay developed a framework for the control of water quality 
(suspended sediment) through regional resource plamning in a water 
supply area. Jacobs extended this procedure by including phosphorus 
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in the planning formulation auid by developing a basis for establish­
ing the feasible quality levels of a water supply. Both Seay said 
Jacobs indicated the urgent need for further research in the 
organization-coordination and control facets of water quality 
management. Seay indicated the need for research on taxing (or 
charges) and cost allocation procedures as well as problems of 
regional delineation (174, p. 120). Jacobs expanded on this by 
indicating a need for an inclusive environmental meinagement system 
(90, p. 151). 
This study will first introduce the physical, economic, and 
institutional dimensions of the problem under study. The theory 
of welfare economics will be used to establish the effect of spill­
overs (i.e., residuals) on the efficient and equitable allocation 
of water resource. The arguments derived from this analysis are 
important in establishing the relevance of certain liability 
rules in water-quality control (i.e., the fairness of the status 
quo). 
A model is then developed to represent certain basic inter­
relationships in the use of water resources. It is argued that 
linear programming, together with its post optimal routines, such 
as parametric programming, may serve as a sufficiently accurate 
simulation of the above-mentioned interrelationships provided 
that the structure of certain engineering models is adapted to 
the assumptions of the technique of linear programming. 
The application of the model involves five groups of water 
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users and/or water suppliers along a single watercourse in Central 
Iowa; namely, the Upper Skunk River Basin. These groups are crop-
farming, feedlots, in-stream uses (such as aesthetics, recreation, 
and wildlife enhancement), urban use, and a meat-packing plant. 
The quality of water supplied and demanded is differentiated. 
Changes in stream characteristics will be simulated with the help 
of existing engineering models, and existing data from engineering, 
agronomy, and economic studies will be used. In cases where such 
data are not available coefficients auid relationships will be 
estimated with the help of specialists in the respective fields. 
A broad framework for institutions in the management of water 
quality is then presented. The structuring of this framework has 
as its aim the achievement of economic efficiency and equity. The 
arguments used in the structuring of this framework are based on 
the universal unanimity rule and the concept of constitutional 
democracy as presented by Arrow (5) and Buchanan-Tullock (29, pp. 
85-96). 
Organization of This Study 
The first chapter introduces the environmental problem in 
general by indicating that the role of all natural resources is 
that of a service (see Figure 1), and that aill inputs will 
ultimately end up as residuals albeit with varying types and 
amounts. These residuals may supply a linkage between uses and 
users in the form of spillovers under certain circumstances. These 
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problems are then related to water quality. The role and need for 
water quality management are specified. The problematic situation 
and objectives of this study are stated and the procedures to be 
used are outlined. 
Chapter II introduces the physical, economic, and institutional 
dimensions in research, and then expemds on the physical dimensions 
of the problem. Chapter III covers the economic and institutional as­
pects. Chapter IV describes the construction of a model to represent 
the basic interrelationships in the pléuining of water quality. The 
application of this model to the Upper Skunk River Basin is pre­
sented in Chapter V. The interpretation of the results of the 
application of this model is presented in Chapter VI. In Chapter 
VII a design for institutions is presented. The summary, conclu­
sions aind recommendations follow in Chapter VIII. 
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CHAPTER II. THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 
WATER QUALITY PROBLEM 
Understanding and solving water quality problems necessitates 
an analysis embracing three dimensions, namely: 1) the physical 
possibilities, 2) the economic feasibilities, aaid 3) the institu­
tional permissibilities. Timmons introduced this three-dimensional 
framework in the study and development of water and other land re­
sources (185), and results of recent applied studies demonstrate 
its usefulness (90, 174). Physical research supplies the data for 
economic analysis, but the economic framework specifies the need 
for physical data (189, p. 668). The quality of conclusions from 
economic analysis are, therefore, highly dependent on the quality 
of physical research. Institutional shortcomings may prevent the 
application of results of economic and physical research. By in­
cluding the institutional dimension in planning, important 
strategies are introduced into the planning framework. 
The present chapter concentrates on the physical characteris­
tics of the water quality problem in order to identify the tech­
nologically possible alternatives available to the planner. The 
quamtitative and qualitative character of the water quality problem 
are reviewed as well as alternative possibilities for attacking the 
problem. 
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The Physical Characteristics of the Problem 
Water is never absolutely pure in the natural state, but may 
1 differ qualitatively from place to place due to natural phenomena. 
2 
This fact presents a problem for exponents of "natural quality" as 
a norm for improving polluted waters (2, pp. 257-264). Qualitative 
problems in water are manifested by damaging deviations from an 
existing (or historical) quality rather than by deviations from a 
hypothetical "natural" quality. A water quality problem may develop 
when the qualitative characteristics of water are changed to such 
an extent that the existing uses (and users) of water are adversely 
3 
affected. 
Water caui serve a variety of purposes. These uses may require 
different qualities of water and may have different effects on the 
quality of the water. In the case of a watercourse (the object of 
For a discussion of the effect of the natural environment on 
water quality, see Franz Ruttner, Fundamentals of Limnology (165, 
pp. 7-99). 
2 The concept "natural quality" assumes that the qualitative 
characteristics of water found in nature (i.e., streams, aquivers) 
is such that it will be equally useful to all users and uses. It 
is only the activities of man which may pollute it (i.e., render it 
less useful to some users and uses). 
3 
Another problem is the elimination of future use options by 
allowing a water body to deteriorate beyond renewability (i.e., 
inter temporal spillovers). An example is the eutrophication of 
lakes. Problems of nonrenewability are of utmost importaunce in 
resource pleuining, but this study will only concentrate on inter-
spatial spillovers in order to study aspects of social interaction 
in water quality plsmning. 
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research in this study), linkages will develop through time and 
space along the watercourse. Table 1 shows the kinds of residuals 
emitted as a by-product of certain uses. In the last column of 
Table 1, a short summary of the effects of these residuals on other 
uses is presented.^ 
Considering the potential sources of pollutamts for the Upper 
Skunk River, as discussed in Chapter I, it can be expected that 
the most prevailing pollutant categories in this region would be 
those of organic wastes, infectious agents, synthetic organic 
chemicals, inorgauiic substances and sediments (see Table 1), The 
uses which are affected by these categories are, in general, those 
of wildlife habitat, recreation, and in the case where towns 
utilize the stream as a source of water supply, utilities. 
Trends affecting water quality in a rural setting 
Agriculture is involved in the present problems of the 
environment. Table 1 indicates this involvement in most of the 
categories of pollutants. 
One of the salient innovations of modern farming is the in­
creasing application of chemical eind biochemical factors of 
production in order to enhaoice production per acre and to control 
unwanted pests and weeds (see Table 2 amd Table 3). It is almost 
unthinkable today for a modern farmer to produce without these 
The term "pollutauit" is used in this table because it is 
assumed that a damaging effect is associated with the inflow of 
each of the residuals. 
Table 1. Selected elements of water quality^ 
Pollution Pollutant Source of Pollutant 
category 
Organic 
wastes 
Municipal sewage, 
organic industrial 
wastes 
Municipal sewer 
systems, industrial 
water discharges, 
agricultural lands, 
animal wastes 
Infectious 
agents 
Pathogenic 
organisms - virus 
Municipal and 
industrial wastes, 
animal wastes 
Plant 
nutrients 
Aquatic plants Aquatic growth -
nutrients 
Synthetic 
orgamic 
chemicals; 
Detergents, 
pesticides, 
industrial 
chemicals 
Industrial runoff, 
industrial and 
municipal waste 
discharges 
Illustrative Effects on Use 
Adverse effects on fish and 
aquatic life, recreation; 
septic conditions; water 
treatment difficulties 
Hazards to human and einimal 
health 
Water treatment difficulties, 
nuisamce, taste, odor, colora­
tion, chemical and physical 
changes in water environment, 
toxicity to fishlife, 
increased BOD 
Tastes, odors, impairment of 
industrial use, toxicity to 
aquatic life, potential 
effects on health 
Inorganic 
chemical and 
mineral 
substances 
Bicarbonates, Mining, manufacturing. 
carbonates; cal- oil field, agricultural 
cium* magnesium; operations, natural 
saline substamces, sources; emimal wastes 
acids, acid salts; 
other elements 
including trace 
elements 
Ability of water to neutralize 
acid wastes. Scaling; excessive 
soap consumption, taste effects. 
Adverse effects oh municipal, 
industrial, irrigation use. 
Corrosion of equipment, toxicity 
to aquatic life 
Sediments Suspended 
materials 
Surface runoff; 
municipal and 
industrial wastes 
Erosion of equipment, reduction 
of fishlife, water treatment 
difficulties; reduction in 
chaainel reservoir capacity 
Radio­
activity 
Radioactive 
substances 
Nuclear test fallout, 
mining, processing, 
use of radioactive 
materials 
Human health effects M Ul 
Temperature Heat Industrial cooling 
waters, water 
impoundment 
Decrease in coolant effective­
ness; adverse effects on 
aquatic life, changes in water 
chemistry 
^Adapted from: Assessment of the adequacy of water supplies-water quality aspects, 
Cornell University (37, p. 27). 
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Table 2. Estimated nitrogen and phosphate applications on 
selected crops and percent of harvested crops 
receiving, U.S., 1947, l'-54 and 1969^ 
Year 
Application/acre 
N 
^2^5 
pounds 
Pet. harvested 
acres receiving 
N % 
percent 
1947 
1969 
Corn for grain 
10 23 44 
109 62 92 
44 
87 
1947 
1969 
5 
39 
Wheat 
25 
34 
18 
55 
18 
42 
1954 
1969 
4 
11 
Soybeains 
40 
44 
17 
19 
17 
26 
Source : 
( 128). 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Development 
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Table 3, Farm expenses on herbicides and pesticides for the 
United States, for selected ysars^ 
Year Expense Percentage of 
total current expense 
Million dollars Percent 
Average: 
1950-54 180 0.8 
1960 290 1.5 
1965 530 2.5 
1968 680 2.8 
1969 730 2.8 
Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A., Farm Cost Situation, 
F.C.S. 42 (199). 
factors, and so-called "orgamic farms" are viewed by the man on 
the street as an eccentric fad. These "new" factors of produc­
tion represent, however, a potential threat to environmental 
quality in general and water quality in particular. An example 
of such a threat is the enrichment of water courses smd lakes. 
A partial result of such enrichment is that the water is rendered 
less useful for certain uses such as irrigation (because of 
brackishness ) or for humaoi consumption (because of taste auid odor 
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problems). Enrichment has also a marked effect on aquatic life (205, 
pp. 63-67). For example, one of the problems of water quality is 
the control of algae growth. Algae growth is related to the nitrogen-
phosphorus ratio in water (57, pp. 90-91). The potential danger to 
the environment due to runoff from agricultural fields is thereby 
enhauiced. The changes in the application of nitrogen and phos­
phates in the production of certain crops axe presented in Table 
2 for selected years. 
Two chemges can be observed from Table 2. There was an 
increase in the rate of application aoid an increase in the percentage 
of crops receiving fertilizer between 1947 and 1969. The extent 
these increases can relate to water quality remains a question. 
For example, the natural fertility of soils may present problems 
in establishing the source of nutrient residuals.^ It was ob­
served by some that ,crop production is still in the "mining stage", 
meaning more nutrients are removed thsm replaced (126, 171). One 
soil scientist remarked that increasing rates of fertilizer ap­
plication can result in a decrease of the enrichment of watercourses 
(207). He relates his argument to an increase in vegetative cover. 
An approach toward managing fertilizer runoff is through the 
control of soil erosion. This procedure will be discussed later 
1 Prof. W. D. Shrader, Dept. of Agronomy, Iowa State University, 
noted that it is possible to establish the nutrient residuals of 
fertilizer applications for specific crops. To relate these resid­
uals to the quality of watercourses and wells with the help of general 
coefficients or models, is at the present state of the arts, not 
possible. (Personal communication, Msurch 1971). 
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in this chapter. There are also other approaches, such as 
fertilizer management (i.e., minimizing soil nitrogen during the 
colder months) (126, p. 152), aoid chaaiges in the rate of application 
(128), but the present state of the arts prevents the formulation 
of workable causal models for predicting fertilizer runoff. 
The changes which occurred in the application of herbicides 
and pesticides in farming are presented in Table 3 for selected 
years since 1950. These factors of production became notably 
more important during that time. The problems of predicting the 
environmental effects of these increases in application are even 
more complex than those of fertilizer. There is a continuous in­
novation of complex organic substances with different potential 
effects on water quality (48, 145, 155). Erosion control may 
again serve as a relevant strategy in preventing these constituents 
from entering the watercourses. This statement will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
An indication of the raoige of potential effects which may 
result from animal wastes was summarized in Table 1. The tendency 
to concentrate farm aunimals in relatively small operational units 
is another innovation with potentially profound effects on the 
water quality of regions where such concentrations may occur. 
Animal waste may accumulate for weeks on a feedlot where it may 
afterwards be flooded into a stream during a rainstorm. A recent 
publication of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration 
allocates one volume to this problem (61). They discussed also 
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another factor which might accelerate the establishment of feed-
lots, namely; the steady rise in the total consumption of livestock 
products.^ It can, therefore, be expected that the trend toward 
feedlots in livestock production will continue into the future. 
Such a trend for cattle feedlots in Iowa is clear from Table 4. 
Although a decrease in the total number of feedlots is reported 
for the years since 1962, the number of larger feedlots increased 
noteably during that time. 
The above-mentioned trends in agricultural practices should 
be a central consideration in water quality management. These 
trends cause deviations from the historical qualities of water, 
and this may result in external costs which affect second parties. 
Such a situation violates both norms of economic efficiency amd 
equity as discussed in Chapter I. 
Other factors of importaaice for the management 
of water quality in a rural-urban setting 
The changes in agricultural practices due to technological 
innovation may represent a growing threat to the environment. 
These chemges are, however, not the only threat to water quality 
in rural areas. Variations in the day-to-day practices on the 
^Statistics indicate an increase in the per capita demand 
for such products as beef and poultry and in the overall pro­
duction of these products in the U.S.A. (201, 200). For example, 
in 1959, 13.3 billion pounds of beef were produced compared to 
21.2 billion pounds in 1969. For chicken these figures were 5.5 
billion and 9.7 billion pounds respectively. 
Table 4. Number of cattle feedlots in Iowa by size of feedlot and total cattle marketed 
from feedlots, 1962-1970^ 
Feedlot capacity Total 
Year 
1,000 1,000-1,999 2,000-3,999 4,000-7,999 8,000-15,999 All feedlots 
1,000 
No. head 
sold 
No. 
1,000 
head 
sold 
No. 
1,000 
head 
sold 
No. 
1,000 
head 
sold 
No. 
1,000 
head 
sold 
No. 
1,000 
head 
sold 
1962 49,964 2,604 33 66 3^ 17 50,000 2,687 
1963 48,964 2,950 31 59 5"^ 24 49,000 3,033 
1964 47,949 3,158 45 88 6^ 28 48,000 3,174 
1965 46,939 3,164 49 85 12^ 45 47,000 3,293 
1966 45,913 3,387 68 113 12 36 7b 44 46,000 3,580 
1967 45,860 3,790 95 133 31 66 11 48 3 20 46,000 4,057 
1968 45,835 4,024 113 160 35 80 13 65 4 40 46,000 4,369 
1969 43,837 4,131 106 176 38 104 15 84 4 54 44,000 4,549 
1970 41,829 4,124 88 150 57 140 21 105 5 65 42,000 4,584 
Source: U.S.D.A., S.R.S. (201). 
^Figures reported include larger lots in order to prevent disclosing production 
figures of individual lots. 
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farm and in the economic life of a region may chemge the quality 
of water in a random manner. Various lemd practices, (i.e., 
tillage auid erosion control), may affect the intrusion of sediment 
in streams. These practices may, therefore, magnify the environ­
mental impact of fertilizer aaid herbicide-pesticide applications.^ 
The effect of suspended sediment on water quality is, in 
itself, widespread. There are various problems associated with 
sedimentation. The useful storage of a reservoir may be diminished, 
turbines in hydroelectric plants may be eroded, and public and 
individual water supplies may have to be given extra treatment 
in order to diminish the suspended solid content of water supplies 
to acceptable levels. High sediment loads may also affect the 
aesthetic and recreational value of streams. Aquatic life is 
affected when spawning nests are covered with sediment (57, pp. 
102-105). Land practices may, therefore, be associated with a 
variety of cases where the historical quality of water is affected. 
Changes in the economic life of a rural region may also affect 
the quality of water. A shift of population may increase or de­
crease the concentration and amount of effluent entering some 
points in a stream depending on the characteristics of the shifts 
between communities. New industries may be introduced, based on 
the resources of the region, thereby increasing the demand for and 
changing the qualities of water in the stream. 
^This statement will be discussed under the section covering 
water quality constituents. 
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These variations from the historical quality of water may 
result in a conflict between the existing uses and users of water 
and the new entrants. The possible transfer of costs associated 
with such chamges can result in gaps between the norms of efficiency 
and equity and the existential situation. 
The effect of the stream environment on residuals 
The discussions about residuals assumed up to this point that, 
a direct relation between the discharge of residuals and the 
changes in water quality exists. In general this is not the case 
because various changes may be affected upon residuals depending 
on the chemical, physical, biochemical, and biological reactions 
of the water. These reactions may change the form and concentration 
of residuals (30, p. 287; 57, p. 17). 
As indicated in Chapter I residuals entering a watercourse 
may either be degradable or nondegradable. The rate of degradation 
and dilution may, however, be affected by a variety of stream 
conditions. First, the flow in a watercourse has a seasonal 
character. Second, in addition to seasonal variations, there 
can be a strong remdom character in streamflow due to, for example, 
rainfall. Third, there are diurnal and hourly variations in water 
use patterns with the associated changes in the amount of effluent 
entering a watercourse (16, pp. 2-3). Fourth, constituents may 
interact through chssical and s:icrc=biclcgical actions (30, pp. 4S= 
59) and may, therefore, complicate certain general planning-assump-
tions such as additivity and linearity. In addition to these four. 
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there is a wide vaoriety of other factors, such as temperature, and 
algae growth that may effect the rate of progression of degradable 
residuals (57, pp. 136-221). 
Predicting the ultimate effect of the discharge of residuals 
into a watercourse is clearly a complicated affair. It is, there­
fore, necessary to present a review of the constituents to be used 
in this study as indicators of water quality. There are two basic 
questions to be answered about these constituents; namely: First, 
why were these constituents chosen as indicators? Second, what are 
the characteristics of the progression of these residuals toward 
and in a stream? 
Water Quality Constituents 
to be Used in This Research 
In the recently completed investigation by Jacobs concerning 
methods and procedures for developing relevemt quad.ity levels for 
a water supply entity, a decision framework was established for the 
specification of relevant constituents in water quality maoiagement 
(90, p. 141). The determinant of relevant constituents is the 
physical linkage of water uses and users. The operational procedure 
is to establish the effect on water quality due to the preceding 
uses and the quality desired by the next uses. This approach will 
be implicit in the subsequent analysis. Biochemical oxygen demand 
amd sediment, introduced into a surface watercourse through urban 
effluent, packing plaint effluent and agriculturaJ. runoff, will 
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serve as an exemplary basis to establish linkage between economic 
agents along the watercourse. 
Organic residuals emd BOD 
One of the oldest parameters for water quality is a so-called 
dilution factor. For example, it was estimated in 1890 that the 
minimum required dilution in a stream is 2.5 cusecs per 1000 
population. Other researchers quoted 4 cubic feet per 1000 
population (52, pp. 10-11). The reciprocal of the dilution factor 
is the load factor in which the residual load in a river is ex­
pressed in terms of population equivalents per volume of stream 
flow. These approaches were all rules of the thumb and may be 
used in combination with more sophisticated approaches, such as 
the BOD load. 
The biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) is a measure for estab­
lishing the concentration auid amount of decomposable organic 
residuals. BOD is used to determine the dissolved oxygen con­
centration of a sample at an initial time of sampling and at 
spaced incubation periods. This method is based on knowledge 
about the activities of aerobic micro-organisms in a stream. 
Aerobic micro-organisms digest the orgamic residuals in a stream, 
thereby chemging it to a less offensive form. During this proc­
ess, the available dissolved oxygen (DO in short) is used giving 
rise to a phenomenon called the oxygen sag. The decline in DO 
may have a damaging effect on aquatic life. If the level of DO 
declines further, it may result in anaerobic activity. The 
CURVE FOR TOTAL DEMAND 
(Carbonaceous + Nitrogenous BOD 
Second Stage BOD 
CURVE FOR CARBONACEOUS DEMAND 
First Stage BOD 
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Incubation Time In Days 
Figure 2. BOD-curve (adapted from Dougal e_t (57, p. 141) 
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auiaerobic bacteria will then digest the orgamic matter in the 
absence of oxygen, and some of the adverse effects will be odors 
and unsightly conditions (30, p. 240), 
Due to the fact that BOD is a result of biological activity 
over time, it cam be expected that BOD readings may differ due 
to the spacing of incubation periods as well as other factors 
which may affect the micro-organisms more directly (i.e., tempera­
ture emd toxic substances). The most common measure for BOD is 
the five-day BOD at 20°C, also indicated as BODg (30, p. 243). The 
BOD loads in a stream cam also be divided into the first stage 
BOD, called the carbonaceous BOD, and the second stage BOD, called 
nitrogenous BOD. The nitrogenous BOD is the result of the activi­
ties of nitrification bacteria, chamging ammonia to nitrite and 
nitrite to nitrate. In Figure 2, this process is presented. 
In this study, BOD is used as a general indicator for 
aesthetics aind cleanliness (i.e., infectious agents). It is 
assumed that the infectious agents will be introduced into the 
watercourses by meams of the inflow of organic residuals (i.e., 
urbain effluent, meat-packing plant effluent, and feedlot runoff). 
Such am approach is acceptable in terms of certain proposals 
presented by agencies of the Federal Government ( 63, p. 32). 
The reaeration of a stream is a counteraction to BOD. The 
oxygen sag curve, as presented in Figure 3, is the difference 
between the BOD and reaeration. Stream reaeration cam take place 
through the natural action of streamflow. It cam also be affected 
Point Of Pollution Loading 
—1— — 
Dissolved Oxygen At Saturation 
OXYGEN SAG CURVE 
'^OXYGEN SUPPLY CURVE 
DEOXYGE NATION CURVE 
INCUBATION TIME IN DAYS 
Figure 3. Oxygen sag curve adapted from Anderson (3, p. 143) 
39 
by algae growth and temperature. These factors complicate the 
formulation, of ain accurate model of BOD progression. 
Sediment 
The choice of sediment as am indicator constituent^ for this 
study is, first, due to its potential impact on water quality 
through its physical presence (as discussed earlier), auid second, 
due to the various substances which may be adsorbed to the sediment 
particles. Sediment may serve as a transport agent for a wide 
variety of constituents. For example, research workers agree 
that nutrient losses through erosion and surface runoff represent 
a major source of enrichment of watercourses (207, 126). Sediment 
serves as a carrier of phosphorus, and surface runoff may remove 
organic nitrogen in the form of plant aoid animal residuals (83). 
As with nutrient runoff, there exists a positive relation between 
runoff and pesticide aoid herbicide residuals in watercourses. This 
relationship is used in current research to study, for instance, 
the control of pesticide intrusion in watercourses with the help 
of soil conservation practices (146, p. 191). 
This study applies the results of relationships in the move­
ment of soils as developed by Wischmeier amd Smith (214). There 
are, however, certain problems associated with direct application 
of these results. Wischmeier and Smith developed a so-called 
The concept "indicator constituent" refers to a constituent 
which may be used as am indicator of the potential presence of 
other constituents which are associated with it. 
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universal soil-loss equation. This equation was developed for 
the purpose of predicting long-term (25 years or more) average 
losses of soil (174, p. 18; 214, p. 41). The prediction of the 
losses from individual storms or for individual years are less 
reliable (214, p. 43). Another problem with the "universal soil-
loss equation" is that it was developed for individual fields. 
This study is concerned with predicting sedimentation within a 
region and for this purpose results obtained from the universal 
soil-loss equation will be less reliable. Topography, soils and 
lauid use patterns may vary considerably within a region, and ag­
gregation may ignore such variations. Another problem is to 
estimate the actual amount of sediment to be delivered to a 
stream. An adjustment will be necessary for deposits in, for 
example, depressions and chauinels. Because factors for such ad­
justments have not been evaluated an average delivery ratio will 
1 
need to be estimated with the help of engineers. 
Sediment is a nondegradable substance, but due to the 
different sizes of particles, there can be considerable variations 
in the amount of sediment transported by water. The sediment load 
2 in a stream can be divided into a suspended load and a bed load. 
^Johnson, H. P., Professor of Agricultural Engineering, Iowa 
State University. Personal communication. June 1971. 
2 Suspended load refers to sediment in suspension and bed load 
to sediment which has settled on the stream bed. 
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The bed load is a complicating factor. Determinations of sediment 
concentrations is dependent on suspended sediment sampling data. 
The total effect of soil erosion on water quality is, therefore, 
obscured. In his analysis of sediment transport in streams, Seay 
came to the conclusion that there has been no major breakthrough 
in recent years with respect to a rational approach in the estima­
tion of sediment transport (174, pp. 19-24).^ He then made two 
simplifying assumptions regarding sediment transport: first, 
suspended sediment data will be taiken as a measure of the total 
sediment load of a stream; second, sediment yields aoid delivery 
ratios will be used "in reverse" when am ultimate source of 
sediment needs to be predicted. He defended his assumptions on 
the basis of existing research results concerning the character 
of sediment from gully and sheet erosion ("it tends to be so fine 
as to have only a small amount of bedload") and because bedload 
consists of a small percentage (less than 15%) of the overall 
sediment in transport in Iowa streeuns (174, p. 24). These as­
sumptions will also apply to applications of the universal soil-
loss equation in this research. 
Measuring the impact of the constituents on water quality 
Although a knowledge of the presence of certain constituents 
2 in water may indicate the existence of "good" and "bad" in water 
^Also see 93, pp. 14-16. 
2 
"Good" aund "bad" in terms of a specific norm, i.e., the 
water quality criterion. 
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quality for specific uses aind users, the impact of changes in water 
quality should be specified. Some analysts of the water quality 
problem use a "damage function" to illustrate the effect of 
chsmges in water quality (98, pp. 62-67). Such a "damage function" 
will be difficult to establish in the real world because individual 
users will be reluctant to disclose the true effect of chamges in 
water quality on their processes (132). Agencies in control of 
water quality rely, therefore, on quality criteria when establish­
ing standards. These criteria are scientifically established re­
quirements for designated uses (63, p. vii). This is am "all-or-
nothing" approach in establishing the impact but conforms in general 
with practices in industries where water is treated in order to 
ensure a uniform quality. Conformity with specific criteria is 
analagous to a damage function of zero elasticity at the specified 
quality level. 
This study also uses specified quality criteria. Such an 
approach is not limiting because a damage function can be developed 
from a system's model (i.e., linear programming) by means of 
paraimetric routines. The establishment of a damage function will, 
however, be highly dependent on the complete specification of all 
the physical alternatives for the control of water quality. As 
indicated later in this study, such a complete specification is 
not possible with the data which are at present available. 
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Physical Alternatives for the 
Management of Water Quality 
It was indicated previously that specific quality criteria 
can be used as norms for designated water uses. There are a 
variety of strategies in attaining these norms which may be grouped 
into one or more of the following categories; 
1) changés in the production process and level of activity 
of the individual producer; 
2) prevention of residuals from entering a watercourse; 
3) treatment of residuals and water in order to change 
it into a less harmful form; 
4) finding alternative sources of water supply for the 
water user; and 
5) increasing the minimum flow of a stream. 
Changes in the production process 
An example of the first strategy can be found in a study by 
Mayer aaid Hargrove where they investigated the changes in 
agricultural production if certain factors of production with an 
environmental impact are controlled (128). An analogous example 
concerning meat packing was found in a survey by the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Administration in 1967. This administra­
tion established that general production technology at a meat 
packing plant may affect the characteristics of the residuals in 
the effluent (60). 
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Preventing residuals from entering watercourses 
Soil conservation is an exemple of this strategy. This 
strategy may be a feasible alternative for all economic activi­
ties if an alternative sink for the residuals exists. Cities 
and industries, for example, may dump residuals in the sea, in 
underground reservoirs, or ship it to the moon, if it is tech­
nically possible, economically feasible, and if the alternative 
does not create equal or worse environmental problems. This 
strategy has widespread use in practice. Residuals caoi be stored 
on site in periods of low streamflow to be released selectively 
when conditions improve, Plauining cem also keep residuals on the 
site of economic activity. For example, residuals from ainimals 
can be prevented from entering watercourses by removing it from 
the feedlot autid applying it as fertilization to agricultural 
lands.^ The layout of feedlots can be constructed in order to 
check runoff (135, 45). 
Treatment of residuals and water 
This strategy cam be applied to such cases as feedlots, 
meat-packing plants, and municipal effluent. There are two 
systems for the treatment of feedlot residuals; naunely, the dry 
system and the wet system. The dry system minimizes runoff by 
There are dangers in using this method, depending on how 
much is applied, where it is applied, how it is applied, and 
when (time of year) it is applied (135, 138). 
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removing moisture from the animal residuals. According to Moore, 
this system is extensively used in the drier southwestern parts of 
the United States (138, p. 289). Some other methods under the dry 
system are drying auid incinerating. Two approaches under the wet 
system are anaerobic amd aerobic treatment (138, 118). Animal 
waste has a high solids content and high oxygen demand (118, pp. 
30-35), sind this indicates that anaerobic treatment cam be success­
ful. Organisms in emaerobic treatment use inorgamic compounds other 
tham oxygen in respiration. Nitrates, sulfates, and carbonates are 
commonly used in respiration (138, p. 291), and gases, such as 
methane, are released.^ Anaerobic digestion requires a relatively 
high temperature; low temperatures may affect its efficiency (118, 
pp. 72-73). Aerobic treatment is feasible when the rate of oxygen 
tramsfer in solution is not a limiting factor amd shallow oxidation 
ponds (about 4 feet in depth) cam be used. Wind action, tempera­
ture, depth, amd amount of sunlight (for algae growth) will, how­
ever, affect the treatment. Mechanical aerators can be used to 
enhamce the oxygen supply (206, pp. 37-49). 
The treatment of residuals from meat-packing plants is 
amalogous to that of municipal effluent (60). The treatment 
processes for both the packing plamt and urbam effluents can be 
divided into four stages (16, pp. 25-32): 
^Miner, J. R., Dept. of Agricultural Engineering, Iowa 
State University, Personal Communication. May 1971. 
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1) Preliminary treatment: includes coarse screening, grit 
removal, comminution, amd preaeration. This treatment 
does not have a significaint effect on the residuals. 
2) Primary treatment: includes processes that reduce 
floating aind suspended solids by mechamical or gravita­
tional means. The most common processes are fine 
screens aind sedimentation taunks. Primary treatment 
cam remove 98-99 percent of settleable solids and SO-
SO percent of the BOD. 
3) Secondary treatment: includes biochemical processes to 
reduce the suspended and dissolved solids further. The 
trickling filter and activated sludge methods are 
examples of secondary treatment techniques. Secondary 
treatment can remove 70-95 percent of the suspended 
solids aind 60-90 percent of the BOD.^ 
4) Tertiary treatment: includes adsorption, electro-
dialysis, extraction, foaming amd ion exchange as 
typical processes. Tertiary treatment can improve on 
the efficiency of BOD removal, but the main purpose of 
this process is to remove refractory organic and in­
organic substances. 
Water treatment may be a feasible alternative to effluent 
^Baumemn, E. R., Dept. of Civil Engineering, Iowa State 
University, Personal communication. March 1971. 
47 
treatment depending on the relative costs of the two strategies, 
i.e., the cost of water treatment is lower than that of effluent 
treatment. In the case of water treatment, there is an added 
beneficial factor in that the assimilative capacity of the stream 
(a scarce resource) is exploited. 
Finding alternative sources of water supply 
It may be rational in certain circumstances to consider 
alternative sources of water supply rather than to enforce a 
stringent quality standard on an upstream user. In such a situa­
tion, the cost of exploiting the alternative source will be less 
than the cost of effluent or water treatment. 
Increasing the minimum streamflow 
This strategy is derived from the knowledge of the effect of 
reaeration on biological activity as well as the dilutive effects 
of larger volumes of water. Low flow augmentation is an important 
strategy because of the potential scale economies associated with 
this approach. An example of this strategy can be found in the 
proposals for the construction of a reservoir in the Skunk River, 
north of Ames (4). 
The physical characteristics of the water quality problem, as 
presented in this chapter, present certain directives for inquiry 
into the economic and institutional dimensions of meuiagement 
problems. First, it was argued that certain farming practices may 
lead to spillovers, but the way such spillovers may lead to 
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inefficiencies and inequities in the economic system still needs 
proof. Second, it was noted that the concept "historical quatlity" 
is of major importance when the effect of residuals is measured. 
How can such a concept be combined with the arguments of externaULi-
ties in economic theory? Chapter III considers the above-mentioned 
problems, and presents an outline of institutions as means for the 
control of water quality. 
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CHAPTER III. THE ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF THE WATER QUALITY PROBLEM 
In Chapter II, the physical dimension of the water quality 
problem was identified as an action by a first party (i.e., first 
in time and space), which results in changes in the historical 
quality of water, thereby affecting next uses and users. Such a 
situation constitutes a social problem because the actions of the 
first party do not affect him alone, but affect other parties also. 
The prevalence of the water quality problem can, therefore, be 
attributed to two possible reasons. First, there may be no tech­
nological meeuis for attacking the problem. However, the available 
technology for water quality control was discussed in Chapter II, 
and it became obvious from the exposition that technological means 
for attacking the problem are available. Second, there may be 
certain shortcomings in the way society organizes group actions ; 
i.e., the various institutions are failing to alleviate the problem. 
This latter proposition is the thesis of this chapter. 
The theory of institutions is, according to Commons, "a 
theory of the part played by collective action in control of 
individual action," (34, p. 1). Control of individual action is 
accomplished by constraining or expanding the range of alternatives 
available to an individual. Such control must be purposeful; 
i.e., it should serve the preferences of a decision-maker as well 
as being functional; i.e., the means should relate to the purpose. 
50 
The first requirement relates to the chauracteristics of social 
interaction and the way institutions react to the needs of society. 
Aspects of this requirement will be discussed later in this chapter 
as well as in Chapter VII. The second requirement relates to the 
chauracteristics and functions of institutions. 
The Characteristics of Institutions 
Institutions are, according to Renne, "... well established 
social structures within which men do collectively the things which 
seem right and proper, in regard to some fundamental interest of 
life" (160, p. 103). Roberts amd Holdren define an institution as: 
. . a system of rules applicable to established practices amd 
generally accepted by the members of a social system" (162, p. 110). 
In general, institutions may consist of two facets. The first 
facet is a system of behavioral rules, while the second is a system 
of structures to serve and propagate these rules. Various forms 
of institutions may exist in a western democracy. Two examples 
of such institutions are the following: 
1) One example is constitutional democracy. Such a 
democracy has a prescribed set of rules according to 
which a society will govern itself amd structures 
(i.e., legislatures, administrations and courts), which 
serve these rules. 
2) The economic system is a second example of an institu­
tion of basic importamce in society. Depending on 
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whether the society prescribes to a socialistic or 
capitalistic organization, certain rules of conduct 
are prescribed, and certain structures (for example, 
property rights, firms, and banks in capitalistic 
societies), are specified to serve these rules. 
Other less obvious forms of institutions are also found in 
society. Codes of conduct for the correct dress and speech in 
certain sections of the population (162, pp. 196-197) and the 
development of "subcultures" based on occupational diversity 
(192, pp. 251-267) are examples of such institutions. These 
institutions also consist of a set of rules aoid a structure to 
serve these rules. For example, the "way-out" dress and form 
of speech in a hippie community may be preserved and observed by 
the commune as the relevant structure. The rules of conduct of 
specific occupational subcultures may be served, for example, by 
professional associations and workers' unions. 
Institutions consist, therefore, of a system of rules 
applicable to established practices which are generally accepted 
by society, in addition to consisting of structures to serve 
these rules. Such structures are required to coordinate and 
organize society toward adherence to these rules. An unsmswered 
question which is now addressed, concerns the functions of 
institutions. 
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The functions of institutions 
There are, according to Roberts et a^., three functions for 
institutions, namely (162, pp. 111-114): 
1) To provide information, 
2) to serve as a constraint, and 
3) to make personal interaction more efficient. 
These functions will be discussed in turn. 
1) To provide information. A decision made by an individual 
in a society may be subject to a wide range of alternative means 
for attaining the objective and a wide range of possible outcomes. 
Such an individual may also have varying degrees of beliefs con­
cerning specific outcome. The existence of an institution may 
serve to limit the means available as well as limit the range of 
possible outcomes. As a limiting case, an institution may specify 
the precise results (162, p. 111). 
An illustration of the importance of the information function 
of institutions is as follows; Without any specification of water 
rights, it may be possible for an upstream user to enlarge his 
profits by increasing his use of a watercourse as a source of 
water and as a medium for the transport of effluent. This may 
effect downstream users qualitatively and qusoititatively. Assume 
that the downstream users do not have any recourse to a court for 
losses occurred. Assume also that the society in which this 
situation exists is without a governmental or legal system which 
may specify the rights of any individueul. The upstream user may 
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then have a variety of outcomes associated with his decision to 
increase his use of the watercourse. Assume further that the 
increase in income from additional water use of $X. The following 
outcomes may accompany his decision; 
1) $X + a shot in the head (or elsewhere) 
2) $X + the kidnapping of his wife or child 
3) $X + losses through arson 
4) $X + losses through thievery 
5) $X + a blue eye or bump on the head 
6) $X + being an outcast 
7) $X + retribution 
8) $X + no retribution 
The first user may have a variety of resources; (i.e., 
including guns, money, amd muscles), which may help him to 
maximize the outcome in his favor. He may also have various 
degrees of belief about the outcome of a specific strategy. 
Assume now that the community in which the various users 
live is strongly religious. They believe as part of their re­
ligion that it is very bad to shoot people or to steal their 
wives, children, and property. In such a situation, the possible 
outcomes for the first user (a very "bad" person) can be confined 
to the last four. 
Now assume in addition that a system of rights (as well as 
the required structures to enforce it) exists where damaged 
parties may have recourse to the courts in order to prove their 
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losses as well as the guilt of the first user. In such a case, 
the first user need only consider the last two outcomes in planning. 
The alternative means available to the first user for attaining his 
objective is also diminished in the same way; (i.e., he cannot 
start shooting and hitting people) when the due process of law 
applies to all damages against second parties. Assume, finally, 
that the first user does not have the right to increase his use 
of the stream. The only outcome in this situation is the second 
to the last; namely, $X + retribution. 
A fringe benefit from this function of institutions (i.e., 
to provide information), is that the cost of the collection of 
information is diminished. The planner needs only to consider a 
few alternatives), and these alternatives are presented to him 
without his searching. 
2) To serve as a constraint. The constraining function of 
institutions links closely with the information function. Insti­
tutions may specify an upper limit for the use of a resource.^ 
This upper limit describes the institutionally feasible levels of 
water use, for example. Such a constraint can be absolute; i.e.. 
In the case where such a restriction is a limitation on the 
maximizing (or minimizing) process, the social cost of such em 
institution will be equal to the shadow price of the restriction. 
"Shadow price" is a concept which is associated with mathematical 
programming applications in economic analysis. It denotes the 
opportunity costs of excluding a resource from or forcing another 
unit of activity into a plan. For an outline of the complete 
argument see Chismg (31, p. 626). 
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it prescribes the exact upper limit to the user. The constraint 
can also be flexible. An example of a flexible constraint is the 
concept of "reasonable usage" in water rights. This concept will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
3) To maike personal interaction more efficient. The worth of 
an institution cam be measured against the function of efficiency. 
If it is assumed that more of a specific service is preferred to 
less, amd the supply of such a service is less under a specific 
institution than under another institution, then society will be 
better off without the first institution.^ 
The function of efficiency links with the arguments of manage­
ment as discussed in Chapter I. It incorporates the elements of 
planning, organization-coordination, and control. A preferred 
institutional form will manage the affair of society the most 
efficiently. 
The management of scarce natural resources is closely linked 
with the choice of aai economic system. In a socialist society, 
the burden for the allocation of natural resources between competing 
uses emd users may be centralized in a plainning bureau. In a free 
It is assumed throughout that a rational society cannot exist 
without some institutional form. Even the emarchist should have as 
an ultimate aim some form of social order. If not, then the 
assumption should be that the anarchist's ultimate aim is chaos. 
Such aim is inconsistent with rational behavior of human beings 
because it is equivalent to destruction of all life. The premise 
which is accepted here is that life is meaningful. 
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enterprise capitalist society, this burden may rest, to a large 
extent, on the shoulders of the individuals who comprise the 
society. Both of these economic systems (i.e., socialist and 
capitalist), may have various rules emd structures which allow 
the systems to function. These rules and structures represent an 
interface^ between the institutions of society and the economic 
objectives of society. 
Economics and the institutional interface 
Economics is a social science which studies the actions of 
individuals and groups of individuals in their processes of pro­
ducing, exchanging emd consuming services that are derived from 
scarce resources. The close interaction between the economic 
activities of man aund the institutions of society was the basis 
of arguments presented by Commons in his treatise on "institutional 
economics" (34). He argued that scarcity necessitates, group action 
because of the conflicts of interest born out of it. Society cam 
accommodate conflicts of interest by means of a variety of insti­
tutions. The allocation of scarce resources by means of the free 
market price system is the result of an objective choice by society 
between alternative systems. It is sanctioned by structures emd 
The concept "interface" as used here refers in part to a 
boundary, but specifically it aims at bringing to the fore the 
idea of close interrelationships between the two sets under 
consideration; i.e., between economic reasoning and institutions. 
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rules created for this specific purpose. 
When choosing an institutional system, the objectives of 
society (for example, economic development), is related to a plan 
of action which is again related to a set of structures for 
organization-coordination and control. These structures supply 
an orderly framework for attaining the objectives. The framework 
of structures (the system of order) is, therefore, dependent on 
the needs of society. Commons declared; "Order, or what I call 
working rules of collective action, a special case of which is 
'due process of law', is itself quite changeable in the history of 
institutions ..." (34, p. 6). A "new harmony of interests" can 
be created by changing the "working rules" of the institutions. 
The free market price system is, therefore, a special case 
of am institutional design for organizing, coordinating, and 
controlling the allocation of scaorce resources. Dahl and Lindblom 
(47), for example, include the free market price system as one of 
the four sociopolitical processes; namely, hierarchy, polyarchy, 
bargaining and the free market price system.^ In choosing the 
free market price system as the relevemt institution for allocating 
scarce resources, society is actually stating that such an 
Hierarchy is a system by which leaders control nonleaders. 
Polyarchy is a system by which nonleaders control leaders. 
Bargaining is a system by which leaders interact for control. The 
free market price system is a process of atomistic bargaining. A 
definition of the free mairket price system is presented in the next 
subsection. 
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institution is more efficient than the available alternatives. 
An inefficiency such as the water quality problem, stipulates, 
therefore, the need for a closer analysis of the functioning of 
the free market price system. 
The Free Market Price System and the 
Efficient Allocation of Resources 
The free market price system may serve as an efficient 
institution for the allocation of resources. The failure of the 
system to accomplish such an objective can be related to two 
reasons; namely, certain of the basic conditions (i.e., premises) 
for optimizing are not satisfied, auid/or the structure of the free 
market system cannot serve an optimizing objective (i.e., there 
are errors or gaps in the logical framework), A review of certain 
arguments for optimizing in a free market economy are consequently 
presented. 
The conditions for the functioning of the free market price 
system as an efficient allocator of resources 
The following assumptions axe relevent to arguments about 
the functioning of the free market price system: 
1) Free market price system; A system where all the 
participants in an economy (i.e., consumers, producers, 
resource holders) are free to formulate indspendsnt 
decisions euid the interaction (baorgaining) between these 
decision-makers leads the economy to a specific equilibrium 
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situation with an optimal set of prices. 
2) Perfect competition: For each homogeneous factor (or 
good) in trade there exists numerous (atomistic) 
participants in em economy, all possessing perfect 
information about market conditions and all can enter 
and exit from the market freely. 
3) Production: Each producer who participates in the 
free market economy is limited to a smooth and convex 
production set. 
4) Consumption: Each consumer is influenced by a smooth and 
convex preference ordering. 
5) Pareto optimality: An allocation of resources is Pareto 
Optimal (P.O.) when it is impossible to change the al­
location of these resources without depriving at least 
one individual. A Pareto-relevaait reallocation of 
resources implicates a movement in which some individuals 
receive an increase in benefits without depriving any 
other individual. 
A P.O. allocation of resources exists when the above-mentioned 
assumptions hold and the following conditions are satisfied (76, 
pp. 202-208; 136, pp. 11-37). 
The exchange optiisiun: 
The marginal rate of substitution between all pairs of goods 
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in the economy should be the same for each participating individual. 
If the ordinal utility function for the i^^ individual is given by: 
(Da U. = u. (Q.^ Q^) 
= Goods consumed; includes primary factors, such as 
own labor (leisure) and produced commodities. 
then the marginal conditions for exchamge optimum are; 
(i)b Sq^ Sq^ 
- T Ô T -  i ô ; -  - - t  
(i,h = 1, . , . , n consumers) 
(j,k = 1, . . . , m goods) 
(P. and P, = price of the and good, respectively) 
J K 
The production optimum: 
The marginal rate of substitution between factor-product, 
factor-factor, product-product should be the same for all partici­
pating firms in the economy. If an implicit production function 
of the h^^ firm is given by: 
(2)a (Qhi ° ° 
<«hin = °hi «hs 
"hs-i-i Ohm 
then the marginal conditions for the production optimum are: 
61 
-
(i,h = 1, . . . , M firms) 
(j,k = 1, ...» m inputs and outputs) 
The top-level optimum: 
The subjective marginal rate of substitution between all pairs 
of goods in the economy should be equal to the marginal rate of 
transformation (objective substitution) for these goods aoid for 
all individuals. These marginal conditions are given by; 
» 
(i = 1, . . . , n consumers) 
(e = 1, . . . , N firms) 
(j,k = 1, . . . , m goods) 
These conditions can also be presented in two dimensions by 
an Edgeworth box diagram (14). The P.O. conditions will then be 
satisfied by all points on the contract curve. From this model 
the role of the price system in establishing an efficient alloca­
tion of resources can be observed. The individual participating 
in the market cauinot influence the market but has to comply with 
the existing systsz of relative prices. The creation of these 
relative prices is instantaneous with the market activities; that 
is, it is automatic and not enforced. 
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Not all sets of market clearing prices, however, are P.O.; 
in a dynamic world this will be the exception rather than the rule 
(17, pp. 107-120). The argument is that tâtonnement procedures 
will tend the system toward a P.O. stable equilibrium. Therefore, 
the free market system presents the plamner with an efficient 
system for organization-coordination in the allocation of natural 
resources when all the assumptions hold.^ A review of the assump­
tions of the perfect competitive model indicates a variety of con-
2 ditions which will result in its failure. Two assumptions are of 
specific importance to the water quality problem: First, em 
explicit assumption that all decisions are independent. This 
assumption relates to the problem of externalities. Second, an 
implicit assumption that all goods cam be traded in the market. 
This assumption relates to the problem of public goods. These 
problems will be discussed in turn. 
Externalities 
The explicit assumption of independence of decision-making is 
violated by spillovers (externalities). This section will discuss 
the resultant failure of the free market price system due to the 
existence of externalities. 
This argument is illustrated by the notion of a separating 
hyperplane in an analysis of production aoid consumption sets (Koop-
mans, 106, pp, 19-33). 
2 See discussion by Bator (14) aaid Reder (159), 
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In the introduction to this study the externalities problem 
was defined as a problem of interdependencies. The formulation 
of a definition for externalities in terms of interdependencies 
only can be self-defeating. In a review of developments on the 
concept of external effects, Mishan correctly warns that the 
economic problem is in essence a problem of interdependencies 
(136, pp. 180-224). Everything depends on everything else. 
External effects arise when relevant effects on production and 
consumption go wholly or partially unpriced (136, p. 184). 
Failure through externalities is a failure of the price system. 
The effect of a change in interdependencies is partially registered 
by the market (the recipient will react) amd tâtonnement towards 
an equilibrium may or may not exist. 
One of the first explorations on externalities appears in 
Marshall's "Principles of Economics" (ca 1890, 125, pp. 266-277), 
Marshall was interested in the external economies resulting from 
business concentration. Pigou, in his "Economics of Welfare", 
cited a variety of cases in which marginal "social net product" 
diverges (1920, 156, p. 149). Although all of these discussions 
used "marginal" concepts in their emalysis, there was a strong 
undertone of what Meade calls the "creation of an atmosphere" 
(131), that is, a total change in resource base for some partici­
pating units. 
The emergence of the Hicksian revolution in the decade of 
the thirties changed the basis for the arguments in welfare 
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economics, leading to the "new welfare economics". Maorginal con­
ditions received more emphaisis in the analysis of external effects. 
A variety of arguments of importance to this study appeared in 
articles on externalities and related subjects since 1952. This 
presented the researcher in environmental problems an operationally 
significant basis for action. Three of these arguments are of 
special importsmce to this inquiry and are consequently summarized: 
(1) Pareto relevant externalities: 
In 1952 Meade gave a full definition of "unpaid factors" 
with the help of marginal analysis (131). He distin­
guished between externalities which arc associated 
with the marginal considerations (unpaid factors) and 
externalities which are extramarginal (creation of 
atmosphere). A decade later Buchsman and Stubblebine 
expanded this definition further in order to arrive at 
the operationally significant concept of Pareto-relevauit 
externalities (28). They presented the usual definition 
of externality: 
(4) . . . X^Y^) 
The utility of individual a is dependent on activities. 
X , . . . , X under his control smd Y, under the 1 m 1 
control of individual b. They defined a Pareto-relevant 
externality as an externality which can be modified in 
such a way that the externally affected party (a) cam 
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be made better off without the. acting party (b) being 
made worse off. 
The control of externalities: 
Writing on the problem of social cost, Coase (1960, 32) 
illustrated procedures to price external effects under 
different assumptions of liability. He argued that 
the total effect should be measured in devising smd 
choosing between social alternatives. The analysis 
by Coase and the presentation of Buchauiaui-Stubblebine 
supplied a sound base for proposals by Kneese (1964, 98 
p. 73) for control measures in water quality management 
Kneese argued that, in terms of opportunity costs, 
charges (payments by polluter) and payments (payments 
to polluter) will result in the same optimum quality 
level for water. The only difference between the two 
measures is that of equity, not efficiency. The 
practical problems associated with these methods will 
not be discussed in this section. 
The institutionalization of externalities; 
Various writers on the subject of externalities, from 
Marshall to Turvey (196), indicated this characteristic 
of externalities. Meade discussed the "creation of at­
mosphere" (131) and Davis-Whinston described "separable 
and "inseparable" externalities (51). The institution­
alization of externalities is a process whereby the 
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tâtonnement procedure in the market tends the system 
toward a P.O. situation with or without compensation to 
any party. This process occurs when the rate of the 
external effect is constant; for example, the quality 
smd quantity of effluent dumped in the river does not 
change. 
Three plemning situations may exist after an externality 
has been institutionalized. 
1) An objective analysis of resource allocation may indicate 
that the new situation (i.e., after institutionalization) 
is less efficient tham some alternative. This situation 
is analogous to arguments against the monopolization of 
resources. A change in resource allocation can be accom­
plished by compensating the parties who are adversely 
affected by such a change. 
2) An objective aoialysis may not indicate conclusively that 
the new situation is less efficient than the old situation 
due to the existence of nonmarket factors (for example, 
aesthetics). In such a situation a change in resource 
allocation can be decided upon by a decision-making body 
(for example, a legislature), smd the relevant compensation 
caoi be paid to parties adversely affected by such a change, 
3) An objective aoialysis may not indicate conclusively that 
the new situation is less efficient than the old situation. 
A decision-making body decides to reallocate resources 
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without compensation. 
The first two situations describe decisions based on con­
siderations of efficiency. The last situation is based on equity 
(i.e., a non-Pareto-relevant reallocation of resources is instigated). 
The institutionalization of externalities in terms of the water 
quality problem is as follows. First, a historical water quality 
is defined with the associated status quo of users aaid uses. Then 
a chaoige in the pattern of use is introduced in the form of changes 
in thé quantity emd quality of residuals entering the waterbody at 
one (undefined) point. This leads to deviations from the historical 
quality. Other users and uses may adapt to the change in the qual­
ity by investing in new treatment amd production processes, for 
example, or by leaving the resource area. A new pattern of uses 
and users (defined according to the variation in practices) 
emerges which represents the new status quo, and a new quality of 
water resources represents the historical quality of future planning 
decisions. 
The ultimate effect of the institutionalization of externali­
ties is, therefore, a new resource base for plsmners. The emphasis 
for the management of water quality shifts from marginal considera­
tions to extra-marginal considerations. The ex-ante problems of 
resources for water quality management differ, therefore, from 
the ex-post problems of reallocation. The problem of reallocation 
is closely related to certain arguments in the allocation of public 
goods. 
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Public goods and water quality 
The failure of the perfect competitive model of the free 
public goods. Samuelson made a distinction between private goods 
and public goods by defining private goods as follows (168, p. 387): 
This equation states that each unit of the goods consumed by 
an individual will subtract from the amount available to other 
individuals. He then defines a public good as follows: 
This equation states that all individuals can enjoy a 
amount available to any other individual. 
These definitions of Samuelson do not specify why the 
existence of public goods may lead toward the failure of the free 
market price system. The reason for such a possible failure cam 
be found in works of authors on the subject of public goods; for 
example. Head (75), Meyer (132), and Hulett (82). From the argu­
ments as presented by them, the close relationship between problems 
market price system can also be attributed to the existence of 
(Xj = total amount available of goods j) 
(i = amount of goods consumed by person i) 
(s = participating individuals) 
particular public good (X ) in full without subtracting from the 
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of institutionailized externalities and public goods can be 
identified. These arguments are consequently presented. 
The "one-producer-one-recipient" example of externalities is 
a limiting case of the problem. In this example the free market 
price system fails because the cost of marginal changes in the 
production of a good (the external effect) is not registered at 
the producer. This effect is, however, registered by the price 
system at the recipient of the externality. It is, therefore, 
fairly simple for the manager of water quality to specify the 
burden of the cost of reallocation between the two participants. 
In the case of many recipients, the added problems of 
indivisibility and nonappropriatibility develop. The improved 
quality from water quality management is presented to all partici­
pants on an equal basis (depending on their uses) as a public good. 
Arguments for the possible failure of the free market price system 
are then as follows: 
After the externality has been institutionalized (i.e., a 
new status quo emd a new historical quality are established), 
participants may look upon changes in water quality as changes in 
their resource base with possibilities of "wind fall" profits. A 
"free ride" problem may develop because the participants may be 
reluctant to reveal the true benefits they receive. This situation 
has as am extreme total nonappropriatibility-of costs to receivers 
of benefits (Head, 75) or any variety of levels of appropriatibility 
depending on the ability of the controlling agency to establish the 
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real marginal benefits received by the individuals. The price 
system may fail at both ends of the linkage between the producer 
and the recipient of the externality. 
In conclusion, the prevalence of the water quality problem 
can be attributed to the failure of the free market price system 
to attach a price to one good (the spillover), as well as to the 
development of a new public good (the change in water quality). 
To review certain means of attacking these problems, the next 
section will again cross the interface between economic thinking 
and institutions in order to review certain aspects of control. 
These arguments should supply a background for certain prerequisites 
in organizing and coordinating water quality management.. 
Control in Water Quality Mainagement 
Control has been defined in Chapter I as a dynamic concept 
which includes decision-making (i.e., the formulation of an ob­
jective), the transfer of information concerning possible deviations 
from a plsm of action, the provision of incentives for plan perform­
ance, and the specification of penalties for deviations from the 
plan. The control facet of water quality management should serve 
all three functions of institutions (as discussed previously). 
The decision-making facet should serve the function of efficiency. 
Although Head (75) tends to use nonappropriatibility as one 
characteristic of public goods, Hulett proved that this is not a 
necessary characteristic (82, pp. 54-57). 
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(i.e., a decision should be the most preferred from the society's 
point of view), and the instruments which supply the information 
about, and incentives and penalties for reactions on a decision 
should serve the information and constraining functions of institu­
tions. This section will review aspects of social decision-making 
and of instruments serving the decisions. 
Social decision-making and efficiency 
Social decision-making is a process whereby relevemt informa­
tion about a specific action is used to calculate and compare 
consequential effects with the norms of society, and to reject or 
accept certain actions on the grounds of such comparisons. In a 
democratic society where the function of dec is ion-making is desig­
nated to a specific institution (the legislature, for example), 
norms will be established outside of such a decision-making body. 
The procedure whereby such norms are established is not of concern 
at this stage of the analysis. A gestalt for the creation of 
norms will be assumed in the form of a Social Choice Mechanism 
(SCM). The SCM represents the overall decision-making framework 
of society. Examples of decisions originating in it (i.e., 
norms for the social decision-msiker), are the choice of constitu­
tion, choice of economic institution, and the choice of the form 
•^Holdren, B. R., Professor of Economics, Iowa Sxaxe Univer­
sity. Personal communication, April-May 1971. 
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of the social welfare function. 
The choice to support the price system within the framework 
of perfect competition is a function of a sociopolitical process 
as stipulated by the SCM. The choice between Pareto efficient 
situations depends upon the form of the social welfare function. 
The first rigorous statement on the subject of the social welfare 
function appeared in an article by Bergson (1938, 18). This 
article was a result of the decline of a theory that social wel­
fare represents the sum of individual cardinal utilities. Bergson 
recommended the use of a welfare function defined as a function of 
economic variables. Samuelson later expanded on this argument 
(167, pp. 219-230) by stating that the form of this function should 
be chosen according to value judgments of the decision-maker. 
These earlier formulations of the social welfare function 
stipulated, in actual terms, that the form of this function will 
depend on decisions by the SCM or amy other decision-maker with 
complete control over the affairs of society. This stipulation 
was partly overlooked in discussions about the Pareto-relevancy 
of decisions. An example is the Hicks-Kaldor analysis in which 
considerations of Pareto efficiency were used to establish compensa­
tion principles in resource reallocation (71, pp. 82-92). Because 
the need for a norm to guide decisions between alternative Pareto 
optimal situations were ignored, the tendency developed to .view 
the "new welfare economics", for example, as an essentially un­
productive discipline (209, pp. 102-103). This study will use 
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specifications from a social welfare function as relevant norms 
for judging efficient and equitable reallocations of resources. 
In order to decide upon the relevamce of such a procedure, the 
underlying assumptions in the development of such a social welfare 
function (i.e., social ordering of preferred allocations of re­
sources), should be reviewed. 
It is the role of the social welfare function to decide 
between Pareto-optimal allocations of resources. The decision­
maker (i.e., legislature or a dictator), accepts the form of the 
social welfare function as a norm. The characteristics of the 
decision-maker should, therefore, coordinate with the objectives 
of the SCM. 
This study accepts the premise that society is organized on 
a democratic basis; i.e., the SCM reflects the needs of society 
rather than the priorities of a dictator. 
Voting in a democracy requires each vote to carry the same 
weight in decisions. It is assumed that complete equity (fair­
ness) requires each decision not to infringe upon emy individual's 
absolute welfare. This is analogous to the universal uneinimity 
rule in decision-making, i.e., a decision cam only be operational 
if everybody agrees. The possibility of a democratic decision­
making system to be operational in a universal unsoiimity decision 
rule for voting, was analyzed by Arrow in formulating his impossibil­
ity theorem (5). Arrow concluded that if there are at least three 
alternatives among which the members of society are free to order 
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in amy way, then every social welfare function which is complete, 
transitive and reflexive, and independent of irrelevaait alternatives 
must either be imposed or dictatorial. 
Arrow's argument places a question mark behind the inherent 
workability of simple majority voting. If a simple majority 
decision rule is accepted as the relevant voting strategy, the 
equity of such a decision can be questioned. Black discussed a 
case where an incremental voting decision is arrived at from 
individual social orderings (19). From this analysis it is clear 
that a simple majority rule in voting constitutes a value judgment 
of the SCM. The logic for this judgment was presented in discuss­
ions by Tullock (194) and Buchanaoi and Tullock (29). The existence 
of "logrolling" (vote trading) creates sm artificial market for 
various issues, and the voting system may in this way reflect 
individual "intensities of concern". This may soften the effect 
of confrontations in the simple majority rule. Taxing (cost allo­
cation procedures) is another factor. If the cost of finaoicing 
specific water quality xmdertaJcings rests upon those receiving the 
benefits, it may effectively rule out opposition from those not 
receiving any. The cost of decision-making is another concern. 
An universal unemimity rule may be too costly a decision-making 
process. The central argument in an emalysis by Buchanan and 
Tullock was, however, that this procedure (majority rule) was 
constitutionalized under the assumption that each individual will 
share at one time or another in the majority or minority. The 
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future outcomes of an individual's votes sure, therefore, a ramdom 
distribution (29, pp. 85-96). This assumption rests upon another 
implicit assumption; namely, that the society is relatively homo­
geneous, devoid of factions, with strong, specific, and uncom­
promising characteristics. 
The analysis of Buchanan and Tullock (together with the norms 
of efficiency arid equity), present a sound basis for structuring 
an efficient decision-maJcing entity in water quality management. 
Factions in a society may have an ethnic base (i.e., so-called 
minority problem), but it may have a strong regional base. Water 
quality cam be considered as a regional problem, and the character­
istics of the problem may differ from region to region. Although 
decisions in the legislature of a central government may pass all 
the formalities of a working democracy, on the regional level, it 
may be an imposed and, therefore, autocratic decision. It is not 
consistent with the professed objectives of the SCM (amd, therefore, 
of society). This lack of equity (as defined by the SCM) may 
present strong conflicts of interest and cam effect the application 
of decisions. If the decision-making structures for the mamagement 
of water quality are delineated on the basis of interlinking 
interests, then it can be argued that such structures may serve 
the premises of a working democracy. In other words, decentralized 
management systems may serve as means for attaining relevant social 
welfare functions (i.e., efficient amd equitable social orderings) 
when it is structured on the basis of long-term homogeneous interests 
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of participating individuals. 
An unanswered question on the aspect of control concerns the 
efficacy of the instruments available to the maoiager of water re­
sources. This question is discussed in terms of informal and 
formal controls. 
Instruments for informal aind formal 
control of water quality 
There are three kinds of instruments available for the control 
of water quality; namely, informal instruments, control by the 
price system in a free enterprise society, aoid formal instruments.^ 
The price system was discussed in a previous section, aoid the fol­
lowing discussions will, therefore, concentrate on informal and 
mostly on formal instruments of control. 
Informal control instruments are those unwritten rules 
established by, for example, custom, tradition, education, and 
propaganda. These instruments can well be viewed as the backbone 
of the SCM; they may determine what actions are important, accept­
able, or unacceptable for society. It is only necessary to consider 
the importance of religion, codes euid ethics in the life of a 
society to appreciate the potential impact of instruments for 
informal controls. The usefulness of these instruments extends 
This classification is somewhat at variance with similar 
discussions by Renne (160, pp. 128-151) and Dahl-Lindblom (47, 
pp. 93-126). 
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beyond the day-to-day manipulation of human actions. These instru­
ments may serve as initiators for more formal institutions (in­
cluding formal instruments), because they may create the need for 
better organization and coordination. The knowledge of environmental 
problems may encourage people to adapt their actions to preserve 
the environment, but it may also create a consciousness for short­
comings in the structure of their institutions. Veblen stated: 
"Social structure changes, develops, adapts itself to an altered 
situation, only through a change in the habits of thought of the 
several classes of the community; or in the last analysis through 
a change in the habits of thought of the individuals which make 
up the community" (204, p. 133). The development of informal 
controls, for example, through informing society of relevant inter­
relationships and responsibilities in the field of water quality 
meinagement, may serve as an innovating factor in the creation eaid 
development of better institutions. 
Informal control instruments may link with formal control 
instruments through court decisions. Formal instruments for 
control consist of those procedures formalized through govern­
mental action in the legislature ( statutes ) auid those which courts 
developed in the settlements of disputes. Formal social control 
of water resources may be exercised through police power, taxation, 
eind eminent domain,^ 
^For an explanation of these concepts see Renne (160, pp. 
135-138), and Barlow (12, pp. 316-335). 
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One of the most importsmt instruments for control in a free 
enterprise society is property rights. Property rights represent 
a triangle with the owner, object of property, and the state 
(controller of the right) at the three corners. Property rights 
is em important factor in organizing smd allocating natural resources. 
It can stipulate the entity or person who has the right, the object 
of property in quality amd quantity, and how a resource can be used 
(what should be done, what is allowed, and what is not allowed). 
Property rights can stipulate the control of a resource in all 
"shades" from total private rights to total public rights. Water 
rights in the United States is an example of different "shades" of 
rights. 
Generally there are two systems of water rights in the United 
States; namely, the doctrine of prior appropriation amd the riparian 
doctrine. An example of a relatively recent deviation from these 
doctrines is the Iowa water permit system. The appropriation 
doctrine is based on Spaoiish-Mexicaii rights and was developed by 
Mormon settlers in Utah and miners in California (1, p. 104). 
Water right is acquired by use with the earliest water right having 
preference over the later right; so-called "first in time, first in 
right" (133, pp. 41-42). Appropriative rights attach to specific 
quaoitities of water and can be specified for specific times, places 
and methods of diversion. The water must be applied to a "bene­
ficial use" (193, pp. 276-277), and the right remains in good 
stemding as use continues. The right may be lost by abeindonment 
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or forfeiture for nonuse over a period of time. Some states estab­
lished ranks for "beneficial use", such as domestic, municipal, 
stock watering, irrigation, manufacturing, and mining (1, p. 106), 
Water may be allocated along this ranking, but apart from transfer 
of the ownership of the lemd on which the water right is based, 
transfer to other types of uses cam be difficult (133). 
The riparian doctrine developed from roots of the English 
common law (1, pp. 99-100). It is based upon the premise that 
owners of laaid bordering a stream or laike have the right to use 
the water on this land. The first riparian users acquire no 
priority over "late comers", amd the rights of upstream amd down-
streaon users are coequal- The original formulation of the riparian 
doctrine held that water can only be diverted for "natural" pur­
poses (i.e., domestic use and watering of livestock), amd that 
amy substamtial withdrawal is a violation of others' rights. Later 
the "natural" use concept was chamged to "reasonable use" with the 
task of determining what is reasonable resting on the courts (133; 
78, pp. 7-9). 
The Water Right Act of Iowa (1957) established the ownership 
of water in watercourses or a natural body in the people amd state 
of Iowa (85; 78, pp. 12-21). Water, therefore, is defined as a 
public good, and the control of the use of water resorts under the 
Iowa Natural Resources Council (78, pp. 14-15), The Council ad­
ministers a permit system to control use. Municipal use^ and other 
^With certain exceptions; see Mines (78, p. 17). 
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users of less them 5,000 gallons a day are exempt from control. 
The permit is granted for a period up to ten years. 
There are various shortcomings in the above-mentioned systems 
of water rights which may hamper these rights from serving as 
efficient instruments in the control aoid allocation of water 
quality. It can be observed from a review of the different 
doctrines that qualitative specifications for water is lacking. 
This, and the fact that the "burden of proof" rests upon the 
recipient of the externality (pollutaint ), present a problem for 
water quality control through legal procedures (98, pp. 46-47; 
107). Control through the price system is limited due to restric­
tions placed on the contractual powers of water users. Uncertainty 
in the case of the riparian doctrine may effect the long-run 
efficiency of the allocation of water resources. These short­
comings may result in the failure of the water quality management 
institutions to fulfill their functions as discussed earlier. 
In order to compensate for such potential failures, various 
additional instruments were introduced by water quality mainagement 
agencies. These instruments are treatment stemdards, effluent 
standards, charges and payments. Treatment standards specify 
physical treatment structures. Effluent standards specify the 
allowable quality and quantity of effluent to enter a water body. 
Charges are per unit taxes, and payments per unit payments on 
residuals entering a watercourse. Each of these instrvunents should 
supply the information smd constraints to the individual user which 
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will facilitate an efficient and equitable allocation of resources. 
An evaluation of all of the instruments is presented in Chapter VII. 
This chapter reviewed the role of institutions in the manage­
ment of water resources. Certain functions for institutions were 
specified and reasons for the failure of the free market price 
system to organize amd coordinate the allocation of water qualities 
efficiently were identified. These reasons were specified as the 
failure to price certain goods (externalities) and the existence 
of a public good (the change in quality of water), A procedure 
for the efficient allocation of resources (i.e., the public good), 
was then discussed in terms of arguments of constitutional democracy 
as presented by Buchanan auid Tullock. An argument to show why 
decentralization may serve the norms of efficiency and equity was 
presented. Instruments for the control of water quality were then 
discussed, and certain shortcomings in water rights were identified. 
These shortcomings represent failures to provide information and 
to serve as a constraint. Certain additional instruments for 
control were then introduced. The next three chapters concentrate 
on a model which applies two of these instruments; namely, treat­
ment stsmdards amd effluent standards. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL 
FOR WATER QUALITY PLANNING 
The physical dimension of the water quality problem presented 
in Chapter II, indicated how practices in rural areas might result 
in spillovers which may change the historical quality of water. 
The effect of stream environment on residuals, namely, degradable 
and nondegradable, were identified. Complications which may arise 
due to these properties of residuals were noted. The usefulness 
of two constituents (i.e., BOD eind sediment), and the relevance 
of using them as indicator constituents were then discussed. 
Discussions on the physical dimension were concluded with a re­
view of physical alternatives in the control of water quality. 
The institutional emd economic dimensions of the water quality 
problem discussed in Chapter III, indentified certain shortcomings 
of the free market price system as an allocator of water qualities. 
It was argued that the absence of some constraining factor (i.e., 
pricing), smd the development of public goods (i.e., a change in the 
quality of water which affects more than one user) may lead to a 
breakdown in the free market price system. Individual responsibili­
ties (and rights) in water qualities remain somewhat vague and am­
biguous. It was shown in Chapter III that a qualitative specifica­
tion of water rights is absent. In addition to this, the burden of 
the proof rests upon the damaged party where water quality problems 
may occur. 
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Chapter III concluded with a brief discussion of certain 
instruments which might be applied in order to supply a constraint 
on the spillovers and thereby enforce individual responsibility 
for the planning thereof. The characteristic of the public good 
under consideration (i.e., a change in the quality of water), is a 
function of the effectiveness of these instruments in controlling 
spillovers and allocating water qualities efficiently smd equitably 
The need for intervention by some public entity in managing the 
water qualities is, therefore, clear. An approach to developing 
such am entity for regional water quality plemning involves élabora 
tion of a model which interrelates the physical dimension of water 
allocation as presented. Quality criteria for a streauo provide 
the basis whereby constraints on spillovers can be enforced. 
The model to be developed in the following analysis is subject 
to a series of limiting assumptions. Specification of these limit­
ing assumptions may serve to create a better understanding of the 
usefulness as well as limitations of such models. 
Assumptions amd Realism in Model Building 
Models are used in both the physical auid the social sciences. 
Engineering aind economic models have one thing in common; namely, 
both are abstractions from the real world with the purpose to 
simulate certain conditions. More specifically, a model is de­
fined as a simplified exposition of a process under study in which 
only the basic characteristics of a problem are considered (53, p. 
84 
The strength of a model lies in the abstraction of relevant 
processes in order to allow the researcher a closer scrutiny of 
the specific area in the same way a microscope magnifies a cell in 
a study of this part of an organism. Conversely, it may be just 
as difficult to describe all the real world processes from the 
workings of one mathqmatical model as it is to describe the organism 
from the restricted knowledge of the cell. The ability of a model 
to describe the real world will depend on its level of sophistica­
tion in regards to the extent to which all the relevant systems of 
the real world are functionally included in the model. Such a 
level of sophistication is only reached after the successful com­
pletion of the all-important partial analysis and after a correct 
interrelation of systems. 
A presentation of an economic model should, therefore, include 
a listing of assumptions. These assumptions have a dual purpose. 
First, the assumptions define the scope of the model. This enables 
research workers to include the model into a larger systems amalysis. 
Second, assumptions may serve to recognize weaknesses in the model. 
This may serve as a stimulant for further research in the specific 
field covered by the assumption. 
Friedman described the role of assumptions as follows: "In 
seeking to make a science as objective as possible, our aim should 
be to formulate the rules explicitly in so far as possible and 
continually to widen the range of phenomena for which it is possible 
to do so" (68, p. 25). The "rules" are defined by the assumptions. 
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Friedman was concerned with the realism of theory and concluded 
that realistic assumptions are not a prerequisite to establish the 
realism of a theory. The accuracy of the prediction resulting 
from an economic theory is the important factor (68, p. 41). He 
refrained from judging assumptions because of the characteristic 
of economic research ("the necessity of relying on uncontrolled 
experience") and because "... each occurrence has some features 
peculiarly its own, not covered by the explicit rules" (68, p. 40). 
The role of assumptions are, according to him, to clarify rather 
than to represent rules. 
The role to clarify, however, places a special need on assump­
tions to relate to real world phenomena in the ex ante planning 
stages. In a comment on Friedman, Nagel specified three instances 
of unrealistic assumptions (142, pp. 62-64). 
(1) A statement may mention only some traits actually 
characterizing aui object but ignores am endless number 
of other traits also present; 
(2) A statement may be unrealistic because it is either 
false or highly improbable on available evidence; 
(3) An unrealistic statement may exist when it is so strictly 
construed that is not applicable to amy actual situation. 
Judging these three instances of Nagel in relation to modelbuilding, 
failure through (1) means an incomplete definition of the scope and 
weaknesses of the model. In such an instance the model will be 
useless for application in a more comprehensive systems ainalysis. 
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Failure through (2) means failure through incompatibility with 
existing research results. Failure through (3) means failure 
through the inability of the model to produce any positive con­
tribution to the existing body of knowledge. 
The same arguments are applicable to the subsequent formulation 
of a model. The abstractions in the formulation of the model will 
concentrate on the processes relevant to the objective of the study. 
Results from research in a variety of disciplines (i,e., other 
models and coefficients) will be included in the model. In situa­
tions where such results are lacking (or are insufficient) esti­
mates and assumptions, which were checked by specialists in the 
respective fields will be used. With this procedure there will be 
adherence to the specifications of Nagel, This procedure will also 
aoiswer the need to interlink with the procedures amd results of 
recently completed studies on the economics of water quality 
control at Iowa State University (57; 58; 90; 174). 
A "Step-function" of BOD Progression for 
Application Within a Linear Programming Framework 
There are two norms guiding the formulation of a model. First, 
the structure and functioning of the model should enable the re­
search worker to fulfill his research objectives. Second, the 
general characteristics of the model should reflect an acceptable 
presentation of general characteristics of the real world phenomena 
under study. The importance of these norms is obvious. 
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Thé objectives of this study call for a model to interpret 
and evaluate linkages between economic agents within a regional 
framework. There are linkages within the physical dimension of 
the problem, for exsuaple, the spillovers from one economic agent 
which may affect the qualities of water used by downstream economic 
agents. There are also linkages within the economic dimension 
of the problem: A regional optimizing model should consider all 
the alternatives open to each economic agent simultaneously. This 
is done by comparing the opportunity cost of all the processes 
available to each economic agent within one decision-framework. 
Linear programming is extremely well suited for several reasons. 
It caui consider a larger number of processes simultaneously. With 
parametric analysis and shadow pricing, a variety of situations can 
be studied emd evaluated.^ For example, by changing the qualita­
tive restrictions by increments the incremental costs or benefits 
of various proposals may be studied. If so required, the marginal 
costs of water quality standards may be evaluated by a review of 
the shadow prices. 
The second norm presents certain problems for the application 
of linear programming techniques. First, a nonlinear BOD-progression 
For extended discussions on the application of linear prograun-
ming and other models, such as non-linear programming, on residual 
management decision, see Russell and Snofford (164, pp. 115-179). 
Input-output models for forecasting purposes in the plaunning of 
environmental quality were discussed by Ayres (7, pp. 35-67). 
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equation must be adapted for analysis in a linear mathematical 
structure. Second, sewage treatment is usually fractioned into 
primary, secondary arid tertiary treatment. This leads to the prob­
lem of accommodating chsinges in the level of treatment into a mathe­
matical structure that has finiteness as one of its strongest 
assumptions. The first problem will be resolved in this section. 
The second will be considered later in the next chapter. 
A simplified oxygen sag equation—the "step-function" 
Some of the most important aspects of BOD progression were 
presented in Chapter II. The complexity of the process is clear 
from that exposition. Factors such as temperature, the rate of 
streéimflow, sludge banks, sedimentation and algae growth, may affect 
the rate of BOD-progression emd DO concentration in a watercourse 
(58, pp. 148-194). The complexity of the problem presents a 
challenge to the need for simplicity in the simulation of physical 
response. The explicit inclusion of all of the abovementioned 
influences may restrict the model as a generalized instrument for 
water quality planning. 
The primary attributes of amy mathematical model of BOD-
progression is first, a limiting value of oxygen consumed, and 
second, a rate constant of proportionality per unit of time (58, 
p. 156). The Streeter-Phelps formulation (180) satisfies these 
conditions. This model has been widely used in simulations af 
BOD-progression. 
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The generaJL formulation of the model is as follows: 
(7) ^ = k(L - y) - rD^ 
where: L = first stage BOD; 
D = oxygen deficit in mg/l; 
t = time elapsed; 
k = rate of BOD exertion per day; 
y = oxygen demanded up to time t; 
r = rate of reoxygenation per day; 
D^ = initial oxygen deficit in watercourse. 
The equation states that the. rate of change in the dissolved oxygen 
deficit is equal to the sum of the rate of oxygen extraction through 
BOD (at a constant rate k) and the rate of reaeration (at a con-
stem t rate r). The rate of oxygen extraction is a constant function 
of the residual BOD (L - y). The rate of reaeration is a consternt 
function of the initial oxygen deficit. 
This formulation, also called the oxygen sag equation, can 
be criticized on various grounds when intended for application in 
a stream. Three major criticisms are: 
(1) The deoxygenation parameter k and reaeration parameter r 
incorporate a variety of factors which are not explicitly 
stated in the formulation of the model. This will result 
in the variation of these paraiueters fxom stream to 
stream, between.reaches within a stream, and from day 
to day. 
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(2) There can be a wide variation between information ob­
tained from a laboratory analysis and the actual stream 
conditions. Information used in the original model of 
Streeter-Phelps (180) were based on information obtained 
from laboratory analysis at the five-day 20°C rate of BOD. 
(3) The effectiveness of results for projection along a 
watercourse are highly dependent upon flow times in a 
particular reach. These values are constantly fluctuating. 
The knowledge of the weaknesses of oxygen sag model stimulated 
research on alternative formulations. In a review of certain al­
ternatives Deininger concluded that "... their applicability is 
limited and can be used only for the specific reach of river for 
which they were developed. They do not apply to other reaches of 
the stream and they are not usable for a stream with many polluters 
along its banks" (52, pp. 79-80). He concluded that the oxygen 
sag equation is still the most useful equation to predict DO levels 
in a stream. Dougal et compared a first-order model (of which 
the formulation in equation (7) is one), a modified monomolecule 
model (which included a statistical analysis of the temporal 
variation of k and r), and a second-order model (58, pp. 255-299). 
They concluded (58, pp. 277-287); ". . . In view of the unpredict­
ability of most biological processes in which precise estimates 
of the progression of events is seldom possible, this means that 
any of the three models is satisfactory. Simplicity then becomes 
a criterion for applicability in a mathematical analysis; this 
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obviously favors the first-order reaction," In view of these 
conclusions the basic arguments of the oxygen sag formulation as 
in equation (7) will be used in this study. 
Equation (7) presents the rate of chauige in total oxygen 
deficit. In order to define the total oxygen deficit up to time 
t integration is necessary. 
Define; 
Integrate equation (8) from time t = 0 with boundary conditions 
y = O aoid t = 0 aind solve for y; 
(8) ^ = k(L - y) 
= -ln(l - y) + InL = kt 
L - y = Q-kt 
(9) y = L(1 - e~^^) 
Substitute equation (9) in equation (7); 
k(L - y) = k(L - L + Le~^^) 
= kLe -kt 
(10) rD 
o 
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liquation (10) can be presented in the form of a first order linear 
differential equation (dy/dx + Py = Q): 
~ + rD = kLe~^^ dt o 
Solve the differential equation for total deficit up to time t 
and the result is: 
(11) D(t) = ^  
In equation (11) the coefficients k and r are known beforehand 
auid t is defined for the purpose. The oxygen deficit up to time t 
can therefore be defined as; 
(12) D(t) = 
where: 
r - k ' 
P = (e-" - ; 
f = -rt 
This study includes various economic agents along a water­
course which will complicate the application of equation (12). The 
differential equation can only be applied to one reach at a time, 
with the final condition of the upper reach becoming the initial 
condition of the next reach. Tliomas (1961, 181) proposed a 
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so-called "step method" which involves an approximate solution . 
of the differential equation. The first attempt to model a river 
basin with the help of the "step method" was by Deininger (1965, 
52). Others such as Loucks et (1967, 120), Anderson (1967, 3) 
and Paraska (1967, 151) relied on the procedures of Thomas and 
Deininger in solving regional water quality problems. On the 
strength of results obtained by these research workers the "step 
method" will be used in this study. The logic of the Thomas 
reformulation is as follows: 
(a) The time rate of oxygen in a stream is given by: 
^ ^  . rD dt dt o 
(b) The general solution to this equation is: 
D(t) = e -rt (C./ll e"dt, 
where C is a constant. Evaluated at t = 0 and D = D 
o 
this equation will yield: 
(c) An approximation is made for the part of the equation 
under the integral sign 
9 
e-dt=y(9) e 
Letting the basic equation for the step 
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method is : 
P y(©) + P\ 
Dissolved oxygen deficit in the downstream end 
of reach i, mg/liter; 
oxygen uptake in reach i; 
dissolved oxygen deficit in the upstream end of 
of reach i, mg/liter; 
flow time of stream between the upstream and down­
stream points of the reach in days or hours. 
For the purpose of this study the formulation will be: 
(14) = Py(e) + + v^(©) 
where; 
•^(G) = correction for algae respiration and 
photosynthesis during time interval Ô. 
In tests made by Deininger on the accuracy of equation (13) it 
was found that the differences between results from equation (13) 
and that of equation (12) was less them .1 percent when step 
increments of .5 days were used. It is clear that equation (14) 
can be used in a linear programming frameivork after the coefficients 
k,r and time of flow, have been established for each reach. 
(13) = 
Where: 
Di = 
y(8)  = 
'^o = 
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Formulating the problem in linear programming format 
When formulating the BOD-progression for a single reach Within 
a stream with the help of the "step method", two. readings of the 
DO situation are of importance. The readings are those in the 
beginning of the reach and at the end of the reach. This may 
create a problem because it may be possible for.the oxygen 
deficit to exceed the limits in between the points. Since con­
straints caun be set up for points sufficiently close to each 
other this is not a real problem in the forthcoming exposition. 
Following the procedure of Deininger (52, pp. 60-66) let; 
D? = Oxygen deficit in the river just above reach i; 
= oxygen deficit in the river after discharge of 
the wastes and the addition of incremental flow 
at the beginning of reach i; 
= flow in watercourse just above reach i; 
= amount of waste flow added at the upper emd 
end of reach i; 
»i 
= amount of river flow added at the upper end of 
reach i; 
Dq. = oxygen deficit of river flow added at upper end 
of reach i; 
Dw^ = oxygen deficit of wastes added at upper end of 
reach i 
^ii^i 
•r—'— = oxygen demand exerted in reach i due to a BOD 
"i+1 
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load in reach i (M. Y denotes an initial load) lO o 
^^(©)^ = algal correction factor for reach i. 
Then the oxygen deficit in the watercourse after discharge of 
waste in reach i for n reaches will be: 
, D?Q. + Dw.W. + Dq.Q. 
(15) D = Q ^ — 
^ "i+1 
and the oxygen deficit at the end of reach i will be: 
(16) Ci = + -'»'(») i 
°i+l 
The value of P is as defined previously. 
The exposition in equation (15) emd equation (16) illustrates 
the need for certain data. First, the flow in each reach and the 
contribution to the flow of each economic agent must be established. 
Second, the maximum DO situation for each reach must be defined; 
otherwise, the existing deficit cannot be defined. Third, the 
BOD contribution in each reach must be established. Fourth, the 
coefficients k emd r must be established. Fifth, the algal cor­
rection factor must be established. Finally, the time of flow in 
each reach needs to be established. 
Equations (15) and (16) form the basis for the coefficients 
in a linear programming matrix wliich can be expressed as follows: 
Assume a region with 1^ water treatment activities consisting of 
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n needs with each reach having on the average m ways of treating 
water for use or treating effluent (1 = mn). The comparative ad­
vantage of using the jth procedure in treating water or effluent = 
Cj. Then define: 
a.. = D. (from equation 15) for the jth activity 
XJ X 
when i = odd number; 
a^^j = D? (from equation 16) for the jth activity 
when i = even number. 
Define k = 2(n): 
b^ = DO (maximum) - DO (standard) + (@)^^ 
The variable b^ defines the available DO in reach i in accordauice 
with the coefficient a. .. This can be viewed as a resource to be 
used in production aaid consumption processes analogous to the 
A.R.C.E.-resource described in Chapter I. The linear programming 
formulation is as follows in the case where m = 1: 
Max z * =3^3 V4 * • • • * 
Subject to: 
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i b. 
6 b. 
^31*1 * ^32^2 
^ b. 
^41*1 * ^42*2 
^ b. 
^ b. 
^61*1 •*• ^62*2 * ^ 63*3 
6 b. 
^71*1 ^72^2 * ^73^3 ^74*4 
:6. b. 
^81*1 ^82^2 * ^83*3 * ^84*4 
6. b. 
+ ^3=3 " ^ 4=4 * - - ' * *kl*l ^ \ 
amd 
Xj i 0 
In matrix form this can be expressed as: 
Max Z = cx 
subject to 
Ax 6 b 
x ^ 0 
99 
where A = a matrix of dimension 
i = 1 ... k 
j = 1 ... 1; 
c = a row vector of dimension 
j = 1 ... 1; 
X = a column vector of dimension 
j = 1 ... 1; 
b = a column vector of dimension 
i = 1 ... k. 
The matrix A consists of two lower triangular matrices, D and E: 
D is of dimension i, j/2 and describes the of 
equation (15); 
E is of dimension i, j/2 and describes the D? of 
equation (16). 
The formulation of the linear programming model may be extended 
to include different seasons of the year (i.e., Summer, Fall, 
Winter, Spring), or different flows in the watercourse (to accommo­
date sedimentation plemning aind feedlot runoff). In such a situa­
tion the formulation will be extended as follows; 
Max Z = cx 
subject to: 
100 
1 
rate of flow 1 
rate of flow 2 
Ax ^  b 
Fx £ b 
Gx 6. b 
Hx 6 b 
Kx 6 b 
Lx ^ b 
Mx ^ b 
NX i b _ 
X ^ 0 
The vectors c, x and b are as defined, and the dimension of 
matrix A = F = G = H=. K = L = M = N. 
The above exposition describes a model for four seasons and two 
rates of flow in the water course. 
A Regional Framework for 
BOD Progression aoid Sedimentation 
Formulating the values of activities in the objective function 
and the level of water quality standards 
Value of objective function: It is the usual procedure to 
formulate a regional cost minimizing model for water quality control 
(52) (3) (90) (174). Applying a gross margin maximizing model is 
not a deviation from the above procedure. A gross margin maximizing 
procedure is easily applied to sediment control because the relevant 
processes will affect the profitability of the farming orgaoiization. 
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The control of BOD will, however, be considered in accordance 
with certain treatment processes. This procedure will lend itself 
for the application of a cost minimizing model. 
In order to include these processes in a gross margin maximizing 
procedure it is assumed that the production process of each economic 
agent is constant. The only variable inputs are those in connection 
with water quality control structures.^ Assuming a constant pro­
duction process, the maximum profit situation for an economic agent 
will be presented when no treatment is applied. Profitability 
will diminish in accordance with the increase in the cost of 
2 
effluent treatment. Net profit is not an illustrative reference 
to evaluate alternative cost situations for the treatment of urban 
effluent. For this reason, the term "gross margin" is used in 
this study. 
The gross margin (value) of each activity in the planning region 
will therefore be calculated as follows; 
This is a limiting assumption because it may siffect the BOD 
content of effluent from meatpacking plaints and feedlots. However, 
this limitation will not affect the message aund arguments of this 
specific study. 
2 Note that water treatment can be viewed as em "effluent" 
treatment-alternative to em upstreaun polluter. The upstream 
polluter is presented with the choice either to treat the effluent 
at point of inflow into the watercourse or pay the cost of water 
treatment downstream, thus using the A.R.C.E.-resource available. 
This argument is presented only to illustrate the role of water 
treatment. Who actually must pay the bill for water treatment and 
effluent treatment is not of importaoice at this stage of the 
inquiry. 
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(1) "Highest treatment cost activity" for a specific efconomic 
agent is equated to zero (Value of activity in the ob­
jective function is equal to zero); 
(2) The value of the "no treatment activity" for a specific 
economic agent is equated to the treatment cost of the 
"highest treatment cost activity"; 
(3) The value of any activity for a specific economic agent 
will be established as follows: 
c = c. - c 
o h s 
where: 
c = Value of activity in the objective function; 
o 
= cost associated with the "highest treatment cost" 
activity for the specific economic agent; 
c^ = cost associated with activity under consideration 
for the specific economic agent. 
Level of water quality standards: The test for realism of 
water quality stemdards used in this study will be according to 
one norm only; is the attainment of the specific quality level 
technologically possible? The concept "technologically possible" 
will generally apply to the existing body of knowledge, but for 
the purpose of this study it will be limited by the activities 
included in the model. 
In the initial formulation of the model certain quality 
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stamdards will be assumed. These standards will be abstracted 
from recommendations in government smd other publications. A 
parametric emalysis of these standards will then be carried in 
order to establish the effect of different water quality require­
ments on the individual and social gross margin for the region. 
Suspended sediment and turbidity^a linkage between sedimentation 
and orgemic residuals in watercourses 
Turbidity is a comprehensive term which includes the effect 
of suspended sediment on the clarity of water. Turbidity is the 
measure of the extent to which the intensity of light passing 
through water is reduced by suspended material. Limits on turbidity 
will, therefore, also serve as limits on suspended sediment, al­
though a separate set of standards for suspended sediment might be 
needed in order to cope with the constituents associated with 
sedimentation (see Chapter II). 
About 50 percent of the solids in domestic sewage is 
suspended (Baumainn, 16, p. 19). Furthermore, about 70 percent 
of the suspended solids in domestic sewage is degradable, the 
1 
rest being nondegradable. Domestic sewage may therefore contri­
bute towards the problems of turbidity. This observation can be 
^Wiechers, S. G., Chemical Engineer, National Water Research 
Institute. C.S.I.R.. South Africa. Personal communication, April 
1972. 
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repeated for meatpacking plants and cattle feedlots. There exists, 
therefore, a linkage between cropfarming and urban, feedlot amd 
meatpacking activities. 
Programming the sedimendation of watercourses 
Sediment is a nondegradable constituent. The problem of 
progression associated with a degradable constituent such as 
BOD (organics) is absent. The inclusion of sedimentation within 
a linear progreunming framework is therefore comparatively easy. 
The overall approach in planning the control of BOD and sediment 
in watercourses can also be affected by the way these two con­
stituents are introduced. Sediment has generally a diffused 
source whereas BOD usually is associated with point sources.^ 
Planning the control of sediment will, therefore, not 
necessarily follow the segmentation in reaches such as practiced 
in plamning the control of BOD. In fact, under certain circum­
stances and assumptions no segmentation is needed. An example 
of such a case is the study of Seay where a relatively homogeneous 
region is used in the planning of water quality with one con­
stituent (sediment) as em exemplary basis (174). In this study 
the two constituents are effectively linked to each other through 
limitations on turbidity. 
SOD may have a diffused source, i.e., the introduction of 
organic material such as leaves aind other plant material to water­
courses through runoff. The relative importance of these sources 
is, however, small compared to such sources as urban effluent and 
feedlot runoff. 
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In predicting soil loss amd sedimentation the universal soil 
loss equation is used. As was previously indicated this equation 
represents long term (25 yr) averages amd, as was stipulated by 
Seay (174, p. 74), the use of long term average flow rates would 
be a reasonable simplification for plainning purposes. On the other 
hand, critical low flow periods is often used when planning BOD. 
This will result in the expansion of the linear programming model. 
The expanded model will be as follows in matrix form: 
Max Z = cx + cy 
subject to: 
Ax b 
Fx it b 
V BOD restricted; 
GSc i b j r rate of flow 1 
Hx ^ b J 
Kx ± b 
Lx jL b 
^ BOD restricted; 
Mx ^ b ' rate of flow 2 
X3 v
| 
Ox + Py 6. d ' Turbidity restricted 
Oy 6. e ^ Sediment restricted 
X z. 0 
y G 
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Where the dimension of matrix A=F=G=H=K=L=M= 
N = O = P, eind the dimension of matrix Q = number of activities 
times the number of reaches (defined according to special character­
istics associated with sediment delivery to the watercourse). 
This model illustrates the basic arguments in plamning for the 
control of sediment and BOD in watercourses. Further refinements 
in it will be carried out when it is applied to the Upper Skunk 
River Basin in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
FOR WATER QUALITY PLANNING WITHIN 
THE UPPER SKUNK RIVER BASIN 
The model developed in Chapter IV is now applied to the Upper 
Skunk River Basin. The objective of the model is to maximize 
social returns in the region subject to restricted qualities of 
water. The restrictions are specified in accordance with the 
constraining function of institutions; i.e., they are variable 
depending on assumptions concerning feasible alternative qualities 
of water in the stream. 
This chapter first reviews the characteristics of the plemning 
region; i.e., hydrologie characteristics, land characteristics, 
and water-use characteristics. Next activities for sediment 
control are developed by means of the universal soil loss equation. 
Activities for the control of BOD are then developed for towns, 
meat-packing plants, and feedlots. These activities (for sediment 
auid BOD control) are then formulated in a first feasible program 
for computation by means of the simplex algorithm. 
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Description of the Planning Region 
A general description 
Cheoracteristics of watercourse: The Skunk River basin 
covers an area of 4,355 square miles. The source of the river 
is in north-central Iowa and it discharges into the Mississippi 
River in the south-eastern part of the state, 396 miles north of 
the mouth of the Ohio River (Figure 4). The average stream slope 
of the river varies from 7 to 8 ft. per mile north of Story City 
(see Figure 4) but decreases to about 4 to 5 ft. per mile at Ames, 
2 to 3 ft. per mile below Colfax and to 1 ft. per mile near the 
inflow into the Mississippi River (86, p. 3). In Hamilton County 
and part of Story County the Skunk River flows in a youthful, 
comparatively narrow valley of shallow to moderate depth. In Story 
County the valley becomes gorge-like but above Ames the valley 
widens rapidly as the river enters a preglacial channel. Below 
Ames, in Story, Polk, Casper and Marion Counties, the Skunk River 
flows through a wide fertile plain with a maximum width of 2 miles 
in Polk County. The river valley is moderately wide in Mahaska 
County but is somewhat narrower through Keokuk, Washington, Jeffer­
son and Henry Counties. In Keokuk County the river is sinuous but 
becomes progressively less so downstream. In Henry County the 
river enters a postglacial valley with bottoms, of \ mile in width. 
Bedrock is exposed in the stream bed and along xhe riversides. 
This gorge continues below Augusta where the valley widens to merge 
Figure 4. The Skunk River basin (after 86, p. vi) 
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with the Mississippi flood plain (86, pp. 3-6), The largest 
tributory stream is the North Skunk River watershed (869 square 
miles). Other tributaries with watersheds in excess of 200 square 
miles are Cedar Creek, Crooked Creek, Indian Creek and Squaw Creek. 
Economic and demographic characteristics: The strong agri­
cultural character of the Skunk River basin was noted by the Iowa 
Natural Resources Council (86, pp. 7-11). About 80% of the basin 
in Story County is cropland and this changes to 60% in Mahaska 
emd 54% in Henry County. Irrigation is of small importance in 
the basin with only about 340 acres under irrigation einnually. 
Pasture cind timber is found in the rough areas. Mainufacturing 
establishments with over 500 employees were reported at Newton, 
Fairfield and Pella. However, recent developments in Ames should 
extend this observation to this predominemtly University oriented 
town. Electric generating stations were reported at Ames, 
Ellsworth, Fairfield, Mount Pleasamt, Nevada, New London, Pella, 
Oskaloosa, Salem aaid Story City. Other major water users were a 
turkey processing plant at Ellsworth, the Iowa Ordinance plant 
near Burlington, soybean processing at Fairfield, aoid Washington 
Cooperative Creamery at Sully. Mining in the basin is confined 
to mineral extraction of sand aind gravel deposits such as lime­
stone quarried at Ames and near Roland. 
The economic development of the basin is, therefore, strongly 
associated with developments in the agricultural sector. "Spin­
offs" from larger communities inside (i.e., Ames) aaid outside 
Ill 
(i.e.; Des Moines) the basin area as well as the growth of certain 
developments in the service section (i.e., institutions of higher 
learning) may serve as a complicative factor in the specifica­
tions of demographic and economic trends. A study made by Méiki 
in 1965 (122) substauitiates this observation. He forecasted a 
continued decline in rural population. This forecast is asso­
ciated with the trend in agriculture towards larger operational 
units as well as the dependence of urbsm growth on continued 
expaoision of the industrial business and service sectors. This 
presents the smaller coiranunities in the basin with a real problem 
of continued existence. Shifts in the concentration of population 
in the basin can be illustrated with the following examples. 
Projections for Hamilton County indicate a population of 19,640 
in 1975 as against 20,032 in 1960. For Story County it is 62,002 
in 1975 as against 49,327 in 1960 amd in Boone County the projected 
change is 26,529 in 1975 as against 28,037 in 1960 (54). 
Maki's projections foresee a continued increase in agricultural 
production through an increase in the application of modern tech­
nology. The processing of this increased amount of agricultural 
production was noted to be a major factor for industrial expansion 
in the state. 
In retrospect, the following conclusions cam be made concern­
ing future developments in the Skunk River basin which may affect 
the need for water quality planning: 
(1) A shift of the population from farms and small rural 
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communities to urban areas with a stronger industrial, 
business and service base; 
(2) A continued increase in the application of modern tech­
nology in agricultural production; 
(3) In order to feed the furnace of local industry the local 
processing of agricultural products will increase. 
The importance of these trends on water quality was indicated in 
the second chapter of this study. 
Soils and topography of the Skunk River basin 
The soils in the basin cam be grouped into three categories 
according to the parent material out of which it was formed (86) 
(149): 
(1) Late Wisconsin drift in the upper region of the Skunk 
River which is classified into the Clarion-Webster soil 
association; 
(2) Soils of the Loess area in the middle and lower parts 
of the Skunk River basin which is classified into the 
Tama-Muscatine, MsJiaska-Taintor, Grundy-Haig, Clinton-
Lindley and Weller-Lindley soil associations; 
(3) Soils in the bottomlands aind terraces derived from a 
wide variety of materials deposited as alluvium, along 
the streams. 
The topography of the area covered by the Claorion-Nicollet-
Webster soil association (see Figure 5) is nearly level to gently-
sloping although some gently sloping to strongly sloping areas 
Figure 5. Principal upland soil associations in the Skunk River basin 
(after 86, p. 8) 
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are also present. Some of the conspicious features of this area 
are low-lying, nearly level plains which contain numerous saucer­
like depressions and low knobs and ridges which rise slightly 
above the level of the low plains. About one-third to one-half 
of the area has been drained by artificial drainage systems of 
tile and open ditches (149, p. 28). As can be deducted from the 
name. Clarion loam, Nicollet loam amd Webster silty clay loam are 
the most extensive soils in this area. 
The topography of the area covered by the Tama-Muscatine 
soil association in the basin is characterized by rounded, gently 
sloping divides, moderate to strongly sloping side slopes, amd 
narrow valleys. Predomineoit soil types are Tama silty clay loam 
and Muscatine silty clay loam (149, pp. 66-67). 
The Clinton-Keswick-Lindley soil association occupies sloping 
to steep areas. The soils of the area are generally silt loam to 
clay loam (149, pp. 22-23). The Otley-Mahaska-Taintor soil asso­
ciation area occupies am area characterized by a landscape which 
appears similar to a broad level plain but which are actually up-
laind divides, irregular in length, width and flatness. The pre­
dominant soils in the area are Otley, MeJiaska aind Tain tor clay 
loam (149, pp. 60-61). The general topographical characteristics 
of the area covered by the Grundy-Haig and Lindley-Keswick-Weller 
soil associations correspond with that of the area covered by the 
Otley-Mahaska-Taintor soil associations. The soils in this area 
are generally silty loam to silty clay loam (149, pp. 60-61). 
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The variations in soils and topography as presented above 
may affect the sediment yield per unit laoid area. Sufficient 
information is not available to make an accurate determination of 
the sediment characteristics of the Skunk River basin. Estimates 
prepared by am interagency task force on sedimentation in the 
Upper Mississippi basin indicate, however, a wide variation in 
sediment yield along the total reach of the Skunk River basin 
(84). They divide the basin into different land resource areas, 
namely lamd resource areas 103, 108 and 109 (Figure 6). The most 
upstream portion of the Skunk River basin is occupied by land re­
source area 103. The sediment yield in this area is rather low 
and will vary in the range of 75 tons per square mile from a one 
square mile drainage area, to about 45 tons per square mile from 
a 100 square mile drainage area and to 34 tons per square mile from 
a 1000 square mile drainage area. The downstream three quarters 
of the basin is occupied by Land Resource Areas 108 and 109. The 
respective yields for these areas are 1500, 900 and 680 tons per 
square mile for the 1, 100, and 1000 square mile drainage areas. 
In the light of the above exposition the importance of 
sedimentation in water quality plamning for the Skunk River basin 
cam be summarized as follows : 
(1) Sedimentation is, compared to other river basins^, a 
The Nishnabotna River basin used in the amalysis of Seay 
(174) amd Jacobs (90) is reported to have an annual sediment yield 
of almost 4,146 tons per square mile for the basin as a whole. 
108 & 109 
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Figure 6. Land resource areas in the Skunk River Basin (after 84, p. 83) 
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relatively lesser problem in the case of the Skunk 
River basin; 
(2) Sediment yield will vary along the basin, a fact which 
accentuates the need for spatial diversification in 
plauining water quality. 
Hvdroloqical characteristics of the basin area 
Precipitation in the basin: The average yearly precipitation 
in the basin is 32,79 inches per year (86, p. 13). This overall 
average varies from 30,75 inches at Ames in the Upper Skunk River 
to 34.73 inches at Mount Pleasemt in the South. About 71 per 
cent of the annual precipitation occurs during the growing season. 
This precipitation is well distributed thus diminishing the need 
for additional applications in the form of irrigation. Over a 
recorded period of fifty years the average cinnual precipitation 
was more them 40 inches in the case of four individual years, and 
five individual years were recorded with a precipitation less 
thsin 26 inches. In addition, one recording has been made of a 
driest average of 20.5 inches (86, pp. 13-15). 
Flow characteristics of the Skunk River: Water quality 
management is highly dependent on the rate of streamflow. Hydro-
logic variability in streams cam complicate the formulation of 
workable plans. Streamflow in the Skunk River is known to be 
extremely variable. The Skunk River near Ames (drainage area. 
315 square miles) has experienced a zero low flow and a peaik dis­
charge of 8,630 cfs (58, p. 25) (172). Water quality, measured 
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by the sediment load, will deteriorate during flood periods while 
the potential, effect of orgamic pollutants will be aggravated by 
a low stream flow. Water quality control measures are, therefore, 
usually developed around specific "design flow" which serve as 
"data" in the construction of the measures. Depending on the 
specific planning need, asi "exceedence" or "recurrence interval" 
table, such as presented in Tables 5 and 6, can be used. The 
exceedence table is constructed from an accumulated frequency 
curve of a continuous time series of discharge,data. This is a so-
called flow duration curve (114, p. 129). The "recurrence interval" 
table is constructed from a generalized frequency curve of low 
flow. This curve is constructed by determining the minimum flow 
each year during periods of various lengths. The data for each 
period is then plotted as a frequency curve (114, pp. 130-132). 
A review of Tables 5 aoid 6 presents a clear picture of the ex­
treme variability of streamflow in the Skunk River over time. 
The utilization of streamflow in the Skunk River basin: Be­
cause of an absence of notable irrigation works in the basin the 
most important uses of streamflow are for municipal-industrial amd 
recreation purposes. Municipal-industrial use of the watercourse 
is generally limited for the purpose of waste disposal. Water • 
is usually supplied from wells. Only the towns of Fairfield, 
Montezuma and Middle town, in the southern portion of the basin, 
use surface impoundments of the watercourse (36, pp. 28-33). 
Seven of the 99 state parks and reserves in Iowa are located in 
Table 5. Streamflow in the Skunk River basin for selected duration percentages® 
Drainage Average Discharge, cfs, exceeded indicated 
Stream area, discharge, percent of time 
sq mi cfs 5 20 50 80 90 95 
Skunk River near Ames 315 135 580 180 43 4.0 1.3 0.55 
North Skunk 
Sigourney 
River near 730 347 1,700 515 125 21 8.2 4.5 
Skunk River near. Oskaloosa 1,635 778 2,850 1,080 330 71 36 21 
Skunk River at Coppock 2,916 1,435 5,700 2,100 620 150 79 54 
Skunk River at Augusta 4,303 2,233 9,500 3,090 890 210 100 64 
^Source; After Dougal et (58, p. 28) amd Schwob (172), Base period 1934-1953. 
Table 6. Recurrence interval for selected flows at three stations in the Skunk River Basin^ 
Record Discharge, cfs, for indicated 
Stream Period low flow, recurrence interval in years 
of days cfs 
1.05 2. 5 10 15 20 
Skunk Ri\fer near Ames, 1 0.0 32 1. 0 0. 14 0.06 0.04 0.03 
7 0.0 40 1. 3 0. 18 0.08 0.06 0.05 
315 scj mi 30 0.0 55 2. 0 0. 23 0.11 0.08 0.07 
60 0.02 77 5. 0 0. 57 0.24 0.17 0.14 
120 0.07 126 11 1. 1 0.44 0.32 0.27 
183 0.20 180 27 2. 8 0.98 0.66 0.54 
Skunk Ri\'er at Coppock^, 1 8.0 277 50 16 9.0 6.7 5.5 
7 8.7 335 67 24 15 12 11 
2,916 sq mi 30 11.2 440 96 38 23 19 18 
60 21.2 577 140 55 35 29 26 
120 45.8 875 204 93 61 50 44 
183 65.8 1,240 283 131 88 73 64 
Skunk Ri\/er at Augusta, 1 7.0 516 60 15 7.7 5.6 4.7 
7 7.43 688 86 25 14 11 9.5 
4,303 sq mi 30 17.3 818 142 43 24 18 16 
60 29.1 1,080 224 73 40 31 26 
120 42.0 1,640 374 138 82 64 52 
183 53.1 2,330 525 219 129 103 86 
^Source: 
^Station 
After Dougal et 58, p. 31 ) and Schwob (172). Base period 1934-1953, 
discontinued in 1944, low flows in 1950*s not recorded. 
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the Skunk River basin. These recreational activities are dependent 
on the quantity aind quality of water available, bringing this use 
of the watercourse in direct conflict with municipal-industrial 
waste disposal practices. 
The use of groundwater as a water supply can relate to 
streamflow in the watercourse. The withdrawal of water from 
surficial aquivers emd from bedrock aquivers which feed the stream-
flow in the river may have a noteable effect on the rate of flow 
in the watercourse. Towns such as Jewell, Ames, Cambridge and 
Colfax have surficial acquivers as their main source of water 
supply (86, p. 42). Under certain circumstances withdrawals 
by these towns may change the Skunk River from an effluent stream 
to an influent stream. This possibility is substantiated by ob­
servations made at Ames (58, p. 73). 
In conclusion, the most important hydrological characteristics 
of the basin which may affect water quality management can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1) Being a "source" river the average streamflow in the 
Upper Skunk River is considerably lower than at lower 
parts near the Mississippi (Table 5); 
(2) As a percentage of average flow, low and high flows 
display em extreme variability; 
(3) Although municipal water is generally supplied from 
groundwater sources, this may affect streamflow by a 
lowering of the watertable or by withdrawal of the 
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spring sources of the river; 
(4) The waste disposal practices in the river may be in 
conflict with recreation facilities along the water­
course . 
The delineation of a regional scope 
This study analyzes certain conceptual problems associated 
with water quality management. This approach is in contrast 
with research objectives where actual situations are analyzed in 
order to supply ^  hoc solutions to specific practical problems. 
The puirpose of including an actual regional situation in a con­
ceptual analysis is to guide the arguments, as developed in the 
research process, towards adherence to the requirements for 
realism in model building as discussed in the previous chapter. 
The importemce of such a procedure can intuitively be seen in the 
light of the complexities of the physical problem analyzed. 
In choosing a region, simplicity of the prototype situation 
will be an important consideration. This is required in order to 
cope with the character of model building as presented in the 
first section of the previous chapter. Kneese presented the need 
for simplifications as follows (101, pp. 87-88); 
"An initial step in working out a method, or methods, 
for solution might be to take a highly simplified situation 
and deal with it in terms of both physical smd economic 
factors and the objective sought. A prototype basin might 
be utilized having a simple hydrology, ccsparativGly fev: 
sources and types of pollution, relatively few water supply 
intakes, and a limited array of potential treatment and 
abatement measures. Also, only a small number of constraints 
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representing aesthetic, recreational and public health 
values might initially be incorporated. The character 
of these constraints would depend upon initial specification 
of the major uses of the receiving water and upon an initial 
judgment regarding design flow." 
For the purpose of this research the Upper Skunk River basin, 
down to the confluence of Indian Creek, will be used as a proto­
type situation. The defence for using only this part of the 
Skunk River in the analysis is as follows; 
(1) The general characteristics of this part of the basin 
is representative of the basin as a whole - an enlarge­
ment of the area will, therefore, add to the calculations 
without effecting the conclusions; 
(2) The Upper Skunk River presents a relatively simple 
situation to the planner; 
(3) The Upper Skunk River can fit into the arguments for 
optimal institutional design to be presented in 
Chapter VII. 
(4) The results of the research by Dougal et (58) in 
the Upper Skunk River present data opportunities for 
the planner which are not matched by other basins in 
Iowa. 
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Development of Farm Management 
Activities for Sediment Control 
The following section will concentrate on activities which 
may alter sedimentation from farmland. The procedure will be to 
estimate the differences in cost associated with various erosion 
control practices. Sediment deliveries associated with each 
practice will then be used as coefficients in the model. 
Estimating erosion rates 
The universal soil-loss equation and some of its limitations 
were discussed in Chapter II. The general form of this equation 
is as follows (214, p. 3): 
(17) A = RKLSCP 
where: 
A = soil loss in tons per acre; 
R = rainfall factor; 
K = soil-erodibility factor; 
L = slope-length factor; 
S = slope-gradient factor; 
C = cropping msmagement factor; 
P = erosion-control practice factor. 
It is clear that R, K, L and S will be data for a specific tract 
of land in a specific region. The computed soil loss for a 
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specific tract of land is, therefore, a direct function of changes 
in the values of C and P. The manipulation of the values of C 
and P forms the crux of sediment control strategies of this study. 
Establishing the values of R, K, L, S: The rainfall factor 
(R) is established at the value of 165 for this study. This value 
was interpolated from iso-erodent curves in Figure 1 of Wischmeier 
and Smith (214, pp. 6-7). The value of K is established from 
the U.S.D.A. publication "Soil Survey Information and Interpreta-
tions" (202). A simplifying assumption is made that all of the 
soil in the Upper Skunk River basin consists of Clarion loam, 
Nicollet loam aaid Webster silty clay loam and the relevant K 
value of thèse soils is .32. 
The value of LS is calculated by applying the following 
equation (214, p. 9): 
(18) Ls = f^ (0.0076 + 0.0053s + 0.00076s^) 
where: 
f = slope length in feet, 
s = slope gradient in percent, 
were established from information presented by Runge et (163). 
Slope lengths were chosen after measuring slope lengths for 
specific gradients on transparent overlays of aerial soil survey 
photographs. These photographs were used in research aimed at a 
conservation needs inventory for Iowa (87). The aerial photographs 
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used in the measurements were selected on the basis of their 
approximation to the Upper Skunk River basin as well as to their 
situation (northern-most or southern-most) inside the basin. 
The importance of differentiating between the northern-most 
auid southern-most parts of the Upper Skunk River basin cam be 
seen in the chsmging topography along the basin. After consulta­
tions it was decided to differentiate between the area north of 
Ames aoid the area south of Ames.^ After measuring aoid tabulating 
the slope lengths according to the abovementioned aerial division 
a certain consistency around the 130, 250 and 450 slope lengths 
was revealed. In Table 7 this information is presented for each 
gradient class. The share of each gradient class resorting under 
a specific slope class is also indicated. 
The LS factors can now be calculated by using equation (18) 
and the data in Table 7, The values of the LS factors is 
presented in Table 8. 
Developing the C-factor: The C-factor incorporates the 
combined effects of growing crops as well as cultural methods 
on soil loss, when compared with continuous fallow. In developing 
the C-factor a variety of items need to be considered. The com­
bination of crops grown, their sequence, their yields, cropping 
practices with residues on the fields, and other management 
^Johnson, H. P., Professor of Agricultural Engineering, 
Iowa State University, Personal communication, April 
1971. 
127 
Table 7. Proportion of each gradient class résorting under a 
specific slope class. Upper Skunk River Basin 
Line North Line South 
of Ames of Ames 
Slope class in ft. Slope class in ft. 
130 250 450 130 250 450 
Percent of gradient class Percent of gradient class 
1.0 30 60 10 33 67 
3.0 25 60 15 7 93 
6.5 35 65 50 50 
11.0 30 70 50 50 
15.5 50 50 50 50 
Gradient 
in 
percent 
Table 8. The values of the LS-factors for different gradients 
and slope lengths 
Gradient 
in percent . Slope length 
.130 ft. 250 ft. 450 ft. 
1.0 0.156 0.216 0.290 
3.0 0.346 0.480 0.644 
6.5 0.846 1.173 1.573 
11.0 1.800 2.496 3.349 
15.5 3.105 4.306 5.777 
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practices such as type of tillage operations amd time of year they 
are performed are factors that may influence the value of C. 
The distribution of rainstorms is an important consideration 
in the developing of the value of the C-factor. Few crops are 
planted early enough in the season to furnish good protection 
during time of erosive rains (11, p. 3). The type of tillage 
performed and the placement of crop residues may play em important 
role in the reduction of erosion. 
The most erosive rains in Iowa occur during May and June when 
the least amount of crop cover exists. When crops are grown in 
rotation, aind with good management of residues and proper tillage, 
soil loss can be reduced considerably. The development of the 
C-factor should, therefore, concentrate on three aspects of 
crop-farming, namely: (1) land use emd rotational systems, (2) 
tillage systems, and (3) the memagement of crop residues. 
Because Seay applied the same approach in his study it is 
necessary to review his results for applicability in this analysis. 
The only rotational system allowed in the analysis of Seay 
was corn-corn-soybean rotation. The only other use of farmland 
allowed by him was permanent pasture. He followed this procedure 
in . . am attempt to recognize the realities of existing com­
mercial agriculture in the basin tempered with the best agronomic 
advice" (174, p. 61). He argues that continuous row cropping of 
the type suggested, rather than sod-based rotations, seems to be 
in general use in the Nishnabotna River basin. After consultations 
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with agronomists with a close knowledge of the Skunk River basin 
it was decided to follow the abovementioned land-use and rotational 
system.^ The fairming practices in the Skunk River basin do not 
deviate so much from the practices in the Nishnabotna River basin 
as to warrant a specified distinction in this respect. By 
staying close to the analysis of Seay a compairison between the 
results of the two studies is made easier. The C-factor for 
this rotational system is developed in Tables 1 and 2 of Appendix A. 
The tillage and residual msoiagement systems proposed by Seay 
are the "conventional tillage" and "minimum tillage" systems. The 
"conventional tillage"-system is a sequence of plow-disk-plant-
hoe-cultivate. The "minimum tillage" is a no-plow system which 
combines ridge planting with high crop residues. These systems 
will also be used in this study. The C-factors for practices 
which include these systems are presented in Appendix A, Tables 
1 and 2. 
Developing the P-factor: In the case where no erosion control 
structures are developed the value of P is unity. The vaJLue of P 
will change to less than unity in accordance with the application 
of a specific control structure. In this study only terraces and 
contouring will be included as relevant erosion control structures. 
Gully control structures will not be considered because the 
^oldenhauer, W. C., A.R.S.-U.S.D.A., Ames, Iowa. Personal 
communication. June 1971. 
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generally level topography in the Upper Skunk River basin excludes 
a need for it. The computed erosion rates for terraced land and 
contoured land is presented in Appendix A, Tables 4 and 5. 
Developing the activities for the control of sediment 
The specification of croplsmd in the Upper Skunk River basin; 
Information regarding land-use patterns in Iowa is presented in 
the "Iowa Conservation Need Inventory" (87). The information in 
this inventory is given on a County basis and was prepared from 
randomized samples by the Statistical Laboratory at Iowa State 
University. The full procedure in collecting the data is given 
in the inventory (87, p. 224). 
The information in the inventory is divided between cropland, 
pasture, range, forests said other lemd. The Counties in the 
Upper Skunk River basin have no rangeland according to this 
inventory. For the planning purposes of this study the total of 
cropland and pasture, as presented in the inventory, will be 
used together as potential cropland. The interest is in what 
the farm land-use pattern can be, not what it is. Note, how­
ever, that a "constant" in the form of sediment delivery from 
forest, "other land" and stream bemk erosion is excluded from 
the planning scope. It should be remembered that even in the 
case of zero sediment delivery from croplands, this "constant" 
in suspended sediment will still be present in the water. Accord­
ing to the definition of activities in the program, it will be 
technologically impossible to remove this sediment load. 
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The distribution of the cropland emd pasture according to 
gradient amd slope length was calculated from the data as pre­
sented by Runge et (163) euid by applying the slope length 
measurements from the airphoto overlays as was discussed earlier. 
Information about the part of the drainage area of each county 
situated in the Upper Skunk River basin was calculated from maps 
developed by Larimer (109), This information is summarized for 
different gradient and slope lengths in Tables 9(a) and 9(b). 
The acreage distribution is of importance in the specification 
of the resource base and restrictions in the L.P.-model. 
Developing the gross margin: Interest of this part of the 
study is in the aggregate effect of farming practices on sedimen­
tation, but it is necessary to specify a farm size in order to 
calculate machine costs. Because of economics of size these 
costs may differ under different assumptions of farm size. Seay 
worked with hypothetical units of 450 acres of cropland because; 
"A unit of this size is felt to be representative of viable com­
mercial farm enterprises that are coming to typify modern agri­
culture" (174, p. 62). The procedure of Seay is followed in this 
instance also. 
The variable costs of importance in calculating the gross 
margin for activités in this study are: (1) The difference in 
cost structure associated with different sizes aoid kinds of farm 
machinery; (2) The difference in operation times associated with 
the general levelness of the cropfields as well as to cope with 
Table 9(8.). Distribution of farmland in the Squaw Creek watershed of the Upper Skunk 
River basin according to County, gradient and slope length^ 
Hamilton County Boone County Story County 
Gradient . 
in percent Slope length (ft.) Slope length (ft.) Slope length (ft.) 
130 250 450 130 250 450 130 250 450 
1.0 8783 18471 
3.0 4377 10505 
6.5 815 1513 
11.0 174 407 
15.5 874 846 
3078 8115 16232 2705 1831 3663 611 
2626 9756 23404 5846 1499 3596 1799 
N 
2827 5249 515 956 
145 339 150 351 
1373 1373 313 313 
^Source: Larimer (109). 
Table 9(b). Distribution of farmland in the Upper Skunk River 
basin (excluding Squaw Creek) according to county, 
gradient and slope length^ 
Gradient 
in 
percent 
Hamilton County 
Slope length (ft.) 
130 250 450 
Story County 
(North of Ames) 
Slope length (ft.) 
130 250 450 
acres acres 
18253 38387 6397 9670 19339 3223 1.0 
3.0 9102 21831 5452 7917 18992 9496 
6.5 1693 3144 2719 5050 
11.0 363 847 794 1851 
15.5 1759 1759 1653 1653 
Source; Larimer (109). 
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Story County Polk County Jasper County 
(South of Ames) (North of Indian Creek) 
Slope length (ft.) Slope length (ft.) Slope length (ft.) 
130 250 130 250 130 250 
acres acres acres 
10260 20832 7721 15675 325 675 
2137 28398 1871 24877 90 1186 
3747 3747 4679 4679 514 514 
1276 1276 2261 2261 511 511 
1595 1595 1949 1949 139 139 
135 
erosion control structures; (3) The cost of applying different 
tillage systems; (4) The yearly cost of construction (interest 
and depreciation) and the generail upkeep of terraces. These will 
now each be considered in detail. 
(1) The difference in cost structure associated with different 
sizes and kinds of farm machines: The specification of the farm 
size as em average unit of 450 acres is a simplification which 
eliminates the need for the consideration of machine-sizes for 
different farm sizes. This simplification is feasible because 
this study presents no interest in economics of size. There is, 
however, another factor of importance in the specification of 
machine sizes. It is the problem of timeliness in performing 
crucial operations. By specifying starting dates for these crucial 
operations (i.e., planting) and the average available time for the 
completion of the operation, a set of farm machinery can be estab­
lished which will answer to the needs (174, p. 67). The complete 
calculation for this approach is presented in Seay (174, Table 
19b, pp. 147-148). 
(2) Operation costs associated with different gradients 
and erosion control structures; It can be expected that field 
operations on flatlands would be less time consuming than opera­
tions performed on slopes because of lower operation speeds on 
slopes. James indicates that parallel terraces ceoi be farmed 
approximately as efficient as flat laind (91, p. 40). It is 
therefore, assumed that the time requirements and variable costs 
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of parallel terraces and flat lamd are the same. On the other hand 
Smith (176) indicates a 32 percent increase in farming time for 
operations perfoinned on nonparallel terraces with shorter row 
lengths emd "point rows" compared to parallel terraces. Seay used 
this information to adjust upland emd contour operating times aind 
variable costs with a factor of 1.32 compared to flatlaind emd 
parallel terrace operation times. This factor will also be used 
in this study with the explicit assumption that upland and contour 
operations have the same increased time requirements as nonparallel 
terraces. With the help of this adjustment the variable costs for 
flat leinds, uplsmds, contour euid parallel terraces can be determined. 
These costs are presented in Appendix B, Table 1. 
(3) Cost of tillage systems: The cost of applying different 
tillage systems is presented in Appendix B, Table 1. These costs 
were calculated from the difference in operation times between 
minimum tillage and conventional tillage. 
(4) Costs associated with terraces; The establishment amd 
maintenemce costs associated with terraces is presented in Appendix 
B, Table 2. The total variable costs in this instemce consists of 
an annual interest charge of 7% percent, the ainnual maintenance 
cost aaid production foregone to lamd in the backslopes of the 
terraces. 
Gross revenues of certain crops on Clarion-Nicollet-Webster 
soils are presented in Appendix B, Table 4, The gross margin of 
different activities is presented in Table 10. 
Table 10. Gross margin and sediment delivery for specific systems 
of cultivation and soil conservation 
Land accord­ System of cultivation Gross Variable ^ 
ing to: & soil conservation revenue prod, cost 
gradient slope 
length 
percent ft. $/ac $/ac 
1.0 130 Conv. tillage 115.66 57.64 
" " + contour 115.66 60.65 
Min. tillage 115.66 49.51 
" " + contour 115.66 51.34 
Perm, pasture 88.00 32.96 
1.0 250 Conv. tillage 115.66 57.64 
" " + contour 115.66 60.65 
Min. tillage 115.66 49.51 
" " + contour 115.66 51.34 
Perm, pasture 88.00 32.96 
1.0 450 Conv. tillage 115.66 57.64 
" " + contour 115.66 60.65 
Min. tillage 115.66 49.51 
" " + contour 115.66 51.34 
Perm, pasture 88.00 32.96 
3.0 130 Conv. tillage 113.30 57.64 
" " + contour 113.30 60.65 
" " + terrace 113.30 57.64 
Min. tillage 113.30 49.51 
•' " + contour 113.30 51.34 
" " + terrace 113.30 49.51 
Perm, pasture 90.00 32.96 
3.0 250 Conv. tillage 113.30 57.64 
" " + contour 113.30 60.65 
" " + terrace 113.30 57.64 
Min. tillage 113.30 49.51 
" " + contour 113.30 51.34 
" " + terrace 113.30 49.51 
Perm, pasture 90.00 32.96 
^From Table 4, Appendix B, 
^From Tables 1 and 3, Appendix B. 
^From Table 2, Appendix B. 
'Vrom Tables 3, 4, 5, aoid 6, Appendix A. 
^Assumed delivery ratios, Johnson, H. P., Professor of Agri­
cultural Engineering, Iowa State University. Personal communication. 
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Variable Gross Erosion Delivery Sediment 
terrace margin rate*^ ratio® delivered 
cost^ 
No. So. No. So. 
Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. 
$/ac $/ac tons/ac t/ac t/ac 
58.02 3.104 .05 .20 0.155 0.621 
55.01 1.862 0.093 0.372 
66.15 1.484 0.074 0.297 
64.32 0.890 0.045 0.178 
55.04 0.033 0.002 0.007 
58.02 4.298 0.215 0.860 
55.01 2.579 \ • < 0.129 0.516 
66.15 2.054 0.103 0.411 
64.32 1.233 0.062 0.247 
55.04 0.046 0.002 0.009 
58.02 5.770 0.289 0.115 
55.01 3.462 0.173 0.692 
66.15 2.758 0.138 0.552 
64.32 1.655 0.083 0.331 
55.04 0.061 0*003 0.012 
55.66 6.864 0.343 1.373 
52.65 4.119 0.206 0.824 
6.26 49.40 0.275 0.014 0.055 
63.79 3.281 0.164 0.656 
61.96 1.969 0.098 0.394 
6.26 57.53 0.131 0.006 0.026 
57.04 0.073 0.003 0.015 
55.66 9.530 0.472 1.906 
52.65 5.718 0.286 1.144 
6.26 49.40 0.381 0.019 0.762 
63.79 4.556 0.228 0.911 
61.96 2.733 0.137 0.547 
6.26 57.53 0.182 0.009 0.036 
57.04 0.101 0.005 0.020 
Table 10. l eant . )  
Land accord­
ing to: 
gradient slope 
length 
System of cultivation Gross Variable 
& soil conservation revenue prod, cost 
percent ft. $/ac $/ac 
3.0 450 Conv. tillage 113.30 57.64 
ff " + terrace 113.30 57.64 
Min. tillage 113.30 49.51 
It " + terrace 113.30 49.51 
Perm. pasture 90.00 32.96 
6.5 130 Conv. tillage 107.30 60.65 
II " + contour 107.30 60.65 
11 " + terrace 107.30 57.64 
Min. tillage 107.30 51.34 
ft " + contour 107.30 51.34 
It " + terrace 107.30 49.51 
Perm. pasture 84.00 32.96 
6.5 250 Conv. tillage 107.30 60.65 
II " + contour 107.30 60.65 
II " + terrace 107.30 57.64 
Min. tillage 107.30 51.34 
II " + contour 107.30 51.34 
II " + terrace 107.30 49.51 
Perm. pasture 84.00 32.96 
11.0 130 Conv. tillage 101.96 60.65 
11 " + terrace 101.96 57.64 
Min. tillage 101.96 51.34 
tr 
" + terrace 101.96 49.51 
Perm. pasture 80.00 32.96 
11.0 250 Conv. tillage 101.96 60.65 
II " + terrace 101.96 57.64 
Min. tillage 101.96 51.34 
tt " + terrace 101.96 49.51 
Perm. pasture 80.00 32.96 
15.5 130 Conv. tillage 97.37 60.65 
<1 '• + terrace 97.37 57.64 
Min, tillage 97.37 51.34 
II 
" + terrace 97.37 49.51 
Perm. pasture 78.00 32.96 
15.5 250 Conv. tillage 97.37 60.65 
IT " + terrace 97.37 57.64 
Min. tillage 97.37 51.34 
II " + terrace 97.37 49.51 
Perm. pasture 78.00 32.96 
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Variable Gross Erosion Delivery Sediment 
terrace margin rate ratio delivered 
No. So. No. So. 
Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. 
$/ac $/ac tons/ac t/ac t/ac 
55.66 12.793 0.05 .20 0.640 2.559 
6.26 49.40 0.512 0.026 0.102 
63.79 6.116 0.306 1.223 
6.26 57.53 0.245 0.012 0.049 
57.04 0.136 0.007 0.027 
46.64 16.853 0.843 3.371 
46.65 10.111 < 1 1 0.506 2.022 
14.11 35.55 0.674 0.034 0.135 
55.96 8.056 0.403 1.611 
55.96 4.834 0.242 0.967 
14.11 43.68 0.322 0.016 0.064 
51.04 0.178 0.009 0.036 
46.64 23.378 1.169 4.676 
46.65 14.027 0.701 2.805 
14.11 35.55 0.935 0.047 0.187 
55.96 11.175 0.559 2.235 
55.96 6.705 0.335 1.341 
14.11 43.68 0.447 0.022 0.089 
51.04 0.248 0.012 0.050 
41.31 35.814 1.791 7.163 
17.06 27.26 1.433 0.072 0.287 
50.62 17.120 0.856 3.424 
17.06 35.39 0.685 0.034 0.137 
47.07 0.380 0.002 0.076 
41.31 49.682 2.484 9.936 
17.06 27.26 1.987 0.099 0.397 
50.62 23.749 1.187 4.750 
17.06 35.39 0.950 0.048 0.190 
47.04 0.527 0.026 0.105 
36.72 61.800 3.090 12.360 
27.00 12.73 2.472 0.124 0.494 
46.03 29.541 1.477 5.908 
27.00 20.86 1.182 0.059 0.236 
45.04 0.656 0.033 0.131 
36.72 85.695 4.285 17.139 
27.00 12. 73 3.428 0.171 0.686 
46.03 40.964 2.048 9.193 
27.00 20.86 1.638 0.082 0.328 
45.04 0.910 0.046 0.182 
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The total specification of activities in the program: In 
Table 10 the gross margin is presented for each activity to be 
considered in the program. These activities will be separately 
specified for each part of the Counties in the Upper Skunk River 
basin (including the Squaw Creek watershed). The upper resource 
base limit for each activity in each subregion was specified in 
Tables 9(a) aoid 9(b). 
Suspended sediment concentration will be calculated according 
to the procedure as explained by Seay by using the formula (174, 
p. 74): 
(19) Concentration (ppm) = 
"w 
where: 
Og = amount of sediment in tons; 
= eimount of water in acre ft. 
The value of will be established for each subregion from 
a per unit average. 
Development of Activities 
for Control of BOD 
Three economic agents will be considered when activities 
for BOD control in the Upper Skunk River basin are formulated, 
namely, urban use, meat packing plants and cattle feedlots. Of 
importance in the formulation of the plaints are: (1) Quad-ity and 
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quantity of the effluent (i.e., concentrations); (2) The way the 
effluent is introduced (i.e., continuously or with intervals); 
(3) Control measures and the associated costs; (4) The relevant 
design flow; (5) The placement of the economic agents along the 
watercourse. 
In the first part of this chapter an exposition was presented 
of the general characteristics of the economic life in the Upper 
Skunk River basin. It was indicated that no major industrial 
complex exists in this area. Excluding the turkey growing enter­
prise at Ellsworth, the major sources of BOD in the watercourse 
are towns in this area. The distributions of towns along the 
watercourse is presented in Figure 7. 
The situation regarding cattle feedlots is best described by 
Dougal et (58, p. 101): "livestock feedlots for cattle and 
swine are believed to be less of a problem since they are scattered 
aoid not concentrated in one region of the basin. No extensive 
commercial lots were observed during the field investigations, 
although several large operations were noted. Several feedlots 
at farms located on rolling slopes at the edge of the Skunk River 
in the region upstream of Ames have open lots that are barren 
and packed, with a significant potential for rapid runoff during 
storms. In the reach of the Skunk River downstream of Ames, 
there are fewer pastures along the stream as the wide bottom 
Isinds are extensively cropped." 
The existential situation in the Upper Skunk River basin is. 
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therefore, not so critical as to warrant a research on water quality 
management as presented here. It was also indicated by Dougal et al. 
that the spacing of major BOD contributors along the stream is such 
that the stream is purified by the time it has reached the next 
community^ (58, p. 109). The objective for including various 
hypothetical situations in the planning framework is to study the 
problems of planning associated with certain potential developments 
in the basin. 
The development of activities for water quality planning 
with respect to towns amd meatpacking plants 
It was indicated in Chapter II that the physical structures 
used in the control of the quality of effluent from towns and from 
meatpacking plants are essentially the same. It will be assumed 
for this study that, considering certain preconditions for 
slaughtering- and packing-operations, treatment processes for 
effluent from meatpacking plants and towns are exactly the same. 
Assumptions concerning the quality aoid quaintity of effluent 
from towns: The quantitative and qualitative variability of sewage 
entering sewage treatment plants was presented by Baumann (15). 
These variations are diurnal (depending on what time of the day), 
weekly (reflecting some basic human routine during the week) amd 
seasonal. In addition to the temporal variations in each community, 
there are differences between ccsssunitiss not only because of the 
^This statement excludes the recreational amd aesthetics 
aspect of water quality plamning. 
144 
effect on sewage quality from specific contributors (i.e., the 
U.S.D.A. Meat Laboratory at Ames) but also because of the size 
of the community. There is also a difference between the volume 
of sewage per capita between the larger and smaller city (15), 
For the purpose of this study a constant sewage flow per 
capita for all the towns in the Upper Skunk River basin will be 
assumed. The limitation of the simplification is clear from the 
discussions above. This simplification is made because of the 
present state of the arts smd because of the need to keep the 
model as simple as possible.^ The limitations of this simplifi­
cation is in the realism of the presentation, but the conceptual 
approach towards the attainment of the objectives of this study 
will be left.unaffected. 
The quantitative and qualitative assumptions concerning the 
characteristics of urban effluent to be used in this study axe 
as follows: 
(1) Daily per capita wasteflow = 123 g.p.d. 
(Dougal et , 58, p. 197, Table 4, 
average of 1970-1990 winter-summer 
projections adapted for a normail year 
from Table 41) 
It is not enough to know the variations in sewage flow and 
concentration. To make this information operational, associated 
information regarding streamflow, time and distance of streemflow, 
reaeration and deoxygenation coefficients fox each flow must be 
available. 
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(2) BODg concentration of wasteflow = 263 mg/l 
(Dougal et al., 58, p. 202, average 
of 1970-1990 winter-summer projections) 
(3) Daily suspended solids per capita = 0.25 lb 
(Baumamn, 16, p. 18) 
These figures will be extended to apply to all towns in the 
basin on a per capita basis. 
Assumptions concerning the quality aoid quamtity of effluent 
from meatpacking plauits: To generalize on the kind of effluent 
emmitted by meat packing plants is in itself a simplifying assump­
tion. A variety of factors may, for instance, affect the volume 
of water used per animal slaughtered. The layout of the factory, 
type of equipment in use, application of water conservation 
measures, the application of clean housekeeping measures, the re­
covery of by-products and the climatic conditions, to name a few, 
may change and affect water use (69, pp. 3-4). The haindling of 
certain residuals in the slaughtering and packing process may 
affect the quality of the effluent considerably, as seen by the 
two following examples relating to bloods aaid fats: 
(1) Blood carries an extremely high organic load. If 
aui abattoir slaughters 100 cattle per day and allows 
the blood to waste, this blood carries a BCD-load 
equal to a town of (on the average) 3,000 people 
f AO . T> . N Qn H1 •? e i f on 1 if 
the few hours slaughtering is actually done, such a 
strong load can upset the operation of biological 
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treatment processes. Blood is difficult to breaJc down, 
amd this may affect the overall efficiency of the waste 
treatment plant (69, pp. 23-24). 
A specific operational procedure is, therefore, 
assumed here for the meatpacking plant. It is assumed 
that all the blood of the slaughtering process is 
efficiently recovered amd converted into blood meal. 
(2) The dressing of the carcass and the cutting of meat re­
sults in wastage of fat which eventually finds its way 
to the drain. Fat tends to stick to walls of sewer 
pipes and if cellolosic solids from paunches are present, 
the sewer pipes become clogged (69, p. 24). 
It is therefore assumed that meatpacking plants 
in this study have fat traps. Fat amd grease cam be a 
valuable by-product amd their recovery obviates the 
cost of having to clean sewer pipes frequently. 
After withholding blood and fats from entering the sewage 
treatment plant the remaining residuals are urine, dung and the 
paunch content. The quaintitative and qualitative assumptions 
concerning the characteristics of meatpacking plant effluent to 
be used in this study are then as follows; 
(1) Daily per head of cattle wasteflow = 720 g.p.d. 
(Funke, 69, p. 4, average of 
abattoirs vrith sieatpacking) 
(2) BOD- concentration of the wasteflow = 219 mg/l 
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(Funke, 69, p. 22, figures converted to 
a sewage delivery of 720 g.p.d.) 
(3) Suspended solids per head of cattle = 18 lb. 
(Funke, 69, p. 22) 
Activities for sewage treatment; The full range of treatment 
processes were discussed in Chapter II. These processes present 
the planner with a certain picture of discreteness. Primary 
treatment, secondary treatment and tertiary treatment are not 
only defined in terms of the type of processes applied but are 
usually also presented with a definite range of effects (Baumann, 
16, pp. 29-32). 
The question now is; How relevant are these treatment ranges 
for application in a planning framework? There may be a difference 
between what amd what can be. Deininger describes the situation 
as follows (52, p. 120): "A study of the economics of waste treat­
ment is a difficult task. It might be assumed that waste treat­
ment plants are designed in accordance with economy; however, an 
aoialysis will show that economy is not often the major consideration. 
Quite frequently legally established stamdards limit the inequity 
of the engineer." 
Anderson expamded on this by describing the operations and 
maintenance procedures practiced at treatment plamts at the 
moment (3, p. 51); "... For although it is possible to design 
a trsatssnt plant to operate at emy particular level of a wide 
treatment range this is not done. Waste treatment plants are 
normally designed to operate as primary, secondary or tertiary 
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treatment facilities. Once designed and built they customarily 
function at their highest level of removal. However this need 
not always be the case. There is no reason why treatment plants 
of the future cannot be built to operate efficiently over a wide 
range of treatment levels." He then gave examples of approaches 
towards accomplishing this. It can be done by variations in re­
tention time, in the amount of chemical additives, in the amount 
of induced air as well as by by-passing certain portions of the 
system (3, p. 51). 
A real question arises, therefore, behind the applicability 
of time series or cross sectional cost-data of water treatment 
activities in a planning framework. From the discussions of 
Deininger aoid Anderson it is clear that such data will incorporate 
an implicit bias. Due to this problem it can be argued that the 
only relevant data to be used in the plauining of water quality 
management will be those developed when engineers ignore standards 
and consider the full raunge of alternatives in construction, 
operation and maintenance. As stated before, this study does 
not accept the existing institutional structure as data. 
The relative merits of different cost figures presented by 
various research workers cannot, in the light of the previous 
discussions, be defended easily. Such reviews of various studies 
were presented by Deininger (52) and Freinkel (66). In both cases 
the results of the studies were described amd findings were then 
expressed in mathematical and/or graphical terms. Deniniger 
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emalyzed cost data from various parts of the United States as 
well as from Germany and Englcind (52, pp. 120-168). Frankel used 
the results from reports covering, in the main, cases in the United 
States (66, pp. 5-18). Deininger presented a linear costfunction 
with respect to different treatment levels (52, p. 164). Frankel 
presented a nonlinear costfunction (66, p. 22). After the argu­
ments presented by these two research workers were studies, it 
was decided to use the costfunction as presented by Deininger. 
The decision was made on the following grounds: 
(1) The review of Deininger covers the results of various 
countries, thereby diminishing the institutional bias 
in the costfigures; 
(2) The cost function of Deininger includes economics of 
size as an explicitly formulated relation, whereas 
the results of Frankel only cover three specific sizes. 
In their final smalysis and in the development of their cost 
functions, both Deininger and Frankel considered various deten­
tion times as a means of altering the efficiencies of specific 
plants. 
It is therefore assumed, that the construction costs of 
treatment plants can be expressed by a cost function of the 
form (52, p. 150) 
(20) C = I a X 
where: 
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P = size o f  treatment plant in M.G.D. (million gallons 
a day or in population equivalents); 
X = degree of treatment in percentage BOD-removal; 
I = index for construction cost at the treatment plaoit; 
a = basic construction costs; 
b = factor for the economics of size (0.75); 
C = total construction. 
In calculating the treatment costs of urban and meatpacking 
plant effluent, a problem will develop due to the differences in 
volume and concentration per unit (cattle or capita) of the 
sewage in the two cases. A usual procedure in such an instsince 
is to express the sewage flow in terms of population equivalents. 
Population equivalents caai be expressed either in terms of the 
volume or in terms of the concentration and characteristics of 
the sewage or in terms of a combination of these two factors. 
A population equivalent expressed in terms of the wasteflow will 
clearly not be equal to a population equivalent expressed in 
terms of BOD concentration (an added problem is the effect of 
suspended solids in this study). Since a waste treatment plauit 
consists of two main stages: (1) a mechanical stage in which 
the amount of waste to be treated is the influencing factor 
(2) a biological-electrochemical stage where the amount of BOD is 
the isipcrtant factor, a population equivalent reflecting both 
these factors is necessary. Short of a detailed study the 
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formulation of an accurate conversion factor for a population 
equivalent will be impossible. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this study, the population equivalent conversion factor for 
sewage from meatpacking plemts will be assumed to be as follows: 
P.E. (BOD) = 
= 4.858 
P.E. (BOD) = population equivalent for BOD per unit 
of cattle slaughtered 
P.E. (SS) =5% 
= 72.00 
where: 
P.E. (SS) = population equivsLLent. for suspended 
solids per unit of cattle slaughtered 
Suspended solids (SS) will not be considered in the treatment 
costs calculations. This procedure (the exclusion of SS in cost 
calculations) is a simplifying assumption and should not be 
viewed as a fact. It is clear that a bias towards high SS con­
centrations will be implicit in the subsequent cost calculations. 
The total AnnuAl cost for sewage treatment plants is assumed 
to be expressed by the following cost function (52, pp. 163-164): 
where: 
and 
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V (1+r)" - il 
(21) AC = C —J + c X 
where; 
C = Total construction cost; 
r = rate of interest; 
n = retirement period in years; 
= index for operation costs; 
c = basic operation costs; 
d = factor for the economics of size in operation 
and maintenance (0.30); 
X = degree of treatment in percentage BCD-removal; 
A C = annual cost of sewage treatment. 
All costs are converted to the relevant E.N.R. Engineering cost 
Index through insertion of the relevant indices in equations 20 
and 21. The values of a in equation 20 aoid c in equation ,21 are 
established as follows: 
(1) a = = $370,000 
P X 
where: 
C = $370,000 (Reading Fig. 7, 52, p. 149, extrapolated.) 
P^ = 1 (1 M.G.D. plant); 
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where: 
C = $11,000 (Reading Fig, 8, 52, p. 154 for primary 
treatment plants); 
y 
P = 1 M.G.D. plant} 
X = 0.35 (average proportion of BOD removed 
through primary treatment, Baumann, 16, p. 30). 
Equation 21 shows that in evaluating the total annuad costs • 
of a sewage treatment plant both the life of the facilities (n) 
and the interest on the investment (r) are important variables. 
There are two major factors which may atffect the life of sewage 
treatment facilities: (1) Care in operation and maintenance; 
(2) the obsolescence factor. Obsolescence may be due to changes 
in the population of a town or due to technological changes. 
Without obsolescence the life of a plant might approximate 40 
years but in general a 25 year period is viewed as normal (66, 
p. 189). Bond issues, on the other hand, are usually not shorter 
than 20 years with 25 years as em average. The relevant rate of 
interest is another factor. It may vary around 4 percent for 
bond issues, but uncertainty about the future may affect the 
relevant rate as a discounting factor, keeping in mind these 
problems it is assumed that the relevant retirement periods (n) 
is 20 years and the relevant interest rate (r) is 4^ percent. 
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The development of activities for water quality management 
with respect to cattle feedlots 
In Chapter II a variety of approaches were discussed in the 
control and disposal of residuals from cattle feedlots. The 
knowledge of these technical alternatives can, in general, not 
be substantiated with arguments of economic feasibility. Knowl­
edge about economic feasibility is either born out of a survey 
of practical results on farms or out of close cooperation of 
economists with engineers in the development and execution of 
studies concerning farm animal-waste mamagement. 
The practical application of a technological innovation 
presents, usually, a considerable time lag after its development. 
Dougal et illustrate the present "state of the arts" in farm 
waste management in the Upper Skunk River basin as follows 
(58, p. 101): "One livestock feeder at Ames has installed a 
lagoon for feedlot pollution control, but the lagoon effluent 
has continued to flow into the recreational impoundment of the 
Isaac Walton League located north-east of Ames." Even if 
economic information concerning practices in specific areas of 
the United States is available it will be difficult to generalize 
from it. The Federal Water Pollution Control Administration ob­
serves (62, p. 9): "Control measures vary, ranging from such 
simple expedients as ditching around lots (to reduce incidence 
of polluted runoff) to sophisticated techniques such as adjusting 
feeding cycles emd amimal concentrations to climatic cycles, to 
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regular hydraulic flushing with collection and treatment of waste 
water. There is no single method of control that combines the 
desirable features of low cost, dependability emd climatic rele­
vance. Significant is the fact that the problem is seldom clear 
cut, but only potential; with the lot size, climate, type of 
feeding and soil conditions all relevant to the situation of any 
unit." 
The existing situation in feedlot-waste memagement is character­
istic of a stage of technological-adaptation. No clear cut pattern 
is followed while feedlot mamagors experiment with different ap­
proaches, A review of literature on this subject reveals a 
considerable lack of economic rationale in discussions about the 
various approaches (36) (134) (46). Although the report of the 
Animal Waste Management Conference does cover papers on the 
"economics" of waste management these papers generally present 
no more than ^  hoc cost calculations. 
To meet the objectives of this study certain simplifica­
tions will be made when describing the "state of the arts" for 
the purpose of the model. It will be assumed that only one 
approach will be used in the control of cattle feedlot waste, 
namely, the collection of feedlot runoff in a basin amd the 
distribution thereof on land designated for the purpose. 
The basic cost information will be derived from a study 
made at the Texas Technological College (150). It is assumed 
that, after acknowledgment of the special conditions under which 
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the cost data were developed aaid after the application of an 
E.N.R, index^, the data will be applicable for the Upper Skunk 
River basin. 
Quality and queintity of effluent: The problem of cattle 
feedlot runoff is closely associated with rainfall occurrences. 
This is an additional probabilistic factor in the design of 
2 
control systems. The intensity and occurrence of rainfall not 
only determines the volume of waste entering a watercourse but 
also the concentration. In studies of cattle feedlot runoff 
Miner and Willrich established in Kansas the concentration of the 
runoff aoid determined the following relationship (134, p. 1585): 
(22) BOD (mg/1) = ^ ^  \ ' S ' 
Where ; 
c = COD/BOD ratio (average 8.8); 
R = rainfall rate in inches/hr.; 
K^ = temperature correction factor; 
= lot moisture correction factor; 
= constant depending on surface (concrete or non-
surfaced) of feedlot aind cattle density. 
iThe E.N.R. indexes may also be misleading due to the factors 
considered in its development (52, p. 125). Due to the lack of a 
better index it is assumed that the E.N.R. indexes are applicable. 
'^This is, of course, not a problem where systems such as 
amaerobic and aerobic treatment are used. In these systems the 
residues are removed from the feedlot and then treated. 
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The values of K , and K can be established from Table 1 and 
m t o 
Figure 1 of Miner and Willrich (134, pp. 1585-1596). Results of the 
Kansas studies as reported by Owens and Griffin also reveal a specific 
relationship between rainfall and runoff observed (150, p. 5). 
(23) Q = -0.3819 + 0.8732P 
where: 
Q = inches of runoff; 
R = precipitation in inches. 
The volume of runoff csui then be established by the following 
equation: 
(24) A(43560)(7.481) 
where: 
= gallons of runoff water; 
A = acres of feedlot (pens and roads); 
43560 = square feet per acre; 
7.481 = gallons of water in a cubic foot. 
The quality and quantity of feedlot runoff to be used in 
this study will depend on the design precipitation. Arguments 
for a design precipitation will be presented together with the 
design flow. 
Costs associated with runoff control: The cost data were 
developed for feedlots with specific characteristics (150, pp. 15-17). 
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It is assumed that: 
(1) The feedlots were designed in the form of a square on 
land with an average slope of 5 percent; 
(2) Land above the feedlot elevations utilized for parking, 
feed storage, administration, shipping or other agricul­
tural use is assumed to be 30 percent of the total area 
of the feedlots; the total runoff from this area is 
assumed to be diverted around the feedlot installations; 
(3) Total acreage (pens, roads eind alleys) amounts to 20 
acres for each 5,000 head feedlot capacity; 
(4) Runoff has to be elevated 35 ft. and transported 700 
ft. for land disposal in the case of a 5,000 head unit, 
and elevated 43 ft. aind transported 860 ft. for a 10,000 
heat unit; 
(5) Only two sizes of cattle feedlots eire considered, 
namely, a 5,000 head unit and a 10,000 head unit; 
(6) Feedlots are situated near the watercourse and that 
all the runoff (or overflow) will enter the stream 
directly. 
The restrictiveness of the above specifications illustrates 
the potential for variations in the characteristics of residuals 
from feedlots (quantitative and qualitative) and the associated 
costs of prevention. This situation presents near insurmountable 
problems for the rational planning and administration of water 
quality. 
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The cost data for the open field disposal system for cattle 
feedlot runoff is presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Average yearly cost of an open field disposal system 
by capacity emd for two feedlot sizes^ 
System size in 
rainfall equivalent 
inches 
5,000 head 
capacity 
10,000 head 
capacity 
Basin 
capacity 
Discharge rate 
/24 hrs. $ $ 
2 .2 931 1390 
.4 965 1594 
3 .2 970 1546 
.4 1008 1691 
4 .2 1013 1630 
Source; Owens, T. R. and W, L. Griffin (150, p. 61), cost 
figures adapted to relevemt E.N.R.-index. 
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The Application of the Model 
In applying the model to the Upper Skunk River Basin certain 
constants need to be specified beforehand. These constants axe 
the design waterflow smd rainfall, the constants and K^, the 
speed of flow, the ultimate BOD, the effect of algae on reaeration 
aoid the spatial distribution of economic agents. The importance 
of these constants are clear from the discussions in Chapter IV, 
Design waterflow and design rainfall 
A model was described in Chapter IV where different seasons 
and different rates of flow were considered. Such an approach is 
highly rational because different seasons present different prob­
lems to the planner. The seasonal character of river- and wasteflow, 
the critical periods for feedlot runoff, the changes in algal 
activity and the changes in temperature are examples of seasonal 
variations which affect the ability of a stream to assimilate aind 
remove residuals. Seasonal variations in recreation demand is an 
example of changes in qualitative requirements for the water in 
the stream. The idea in formulating a model to recognize seasonal 
situations is to compare different situations and then to establish 
the critical seasons for specific water uses and water supply. A 
present practice is to rely on one critical planning situation, 
for example, the quality of the 7-day, 10 year low flow. This 
low flow should answer to the requirements of specific uses,^ 
even if such water uses are irrelevant for the most probable time 
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such a low flow might occur. Because of a lack of data with respect 
to different seasons this study will also concentrate.on one 
critical (unspecified) season for the demand and supply of water. 
This is a restrictive procedure and it might result in "excess 
resource capacity".^ 
The 7-day, 10 year low flow is the generally accepted design 
flow for the construction of waste control plants (Baumann, 15). 
The basis for using this design flow is to ascertain that the 
plant will accommodate the most stringent stream conditions. The 
decision in using this design flow is arbitrary, devoid of economic 
analysis aoid generally without knowledge concerning the opportunity 
cost of using such a stringent measure. There are obvious alterna­
tives for the purpose of increasing the design flow such as i 
temporary storage of sewage during low flow periods. The important 
point here is that a too stringent design flow will also result in 
"excess resource capacity". 
For this study the 7-day low flow recurring every 1.05 years 
will be used in plemning the control of urban effluent and meat­
packing plant effluent. It is assumed that each waste control 
plant has the facilities to withhold wasteflow during periods of i 
lower than this design flow. The 7-day, 10 year low flow in the 
Upper Skunk River basin is extremely low (0.05 cfs. North of Ames). 
The concept "excess resource capacity" refers to the under 
utilization of a specific resource, i.e., the ARCE resource as 
defined in Chapter I. 
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During this low flow period many of the tributaries flowing into 
the Skunk River become influent streams. These streams represent 
then a natural sand filter to towns dumping sewage into its course, 
thus preventing any negative effect to communities downstream.^ 
The design flow for cattle feedlots should be considered 
together with a design rainfall because of the close association 
of the quality and quantity of feedlot runoff with the rainfall 
intensity (see equations 22 and 23). Establishing these design 
parameters are, however, extremely complex. If a specific storm 
is only associated with a small area surrounding a feedlot, the 
runoff may enter a stream with a relative low flow. The same 
precipitation over the whole catchment area may result in near 
flood conditions. For the purpose of this study it is assumed 
that the precipitation falling on a specific feedlot is evenly 
distributed over the whole of the upstream catchment area. Be­
cause of the relative small area to be used in this model for the 
location of feedlots (the area in the basin north of Ames) this 
assumption is not so restrictive. 
The design rainfall to be used in simulating feedlot runoff 
is 4" in 7 days. This precipitation is noted to have an extremely 
low probability of occurrence (less them 5 percent; 175, p. 30). 
After comparing the potential results of a 4" storm occurring in 
^Dougal, Merwin, D., Professor of Engineering, Iowa State 
University. Personal communication, June 1971, 
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one day (recurrence interval about 10 years for the Des Moines 
area south of Ames (56)), it was obvious that the 4" one week 
precipitation is the more critical. Using the average yearly 
yield of the Skunk River as a basis of comparison with average 
yearly precipitation such a precipitation represents a flow of 
about 180 cfs. near Ames. It was decided to use the average flow 
of 135 cfs. near Ames at the design flow leaving a "security 
leverage" of about 45 cfs. against the uncertainty of precipita­
tion not occurring in the spatial pattern as described above. 
Assumptions concerning certain factors used in the model 
Specific assumptions used in this study are as follows: 
(1) The deoxygenation rate: 
(base 10) = 1.4 
(Average value after Dougal et , 58, pp. 
424-425) 
(2) Reoxygenation rate: 
Kg (base 10) = 5.00 
for flow (Q) 40 cfs. 
Kg (base 10) = 55 
for flow (Q) 135 cfs. 
(Dougal et al., 58, pp. 440-441) 
(3) Time of flow (i.e., speed of stream flow): 
Time (m.p.h.) = 0.149 Q°'3737 
(Dougal et , 58, p. 329) 
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(4) Ultimate BOD: 
The BOD^ data supplied when the quality of water is 
described"is useful when a standardized procedure is 
required in reporting. For the purpose of simulating 
stream condition the ultimate BOD is required. All 
the BOD data in the model is subsequently chsinged to 
the ultimate BOD according to the following relationship. 
BOD5 = .676 
(Dougal et a^., 58, Average from Table 108, p. 445) 
(5) Algal photosynthesis-respiration (P - R) correction 
factor: 
An algal (P - R) correction factor of 5.8 mg./l./day 
is allowed in the model which is the average of the base 
levels as presented by Dougal et (58, p. 450). It 
is clear from the exposition of Dougal et that the 
effect of seasons on algal activity is of special import­
ance in planning water quality. By applying this single 
correction factor a simplification is accepted of a 
complex process. 
The spatial distribution of economic agents along the watercourse 
In Figure 7 an approximation is presented of towns along 
the watercourse. In Table 12a the population of the towns as it 
was in 1960 is presented together with the drainage area covered 
at the point of inflow of the sewage of each town into the main 
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Table 12a. Location of municipal sources of sewage inflow into 
the llDoer Skunk River ^  
Source 1960 population 
Drainage area, 
sq. mi. 
at inflow 
in Skunk River 
A. Skunk River upstream of Ames 
1. Blairsburg 287 10 
2. Ellsworth 493 55 
3. Kamrar 268 151 
4. Jewell 1,113 151 
5. Remdall 201 160 
6. Story City 1,773 180 
7. Roland 748 313 
B. Squaw Creek upstream of Ames 
8. Stainhope 461 556 
9. Gilbert 318 556 
10. Jordan 50 556 
C. Skunk River downstream of Ames 
11. Ames 27,003 557 
12. Kelley 239 615 
13. Huxley 486 645 
14. Cambridge 587 645 
15. Elkhart 260 714 
16 = Valeria 76 786 
17. Colfax 2,331 800 
^Source: Dougal et al., 58, p. 105-107. 
167 
course of the Skunk River. The water quality for the tributory 
flows aire specified only for the point of inflow into the main 
course. The defense for this approach will be presented in 
Chapter VII, It is connected with the arguments for an institutional 
structure. The singular purpose of the tributory flow in this model 
is that it will absorb a certain percentage of the BOD in the waste 
dumped into it before the waste enters the main stream. 
The location of recreational activities amd the arguments 
for aesthetics will be implicit in the specification of the 
restrictions on the DO level, turbidity aind sediment concentra­
tion. These restrictions will be changed parametrically. A spatial 
specification of these economic agents is therefore not feasible in 
this study. 
The location of feedlots are specific for the area north of 
Ames in order to recognize the observation of Dougal et They 
observed that the area south of Ames consists of wide bottom lands 
which are extensively cropped with few pastures (58, p. 101). 
There were, according to these authors, several feedlots up­
stream, located on the rolling slopes at the edge of the Skunk 
River. However, the actual location and size of feedlots to be 
used in this study will not represent axiy real situation amd are 
included for the exclusive purpose of this conceptual analysis. 
It is assumed that four feedlots of 5,000 head capacity are 
situated respectively 5 and 15 miles south of Blairsburg and 5 
and 15 miles south of Ellsworth. It is also assumed that 2 
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feedlots of 10,000 head capacity are situated respectively 10 
miles south of Blairsburg and 5 miles south of Story City, 
Two meatpacking plants with a capacity of 100 head a day 
slaughtered are also included. One is assumed to be located near 
Ellsworth and the other near Cambridge. 
The spatial distribution of farmland for different slope 
lengths and gradients was presented in Tables 9(a) and 9(b) in 
a previous section of this chapter. 
The formulation of an initial feasible program 
The data is now formulated in a format which will allow for 
a logical sequence of operations to be performed on the computer. 
In the instance of the model as presented in Chapter IV, the 
simplex algorithm is used. Data which are structured for the 
application of this algorithm is called the "initial feasible 
program". The structuring of such a program requires a specifica­
tion of restrictions and activities. 
(1) Formulating the quality restriction: The quality 
restrictions in a specific reach are specified in terms of "total 
available resources". The available resource in the case of the 
DO for a specific reach is specified as follows: 
DOi = (DO^ - D^) 
where: 
DO^ 5= Total DO available in reach i expressed in mg. ; 
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DO^ = Expected DO in a stream before withdrawal from 
BOD sources in mg./l; 
D^ = Quality restrictions, in mg./l; 
= Streamflow in reach i, in liters a day. 
For the purpose of the model the value of DO^ will be ex­
pressed in lbs. as will be the coefficients in the model". The 
value of DO^ is analogous to; 
DO (maximum) + (6)^ 
in the presentation of the arguments for an L.P. model in 
Chapter IV (see p. 70). The value of DO (maximum) was established 
on an average of 8.5 mg./l. (Reading Fig. 72, p. 421, Dougal et al., 
58). After adding the correction factor for the P - R ratio the 
value of DO was established on 14.3 mg./l. The value of D will 
be established according to the requirements in the specific reach 
and will be changed in a parametric analysis. 
Due to a lack of information on the DO-concentration of 
wasteflow from treatment plants immediately after it has entered 
the watercourse, it is assumed that the effect on the DO-concentra-
tion in streams is neutral. Although this assumption might lead 
to em over estimation of the DO concentration in the stream, 
factors such as the inflow turbulence emd the effect of algae 
(see Dougal ei , 58, equation 1245, p. 443) '.vill disîiiîish this 
error. On the other hand, the larger the proportion inflow to 
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streamflow, the larger will be the error factor. 
The values of the restrictions on sediment and turbidity 
are established according to an. analogous procedure. For example: 
Sed^ = (Sed^ - Sed^) 
where; 
Sed^ = Max. sediment load from farmland which may 
enter reach i in the stream in mg. or lbs.; 
Sed^ = Quality restrictions on sediment in mg./l.; 
Sed^ = Expected sediment concentration without asiy 
contribution from farmland in mg./l. 
The value of Sed^ is assumed to be equal to zero for this 
study. The arguments of this assumption were presented earlier. 
The formulation of restrictions on turbidity follows the same 
procedure as for sediment. 
The following quality restrictions are specified as an 
initial condition for the model: 
(a) For DO, purpose warm water fish habitat: minimum 
5 mg./l. (58, p. 77); 
(b) Suspended sediment plus suspended solids for warm 
water fish habitat; maximum 75 mg./l. (174, p. 77); 
(c) Suspended sediment plus suspended solids for aesthetics 
and primary contact recreation, maximum 37 = 5 wo./l. 
(174, p. 77). 
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In addition to these restrictions quality levels will be 
changed parametrically in order to simulate and to study different 
planning conditions. 
(2) Formulating the activities; Three sets of activities 
will be formulated for each town and each meatpacking plant. The 
first set will be "no-treatment" activities. The second will be 
transfer activities with the purpose of relaxing the "no-treatment" 
in a manner which will comply with a treatment range of 20 percent 
of 95 percent BOD removal. The logic for the transfer activities 
in the initial program is as follows; 
Real Transfer activities 
activity 1 2 
C-# +P_ -P, ±P, 1 a b 
B 
i 
1 = +1 +.20 
.20 = +.20 -.1 
.75 +.1 
where; 
value of P^ = Gross margin for no treatment; 
value of P^ is specified such that the value of: 
P^ + (-Pg^) = Gross margin of treatment for 20 percent 
removal; 
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value of = (•1/*2)P^ -('l/'75)(P^ -
= -SP^ - •133(P^ - PJ. 
A third set of activities is also formulated which is asi alternative 
to the "no-treatment" and transfer activities. The third set is 
formulated in order to accommodate the relative high removeUL rate 
for suspended solids at the lower treatment levels (i.e., primary 
treatment) (see Baumann, 16, p. 30). This activity only becomes 
operational after the suspended solids in treatment plant effluent 
becomes a restrictive factor. The coefficients for suspended 
solids in this activity represents a removal ratio of 65 percent 
of SS for a treatment plant constructed for 30 percent BOD removal. 
Two sets of activities will be formulated for feedlots. The 
first set will be "no prevention" real activities which represent 
a situation where all the runoff enters directly into the Skunk 
River. The second set will be transfer activities which will en­
force certain prevention ratios under limiting DO-situations. The 
logic of the transfer activities is as follows; 
Real Transfer activities 
activity 1 2 
C-* P 1 P a 
B 
f .03 
85 + .85 .1 
15 + .1 
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where: 
value of = Gross margin for no control of runoff; 
value of is specified such that: 
P + (-P ) = Gross margin for 85 percent control of 
runoff; 
value of P^ = (•1/-85)P^ - ('l/'15)(P^ - P^^) 
= -117 P^ - '666(P]^ - PJ. 
The activities to be considered for sediment control are 
formulated in Table 10. These activities are formulated in . 
accordaaice with the spatial distribution of the lemd types as 
presented in Tables 9(a) and 9(b). The gross margins in Table 10 
are adapted for use in this model by subtracting a constaait, 
equal to the value of the smallest gross margin ($12.72), from 
each of the gross margins as presented. An upper limit of one (1) 
is placed on each economic agent. If such a constraint is not 
included in the program it might be possible for the program to 
start building treatment plants or to include extra tracts of 
Ismd. 
(3) Formulating am initial feasible program: An initial 
feasible program is formulated and coded according to the format 
for The Mathematical Frogxôiûiûing Systss: (MPS/360) of I=BcM: It 
is necessary to allocate a computing name to each activity in the 
Table 12b. Activities for BOD control in the Upper Skunk River basin 
Real activities Tremsfer activities 
Name Comp. Gross Comp. Gross Comp. Gross 
name margin name margin naone margin 
dollars dollars dollars 
Blairsbuig BLSB 16,859 BLSA 3,540 BLSB 0 
Ellsworth ELLW 20,000 ELLA 4,200 ELLE 0 
Kamrar KAMR 16,520 KAMA 3,469 KAMB 0 
Jewell JEWL 25,541 JEWA 5,364 JEWB 0 
Randall RAND 15,132 RANA 3,177 RANB 0 
Story City STOC 29,494 STOA 6,193 STOB 0 
Roland ROLD 22,606 ROLA 4,747 ROLB 0 
Stanhope STAN 19,491 STAA 4,093 STAB 0 
Gilbert GILB 17,402 GILA 3,654 GILB 0 
Jordain JORD 9,908 JORA 2,080 JORB 0 
Ames AMES 70,319 AMEA 14,767 AMEB O 
Kelley KELL 15,955 KELA 3,351 KELB 0 
Huxley HUXL 19,810 HUXA 4,160 HUXB 0 
Cambridge! CAMB 20,981 CAMA 4,407 CAMB 0 
Elkhart ELKH 16,387 ELKA 3,441 ELKB 0 
Valeria VALE 11,255 VALA 2,364 VALB 0 
Colfax COLF 32,110 COLA 6,743 COLB 0 
Alternati.ve Real Activities for towns (60% SS removal): 
Blairsbujrg BBRG 16,859 
Ellsworth ESWT 20,000 
Kamrar KMRR 16,520 
Jewell JWLL 25,541 
Randall RDLL 15,132 
Story City STCY 29,494 
Roland RLEW 22,606 
Stemhope STHP 19,491 
Gilbert GLRT 17,402 
Jordan JRDN 9,908 
Ames AMSS 70,319 
Kelley KLLY 15,955 
Huxley HXLY 19,810 
Cambridge CMBG 20,981 
Elkhart ELKT 16,387 
Valeria VLRI 11,255 
Colfax CLFX 32,110 
M. Packing (1) MPAC 19,810 MPAA 4,160 MPAB 0 
(Upstream) 
M, Packing (2) MPPC 19,810 MPPA 4,160 MPPB O 
(Downstream) 
Feedlot (1) FLAL 970 FLAA 931 FLAB 83 
(Upstreaia) 
Feedlot (2) FLBL 1,546 FLBA 1,390 FLBB 35 
(10,000 capacity) 
Feedlot (3) FLCL 970 FLCA 931 FLCB 83 
Feedlot (4) FLDL 970 FLDA 931 FLDB 83 
Feedlot (5) FLEL 970 FLEA 931 FLEB 83 
Feedlot (6) FLFL 1,546 FLFA 1,390 FLFB 35 
(10,000 capacity) 
Alternative real activities for meatpacking plaaits (30% BOD removal): 
M. Packing (1) 
M. Packing (2) 
MPKX 
MPKY 
19,810 
19,810 
Table 12c;. A guide to the computing names for land treatment practices in the Upper 
Skunk River basin^ 
Which diçiits Describe what? Code 
in name? 
First two 
Third and 
fourth 
Fifth 
Sixth 
Treatment practice and 
tillage practice 
Reach in river 
Slope gradient 
Slope length 
CO = Conventional tillage; CC = Conventional 
tillage + contour; MN = Minimum tillage; MC = 
Minimum tillage + contour; CT = Conventional 
tillage + terraces ; MT = Minimum tillage + 
terraces; PP = Permanent pasture 
01 = Skunk River in Hamilton County 
02 = Skunk River in Story County North of 
Ames 
03 = Squaw Creek 
04 = Skunk River South of Ames up to Colfax 
A = 1%; B = 3%; C = 6,5%; D = 11.0%; E = 15.5% 
X = 130 ft.; Y = 250 ft.; Z = 450 ft. 
>1 
\h<i gross margin for use in the program for each activity can be established from 
Table 10 by using the gradient, slope length and treatment practice as guide and by sub­
tracting $12.73 from each gross margin as presented in the Table 10. 
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program. These names and the gross margin of each activity are 
presented in Tables 12(b) and 12(c). An exposition of the initial 
feasible program is"presented in Appendix C. A discussion of 
various computer runs of this program will be presented in the 
next chapter. 
Concluding observations concerning the model as applied 
This chapter illustrated the application of a model for 
water quality planning to the Upper Skunk River basin. The model 
as developed is able to interrelate physical linkages between 
economic agents within the basin. It is also able to combine the 
alternative means for achieving the required levels (i.e., the 
processes) of water quality within our decision-making framework. 
The application of the model to the Upper Skunk River Basin il­
luminated a variety of data needs. Some of these shortcomings 
were absolute, such as in the case of feedlots where relevcint 
information was absent. Some were partial, such as in the case 
of the establishment of relevant design water flows in terms of 
economic logic. There were also other problems of a more general 
nature. An example is the value for each constant which was used 
in structuring the model. The potential variability of these 
constants is an important limitation on the structuring of 
• generalized plamning models for water quality msmagement. The 
relevance of this kind of plamning procedure xo real world prob­
lems can, therefore, be questioned. It should be noted, however, 
that the application of treatment and effluent standards 
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necessitates such a planning procedure if economic efficiency 
is aoa objective in the allocation of water qualities. The 
possibility of other control instruments, such as charges and 
payments, should, therefore, be reviewed in order to establish 
the most efficient instrument for the control of water qualities. 
Chapter VI will present a short summary of various computer 
runs which were carried out on the initial program. The aim of 
this summary is to illustrate a variety of simulations and con­
clusions which can be conducted from the program as presented. 
The analysis of instruments of control continues in Chapter VII 
with an exposition of charges and payments emd a comparison of 
the efficiency and equity of these and the other instruments 
when applied to water quality problems. 
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CHAPTER VI. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS FROM 
APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL IN THE 
UPPER SKUNK RIVER BASIN 
A procedure for constructing a model for water quality 
planning was developed in Chapter V. Such a procedure requires 
a thorough knowledge about relevant water quality criteria, the 
effect of a water body on residuals, the placement of economic 
agents along a water body, the characteristics of water quality 
as used by each economic agent, and the opportunity costs of 
chsmging these characteristics of water quality use. By inter­
linking these data within a model which represents a logical 
framework of a regional water quality planning system, an optimal 
system of treatment said effluent standards may be established. 
Various assumptions concerning the data included in the model 
were used in order to simulate specific planning situations. 
These simulations may serve as examples of some of the results 
which can be obtained from a model as structured in the previous 
two chapters. 
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The Optimum Treatment Standards 
for an Initial Planning Situation 
An initial computer run was carried out using 1960 population 
figures. This run excluded both the meat packing plamts and all 
but the fifth feedlot (FLEL, see Table 12(a)). Post optimal 
parametric routines were applied on the stream-standard of 5 
mg./l/ DO. Taking into consideration the assumptions outlined 
in Chapter V, the results of this run are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13. Optimal treatment strategies for water quality 
management, initial planning situation. Upper Skunk 
River Basin 
Max. Stream Available Gross Treatment required 
avail standard DO margin ______________________ 
DO DO in Town or Percentage 
mg./l. mg./l, million feedlot removal of 
dollars BOD 
14.3 5.0 9.3 25.1219 No treatment at all points 
14.3 12.0 2.3 25.0807 Ames 20 
14.3 12.8 2.5 25.0630 Ames 46 
14.3 13.5 0.8 25.0196 Ames 74 
Blairsburg 54 
14.3 13.9 0.4 24.7803 Ames 88 
Blairsburg 77 
Ellsworth 70 
Story City 50 
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These results clearly indicate that treatment will only be required 
at extremely high DO standards for the yearly 7-day low flow. 
Conversely, relatively high treatment levels will only be required 
from towns (or feedlots) if a more critical design flow (i.e., the 
7-day - 10 year low flow) is used. Because of the extreme low 
flows recorded in the Upper Skunk River Basin, the chances of 
linkages (externalities) between communities are small in such an 
instance. The social cost of untreated waste will, in the case 
of extreme low flows, be carried by the communities in which the 
waste originates. 
The Optimum Treatment Standards for 
am Extended Planning Situation 
Considering the optimal conditions for the initial planning 
situation the question may be raised about what the situation will 
be if certain expected developments in the Upper Skunk River Basin 
are realized. A second computer run was carried out which in­
cluded six feedlots, two meatpacking plants (see Table 12(a)) 
and extended the Ames population to 70,000 people (see Dougal et 
al.. 58, p. 166). The results of this run and the post optimal 
paraimetric routines on DO standards are presented in Table 14. 
As was the case with the initial planning situation the re­
sults of the parametric routine for the extended planning situation 
indicates a need for waste treatment only at relatively high DO 
stauidards for the yearly 7-day low flow. Treatment of the Ames 
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Table 14. Optimal treatment strategies for water quality control, 
extended planning situation. Upper Skunk River Basin 
Max. Stream Available Gross Treatment required 
avail. standard DO margin 
DO DO in Town, meat­ Percentage 
mg./l. mg./l. mg./l. million packing plamt removal of 
dollars or feedlot BOD 
14.3 5.0 9.3 25.1805 No treatment at all points 
14.3 8.9 5.4 25.1347 Ames 25 
14.3 9.6 4.7 25.1185 Ames 36 
14.3 10.4 3.9 25.1023 Ames 46 
14.3 11.2 3.1 25.0861 Ames 57 
14.3 12.0 2.3 25.0699 Ames 68 
14.3 12.8 1.5 25.0525 Ames 79 
14.3 13.5 0.8 25.0001 Ames 90 
Blairsburg 54 
Ellsworth 38 
Meatp. plaint 20 
14.3 14.0 0.3 24.7033 Ames 95 
Blairsburg 95 
Ellsworth 95 
Meatp. plauit 95 
Kaunrar 95 
Jewell 95 
Randall 95 
Story City 95 
Staoihope 95 
Gilbert 95 
Jordan 95 
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effluent starts however, at a relatively lower stream standard 
(8.9 mg./l. DO for the initial problem). At the more extreme 
stream standards, Ames and all of the towns north of Ames are re­
quired to apply 95% BOD removal in the optimal design. Two im­
portant results of computer runs, as analyzed in Tables 12 and 13, 
should be noted. First, the need for effluent treatment were con­
fined to the area north of Ames. Second, when the characteristics 
of economic agents (i.e., Ames) were changed, a regional optimum 
plaun required chauiges in the level of effluent treatment of those 
other agents who stayed the same. This observation cam be ex­
tended to the introduction of new economic agents (i.e., meat­
packing plemts) in the basin area. 
Optimum Treatment Standards for the Extended 
Planning Situation Plus a Reservoir North of Ames 
Low flow augmentation is am important strategy for regional 
water quality control. One of the objectives of the proposed 
reservoir on the Skunk River north of Ames is to serve this 
purpose (4). A computer run was therefore carried out which 
similates the effect of a reservoir north of Ames with a net yield 
of 25 cfs. for low flow augmentation. The results of this run 
are presented in Table 15. 
The DO concentration at the point of inflow into the reservoir 
^See 58, p. 83. 
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Table 15. Optimal treatment strategies for water quaility manage­
ment, extended planning situation with reservoir for 
low flow augmentation. Upper Skunk River basin 
Max. Stream Available Gross Treatment required 
avail. standard DO margin 
DO DO 
mg./l. 
in Town, meat­ Percentage 
mg./l. mg./l. million packing plant removal of 
dollars or feedlot BOD 
14.3 5.0 9.3 25.1805 No treatment at all points 
14.3 10.4 3.9 25.1276 Ames 26 
14.3 11.2 3.2 25.1114 Ames 37 
14.3 12.0 2.3 25.0952 Ames 53 
14.3 12.8 1.5 25.0778 Ames 58 
14.3 13.5 0.8 25.0255 Ames 69 
Blairsburg 55 
Ellsworth 38 
Meatp. plaint 20 
14.3 14.0 0.3 24.8692 Ames 79 
Blairsburg 95 
Ellsworth 95 
Meatp. plauit 90 
Jewell 95 
Randall 36 
Story City 90 
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was used as one of the stream standards. If the assimilative 
capacity of the waterbody in the reservoir itself is used it will 
serve as a convenient alternative for sewage treatment upstream. 
Eutrophication of the reservoir will then be a major problem for 
water quality management. 
A comparison of the results in Table 14 and Table 15 indicates 
various chaoiges in the optimal design of the regional water quality 
memagement system. First, the saving (benefit) due to the construc­
tion of the reservoir constitutes $25,300 a year for a stream 
standard of 10.4 mg./l. and changes to $165,900 a year for the 
more extreme standard (14.0 mg./l.). Second, there is a change 
in the optimal design of sewage treatment with respect to economic 
agents upstream of the reservoir. The reason for this lies in 
the exclusion of the Squaw Creek and Ames effluent inflow from 
considerations for treatment design at economic agents upstream 
of the reservoir. The result is that even these agents may profit 
from the reservoir. Third, towns in the Squaw Creek watershed 
which are, for the purpose of this study, outside the main planning 
scope of the Upper Skunk River Basin, profit about $46,801 a 
year from the construction of the reservoir when the most stringent 
DO standards are applied. 
In retrospect, the importance of close cooperation between 
the designers and planners of a multi-purpose reservoir, such as 
the Ames-reservoir, and the designers and plamners of water quality 
control should be noted. Factors such as the design flow (for water 
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quality control) from the reservoir, the design flow for the 
construction of treatment plants and the relevant stream DO 
standards are closely interrelated. The range of possible combina­
tions of the abovementioned three factors presents the planner autid 
decisionmaker with a near infinite amount of alternatives for the 
accomplishment of specific objectives in water quality management. 
Optimum Treatment Staindards for the Extended 
Planning Situation With Chamges in Turbidity 
Standards at Ames 
Up to this stage a uniform DO-standard for the whole of the 
Upper Skunk River were used in the aunalysis of water quality. This 
procedure does not acknowledge the potential differential demand 
associated with specific uses amd users of the water. In the case 
of the Skunk River Basin, where conflicts may arise between ob­
jectives of wild life enhancement, recreation and aesthetics on 
the one hand and objectives of effluent carriage on the other 
hand, the importance of such a differentiated demaind may not be 
entirely clear. In a rural setting, as is the case in the Upper 
Skunk River Basin, there may be strong incentives for legis­
latures to place a high value on aesthetics (i.e., the proponents 
of "natural water quality") and to ignore the development of 
alternative uses of the stream. 
The arguments of the "next-use" concept, as presented by 
Timmons (186) and Jacobs (90), said the logic of Pareto-relevant 
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externalities, as discussed earlier, are important instruments in 
the hauids of the planner and should therefore be included in this 
conceptual analysis. Consequently a further deviation of the 
actual situation in the Upper Skunk River Basin is reviewed. It 
is assumed that the future City of Ames (pop. 70,000) will draw 
a certain percentage of its water requirements from the Skunk 
River. A further simplification is applied by assuming that the 
quality of this water is specified in terms of turbidity standards 
for water presented to the consumer. In order to accomplish this 
the quality of water in the stream at the point of intake can be 
improved or water treatment facilities can be built to remove the 
turbidity, or any combination for the two approaches cam be 
applied. 
Turbidity problems supply an ecological linkage between 
cropfarming practices and economic agents such as towns, meat­
packing plamts sind feedlots. Table 16(a) supplies the results 
of the computer run for the towns, meatpacking plants sind feedlots 
and Table 16(b) the results for cropf arming in reaches 01, 02 aind 
03. Reach 04 is excluded from the cinalysis due to the relative 
low initial specification of turbidity standards along the river 
(900 mg./l. SS). 
From Tables 16(a) and 16(b) it is clear that changes in 
turbidity steindards at Ames will effect both the laoid treatment 
practices and the required level of effluent control (or treatment) 
at the meatpacking plemts, towns and feedlots. Up to a turbidity 
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Table 16(a). Optimal treatment strategies for water quality 
meunagement with respect to towns, meatpacking 
plauits and feedlots, for parametrically changing 
turbidity standards at Ames, Upper Skunk River Basin 
Stream Gross margin Treatment required 
standard in million 
mg./l. SS dollars Town, meatpacking Percentage 
plamt or feedlot BOD removal^ 
900 25.1805 No treatment required 
375 25.1805 No treatment required 
300 25.1764 No treatment required 
225 25.0777 Feedlot (No. 2) 85 
Feedlot (No. 5) 85 
150 25.0532 Feedlot (No. 1) 100 
Feedlot (No. 2) 100 
Feedlot (No. 3) 100 
Feedlot (No. 4) 100 
Feedlot (No. 5) 100 
Feedlot (No. 6) 100 
75 24.4366 The same as for 150 rag ./I. SS 
37.5 22.6808 The same as for 150 mg ./I. SS 
9.5 17.1089 Feedlots (No . 1, No, 
2, No. 3, No . 4, No. 100 
5, No. 6) 
Blairsburg 95 
Ellsworth 95 
Meatpacking ; plaoit 95 
(No. 1) 
Kamrar 95 
Jewell 95 
Randall 95 
Story City 95 
Roland < Gilbert 95 
Stanhope Jordan 95 
^Percentage BOD removal is used as an index of the levels of 
treatment. The removal of suspended solids (SS) is associated 
with BOD removal as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Table 16(b). Cultivation and land treatment practices for different stream turbidity 
staaidards at Ames, Upper Skunk River Basin 
Stream Gross Reach 01 Reach 02 
standard margin ' 
Land characteristic and practice Land characteristic and practice 
mg./l. million • 
SS dollars AX AY AZ BX BY BX CX CY DX DY EX EY AX AY AX BX BY BX CX CY DX DY EX EY 
900 25.1805 
375 25.1805 
300 25.1764 
225 25.0777 
150 25.0523 
75 24.4366 
37.5 22.6808 
9.5 17.1089 
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Table 16(b). (cont.) 
Stream 
standard 
mg./l. 
SS 
Gross 
margin 
million 
dollars 
Reach 03 
Land characteristic and practice 
AX AY AZ BX BY BX CX CY DX DY EX EY 
900 
375 
300 
225 
150 
75 
37.5 
9.5 
25.1805 
25.1805 
25.1764 
25.0777 
25.0523 
24.4366 
22.6808 
17.1089 
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standard of 225 mg./l. SS no control is required' from the towns, 
feedlots No. 1, 3, 4 and 6 or the meatpacking plant upstream of 
Ames. Feedlots No. 2 amd 5 should apply 85 percent control. At a 
standard of 150 mg./l. up to 37.5 mg./l.SS all of the feedlots are 
required to apply complete control of the runoff. It was necessary 
to control the quality of effluent from the meatpacking plant 
and towns only when the stringent measure of 9.5 mg./l. SS were 
applied. Minimum tillage is the optimal cultivation and land 
treatment practice for stream standards up to 375 mg./l, SS. 
A standard of 300 mg./l. SS specifies minimum tillage plus contour 
on lands with an average gradient of 6.5 percent and average slope 
lengths of 130 and 250 ft., as well as permanent pasture on lamds 
with an average gradient of 15.5 percent and average slope length 
of 250 ft. At a standard of 150 mg./l. SS certain leoids have 
to be terraced (see Table 16(b)). At a standard of 37.5 mg./l. 
SS all of the upstream lemds have to be under permanent pasture. 
Water treatment as an alternative to abatement was not con­
sidered in this model. Although it could have been considered in 
the plaun it was excluded in order to illustrate the arguments of 
marginal analysis in a regional optimal design for pollution 
abatement. Economic theory indicates that it is best to invest 
in quality control practices up to the point where the incremental 
cost of these practices equals the sum of the incremental benefits 
to the water uses amd users. Tables 16(a) and 16(b) present the 
incremental costs of abatement for specific increases in the water 
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quality measured in terms o f  suspended solids. The incremental 
abatement cost if $4,100 for the increment 375-300 mg,/l. SS, 
$98,700 for the increment 300-225 mg./l. SS, $25,400 for the 
increment 225-150 mg./l. SS, $615,700 for the increment 150-75 
mg./l, SS, $745,800 for the increment 75-37.5 mg./l. SS and 
$5,571,900 for the increment 37.5-9.5 mg./l. SS.^ 
The cost of water-treatment was reviewed by various research-
workers such as Frankel (66), Deininger (52) and Jacobs (90). Most 
of these presentations ainalyzed the effect of various sizes of 
pleuits but Jacobs* analysis concentrated specifically on the 
effect of turbidity on treatment costs. Analyzing the daily 
records of the water treatment plamt at Omaha he arrived at a 
specific relationship between turbidity (expressed in JTU) and 
the amount of aluminum sulfate used (90, pp. 132-133), namely; 
AL = 46 + .138T 
where; 
A1 = lbs. of alum used per mgd; 
T = the JTU. 
Jacobs estimated an incremental treatment benefit (cost) for a 
- / 
It is clear from these incremental costs that an abatement 
cost function is net necessarily sisooth and differentiable (com­
pare the first four increments), a fact which again underlines 
the superiority of systems analysis over marginal analysis when 
investigating environmental problems. 
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2.5 mgd. - plant of $2,84/mg,/l. SS (interest rate = .04) (90, 
p. 13, Table 21). If waste flow constitutes 70 percent of water 
demand (Dougal et , 58, p. 191, Table 41) then for a 123 g.p.d./ 
capita wasteflow, Ames (pop. 70,000) will require 12.25 m.g.d. 
Ames may withdraw a certain percentage, i.e., 2.5 m.g.d., from 
the Skunk River, but even in the instsmce where all the water 
requirements of Amies are supplied from the Skunk River it will 
still be optimal to apply water treatment at Ames rather than to 
apply pollution abatement upstream. This statement was verified 
under the assumption of no economics of size for water treatment 
plants. It will be more so with increasing economics of size, 
which is the actual situation according to the findings of Deininger 
(52, pp. 171-192). 
This optimal solution accounts for a situation where one 
downstream user (Ames) is considered. When more thaui one (i.e., 
recreational use) are considered the optimal solution may be 
quite different because the benefits of pollution abatement up­
stream then acquires the characteristic of a public good, i.e., 
the benefits from abatement is equal to the sum of the individual 
benefits for urbam use auid recreational use. The problem of 
"publicness" of the benefits of pollution abatement and the 
problem of changes in use patterns complicates rational water 
quality planning in the long term.^ 
^See Chapter III of this study. 
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Optimum Treatment Standards for Changes 
in Standards for Suspended Sediment at Colfax 
A final run was carried out under the assumption that the 
"basin authority" downstream of the Upper Skunk River Basin has 
specified a suspended sediment stemdard for the stream at the 
point of "inflow" into the lower basin. The benefits from a higher 
quality of water is outside the planning scope of the Upper Skunk 
River Basin, and can therefore not be measured as in, for example, 
the case of the changing turbidity standards at Ames. Such a 
situation is emalogous to streams which traverse international 
borders or which flow into the sea thereby affecting international 
fishing rights. 
The results of this run are presented in Table 17, The changes 
in the optimal practices for different stream standards are 
obvious from this table. The most stringent standard for this 
run (37.5 mg./l. SS) again requires all laoid to be under permanent 
pasture with a total cost of over $10 million for the region. 
Some Concluding Observations 
One of the norms of this study is economic efficiency. To 
meet this norm, a procedure for maximizing social benefits was 
discussed in this section. Various computer runs were carried 
out in order to sisiulats certain changes in the Upper Skunk River 
Basin. The results of these runs clearly indicate that when 
changes in the characteristics of a water user occur aoid the 
Table 17., Cultivation and land treatment practices to cope with different stream 
stemdards for suspended sediment below Colfax, Upper Skunk River Basin 
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chemges affect water quality, then an optimal solution for pollution 
and abatement requires a review of the whole basin system. It will 
not be sufficient to force the agent (or agents) concerned into 
compliance with the relevant quality standards. This observation 
is analogous to certain arguments of the "general theory of the 
second best" of Lipsey and Lauicaster (115) 
A specific region may constantly be changing as far as water 
quality usage is concerned. Technological changes, population 
movements, changes in the size of economic agents, and changes in 
the spatial distribution of economic agents may present a need 
for constant revisions of treatment and effluent stamdards if 
economic efficiency is an aim. These chainges place a special 
need on a rational approacli in the application of, as well as the 
choice of, instruments for the control of water quality. A 
chaujging water quality situation also requires a constant review 
of objectives and the plans of action in terms of the available 
alternatives. New decisions need to be formulated and executed. 
This requirement accentuates the need for efficient structures 
Even as presented by l.ipscy and Lancaster, the "second 
best" solution (i.e., after the system adapted itself to a 
chamge) is actually a "first best". Mishan clearly indicates 
this in his review of the "General theory" and concluded; "If 
second best theory has a positive contribution to make, it is 
that of serving notice that, in the presence of constraints, 
slap-dash optimizing, wherever one can. may not improve 
matters ..." (136, p. 156). 
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and other institutions to streamline decision-making and organization-
coordination in water quality management. Chapter VII will consider 
these elements of the water quality mamagement problem® 
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CHAPTER VII. A DESIGN FOR INSTRUMENTS 
AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT 
OF WATER QUALITY 
The management process consists of three elements, namely 
planning, organization-coordination and control. Chapters IV, 
V ^d VI were concerned with the development, application auid 
interpretation of a plan for the efficient achievement and alloca­
tion of water qualities. This chapter will be concerned with 
problems of achieving such optimal allocations over time; i.e., 
problems of organization-coordination and control. An inquiry 
into problems or organization-coordination and control relates 
to certain rules (i.e., rules for decision-making and group 
formation) and structures to serve these rules (i.e., the relations 
between the decisionmaking and administrative powers in control). 
These rules and structures represent a design for institutions. 
Institutions may expemd or restrict individual rights. 
Inquiry into aspects of these relations between existing institu­
tions and the individuals it should serve, is analytical in 
nature. Such research accepts the status quo in institutions. 
In a "normative" sense the inquiry into institutional behavior 
is purposeful. The paradigm of such inquiry is to relate the 
objectives of society to a plan of action which is again related 
to a set of rules and structures for organisation-coordination 
and control. 
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The development, application and interpretation of a model 
for water quality allocation in the Upper Skunk River basin is 
an example of a proposed plan of action for the management of 
these water qualities. Analysis and interpretation of this plan 
of action presents certain directives for inquiry into institu­
tional design. These directives will be discussed in turn. 
(1) The enforcement of the qualitative restrictions in the 
planning model assumed implicitly the application of treatment 
and/or effluent standards as instruments of control. Treatment 
and effluent standards are not the only instruments available to 
a control agency. The question to be emswered therefore is: 
Considering an optimal allocative design for water quality, which 
instrument or instruments caoi enforce such a design the most 
efficiently? 
(2) The application of these instruments and the potential 
reallocation of water qualities between economic agents may lead 
to problems related to the rights of individual economic agents. 
The question to be answered here is: Considering the requirements 
for allocative efficiency as well as the nature of the resource 
reallocated, what are the preferred characteristics of individual 
rights in water? 
(3) The parametric analysis as well as the simulations of 
various planning situations as presented in Chapter VI specify 
a continuous change in the responsibilities of individual economic 
agents. For example, in an optimal plem, a change in the size of 
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the City of Ames and/or selected economic agents may require an 
increase in effluent treatment from agents which did not change 
(compare Tables 13 and 14). A parametric analysis of quality 
changes also indicates changes in individual responsibilities. 
These changes relate to problems of equity in control. The 
question to be answered is: Considering the requirements for an 
optimal regional re-allocation of resources, what procedure is 
required in order to judge such reallocation equitable? 
(4) The introduction of a reservoir (Table 15) and the 
enforcement of qualitative standards at the point of outflow 
(Table 17) illustrated certain problems in regional delineation. 
Benefits from a reservoir may accrue to economic agents outside 
the planning region. Changes in qualitative specifications down­
stream of the planning region may be a source of conflict between 
bounding "xegions. The question concerning this problem is: 
Considering requirements for inter- and intra-regional allocative 
efficiency, what should be the procedure in regional delineation 
and how cam interregional cooperation be affected? 
These four questions are discussed in turn in this chapter. 
The discussion is introduced with a review of instruments for the 
control of water quality. The aim is to judge the efficiency and 
equity of the instruments when applied in the management of water 
qualities. Questions of equity are linked in these discussions to 
aspects of water rights smd decisionmaking. This procedure is 
followed for reasons of logic in inquiry. In the real world 
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a choice of instruments for control is usually specified by 
existing institutions. 
A Comparison of Instruments for 
Water Quality Control 
The failure of the price system as on instrument for water 
quality control was identified (in Chapter III) as a problem in 
pricing water qualities due to the existence of a public good 
(a change in the quality of water). Short of prohibiting the 
consumptive use of certain qualities of water (i.e., pollution), 
the need for instruments of control is, therefore, apparent. A 
procedure for an efficient application of treatment and/or 
effluent standards was presented in the preceding three chapters. 
A brief review of charges and payments is consequently presented 
in order to define the relevance of these instruments for water 
quality control. 
Charges and payments as instruments 
for water quality control 
The application of charges and payments to problems of water 
quality is an attempt to reinstitute a pricing mechanism as the 
relevaoit instrument of control. Charges are per unit taxes 
entering a watercourse. Payments are per unit payments on the 
reduction of effluent, i.e., the economic agent is paid tc 
reduce his residual emission to a more desirable level. The 
actual functioning of these two instruments in terms of the price 
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system cam be illustrated as follows: 
Assume there is one dealer in a specific resource. For the 
purpose of this study, and to follow the concept of public goods, 
the name of the dealer is "The Public". "The Public" requires a 
certain amount of the resource, called a "specific water quality". 
Assume this resource is used at the present by two economic agents, 
named "No Right" and "Full Right". The economic agent, "No Right" 
is using the "specific water quality" without prior consent of 
"The Public", who is the actual owner. "The Public" does not 
require all of the "specific water quality". It decides, therefore, 
to sell the right to use some of the "specific water quality" to 
economic agent "No Right." "No Right" must, therefore, buy the 
right to the use of the "specific water quality" from "The Public". 
This increases his cost for the resource and provides an incentive 
to diminish his use of the resource, thus releasing a certain 
amount for the use of "The Public". "The Public" will establish 
a price (a charge) such that the quantity released by "No Right" 
is equal to the quauitity required by "The Public". 
"The Public" also decides to buy (a payment) some of the 
"specific water quality" from "Full Right", who has full right 
to the resource. This is accomplished by means of payments 
which will induce "Full Right" to release the required quantity 
^The objective of the dealer is to allocate the resource 
between users. 
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of the "specific water quality."^ 
It should be noted from the above illustration that the 
process of charges and payments allocations is adaptive in 
nature. The feasible quality level is reached by means of a 
2 bargaining process analogous to the price system. The equi­
librium set of charges and/or payments (i.e., where quality 
demanded is equal to equality supplied) , will cheinge over time 
subject to all the factors which may affect the relative 
efficiencies of resource use over time. Examples of such factors 
are changes in technology aind changes in competition for the 
specific resource (i.e., water quality). 
The comparative effectiveness of the charges versus the 
payment scheme was a subject of controversy during recent 
years (94; 95; 25; 195; 157). There were arguments pro smd con 
Kneese's analysis (98). His analysis showed a symmetry between 
the results achieved by charges, and those achieved by payments. 
These arguments were resolved to a large extent by the restatement 
of Kneese*s original ainalysis in the book by Kneese and Bower 
(103, pp. 101-102). They emphasized the absence of actual compensa­
tion payments. The crux of the Kneese and Bower argument is that 
^The amount required is specified by "The Public" according 
to his needs. 
^The feasible level is dstsrsiinsd by "The Public" according 
to his needs. 
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an economic agent is facing the same cost function under both the 
charges and payment schemes. In the instance of charges, this 
cost function is structured by real costs, while in the instance 
of the payment scheme, this cost function is structured by 
opportunity costs. Certain writers, such as Kamien et (94), 
argued that such symmetry cauinot exist when the cost and revenue 
functions of participants change due to transfers from payments 
and/or charges. Kneese emd Bower ruled such transfers out by 
their restatement of the symmetry argument in terms of public 
goods. 
A recent review by Randall (158) approached the symmetry 
controversy from amother angle; namely, through an analysis of 
budgetary constraints. He argued that the level of abatement 
(or treatment) would be higher under charges than under payments 
due to a downward shift in the budgetary constraints under charges. 
A brief summary of his arguments is consequently presented in 
terms of a "zero liability rule" for the payment scheme and a 
"full liability rule" for the charges scheme. The budget 
constraints for the "zero liability rule" are as follows: 
For the affected economic agent: 
(25) ?! - Fjqji - ''n (%2 - %2> = 
For the acting econimic agent: 
(26) ?m%2 ' Pn%2 " (%2-V' = 
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For the "full liability rule", the budget constraints are 
as follows: 
For the affected economic agent; 
(27) \ - Fjqii - ... - + P%2 " = ° 
For the acting economic agent: 
(28) \ - ... -
* pi (%2 - "ln2> ° ° 
where affected party suffers em external diseconomy from the 
acting party's consumption of good n, and: 
Yj = wealth of economic agent j; 
= consumption/use of the good/resource i by 
economic agent j; 
p^ = the competitive market price of the good/resource i; 
* 
p^ = unit charge or compensation price; 
= amount of good/resource n which would be consumed/ 
* 
used by the acting party if p^ = O. 
Equations (26) and (28) identify the changes under the 
t'.*;o liability rules as + t j *  f a  °  -  a  and - p*q_ „ respectively. 
-n •-n2 -n^- n "2 ^ . 
The analysis of Rauidall ignored, however, the actual cost of 
abatement and/or treatment. In order to establish the overall 
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effect of the two liability rules on the budget constraints, 
the following variables are redefined and new variables are 
introduced. 
Define; 
a y  = change in budget constraint; 
= use of qualities of water without charges or 
payments ; 
q^g = quantity of specific qualities of water used 
(i.e., level of pollution) after charges or 
payments; 
p^ = per unit treatment cost. 
For the zero liability rule, the actual budget change will 
be; 
(29) Aï = P* (<V2 - - Pn <%2 - V' 
* 1 in equilibrium p^ = p^, therefore 
A Y = 0. 
For the full liability rule the actual budget chsmge would 
be: 
(30) Uy = -p*q^2 - Pn 
* 1 in equilibrium p^ = p^ emd 
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* 1 define p = p = p , then; 
'^n ^n n 
^ = -Pn%2 
The overall effect of the payment scheme is, therefore, 
zero changes in the budget constraints. The overall effect 
of the charges scheme is - which represents a pricing 
of all residuals emitted by the economic agent. The effect of 
the charges scheme on production is illustrated in Figure 8. 
There is an upward shift in the average and marginal cost curve 
from AC and MC representing the initial situation and payments 
situation) to AC^ and MC^ (representing the situation under 
charges). 
Economic agents under the charges scheme (charge = FG) 
suffer a decrease in economic rent equal to the shaded area, and 
the production of the specific output decreases from OQ to OQ^. 
If the use of the water quality is associated with the production 
of the specific output (which is usually the case), then it can 
be concluded that the short term result will be that a system of 
charges will provide for a lower level of water quality use 
(pollution) if compared with payments of equal value. 
The analysis as presented in Figure 8 is in terms of compara­
tive statics. The long run effect of the per unit charge may be 
different depending on the nature of the economic agent. If it 
is a private concern in perfect competition with other firms in 
the industry, a process of adaptation will start in order to 
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Figure 8. Shift in the short run average and marginal cost 
curve of a firm due to a per unit charge 
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eliminate the differences in economic rent. This may lead to the 
elimination of the firm concerned, depending on the severity of 
the change in the economic rent. If a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium exists, then the ex ante situation for the economic 
agent under discussion will be that of zero economic rent, emd 
the ex post situation will be a negative economic rent. The long 
run effect of charges, as compared to payments, will be a de­
crease in the supply of a product at a specific price in the case 
of both a monopolistic and a public agency. 
A system, of charges may, therefore, result in a higher 
level of residual treatment or abatement in the short run than 
an equivalent system of payments. This difference is attributed 
to a reduction in the output of the final product with which 
the production of residuals are positively associated. Such 
differences in the level of abatement or treatment may be 
eliminated by adaptive processes in the economy. Examples of 
adaptive processes are changes in the price level of products 
with which the residuals are associated, the introduction of 
new economic agents in situations with positive economic rents, 
the elimination of economic agents with negative economic rents, 
emd changes in technology. 
There may be administrative difficulties in the application 
of the payment scheme. These difficulties are associated with 
establishing the level of water quality use (i.e., pollution) 
under a no-payment situation (103, pp. 97-142; 25). The charges 
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scheme is relatively simple to administer because the only 
criterion for setting a charge is the actual level of water 
quality use. 
The ultimate choice between a system of charges and a system 
of payments will depend on the rights of the economic agent con­
cerned. Arguments to this effect will be presented when the 
equity of an application of certain instruments in the control 
of water quality is discussed. The next section will present a 
brief review of the relative efficiency of these instruments in 
the control of water quality. 
The relative efficiency of instruments 
for water quality control 
The relative efficiency of charges, payments, treatment 
standards, amd effluent standards is judged according to two 
criteria; namely, first, the ability of these instruments to 
enforce an optimal allocation of water qualities, and second, 
the administrative cost in applying these instruments. For the 
purpose of distinction, the first criterion is called "planning 
efficiency", amd the second, "administrative efficiency". 
(1) Plauining efficiency: The brief review of charges aoid 
payments indicated a procedure whereby a social optimum can be 
reached. Charges and payments are aoialogous to the pricing system 
in the free market economy, albeit an artificial pricing system. 
The application of charges and payments is an adaptive process, 
analogous to the tâtonnement procedure of the free market price 
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system. Charges said payments are, therefore, suitable for ap­
plication to dynamic situations. 
The exposition of a model for water quality planning in 
Chapters IV, V and VI, described a procedure whereby optimal 
treatment aoid effluent standards can be specified. This analysis 
was static, and the complexities in restructuring such standards, 
when certain chemges in water quality use occur, were noted. 
Treatment and effluent stsoidards have a lower planning efficiency 
in dynamic situations when compared to charges and payments. This 
difference is attributed to the potential larger adaptive lag of 
treatment and effluent stsoidards, which may result in suboptimal 
allocations of water qualities at certain stages during a change.^ 
Charges and payments can control point sources of water 
quality use (pollutemts) but not diffused sources. Treatment 
standards can control both point and diffused sources. Effluent 
standards can control point sources but not diffused sources. 
Treatment standards are, therefore, the only logical choice for 
the control of diffused sources of water quality use. 
An important factor in the control of water quality and the 
meinagement of scarce qualities of water is the development of 
The adaptive lag for treatment and effluent standards con­
sists of recognizing a deviation in performance, developing a new 
regional plan according to the procedure as described in Chapters 
IV, V and VI, aaid enforcing the new standards. The adaptive lag 
for charges and payments consists of recognizing a deviation in 
performance and enforcing the new stemdards and payments. 
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new technologies which may achieve the required allocations at 
progressively lower costs. A stimulant for the development of 
such new technologies does exist for charges, payments, and effluent 
standards. The economic agent is free to develop ways and means 
to meet the required levels of water quality use at progressively 
lower costs. In the case of treatment standards, the initiative 
for such innovations resides with the agency in control. Such an 
agency may not have the same incentive to develop the new tech­
nologies when compared with an economic agent under the charges, 
payments or residuail standard schemes. 
(2) Administrative efficiency: A comparison of administra­
tive costs associated with each of the instruments is now presented. 
The following codes are identified for ease of exposition: 
p = cost of planning physical structures for control 
and abatement and the enforcement of these optimal 
plsms on participating economic agents (this process 
includes cost calculations for the structures); 
c = investigations on costs and efficiency as practiced 
by participating agents; 
s = planning an optimal structure for a region (the 
formulation of an L.P. in this study is an example); 
m = monitoring the level and quality of effluent; 
s = enfcrcement of standards; the establishment of 
penalties and the management of funds (or costs) 
associated with transfers or compensation; 
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i = establishing an initial situation for the specific 
case of payments. 
The relative costs of administration are established at: 
Instrument A; Payments = m + e + i 
Instrument B: Charges = m + e 
Instrument C: Effluent stamdards =c+s+m+e 
Instrument D: Treatment and abatement standards = 
p + s + m + e. 
The following proposition is accepted: 
p > c > i 
The relative administrative cost of the different instru­
ments can now be ordered as follows: 
B < A -C C D 
Charges are the least costly to administer followed by 
payments, effluent staoidards, and treatment standards. 
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The application of instruments for the control 
of water quaJ-itv and considerations of equity 
The application of the above-mentioned instruments for the 
control of water quality may have two effects on the economic 
viability of the economic agents concerned. First, it may de­
crease the economic rent as in the case of charges, treatment 
staoidards, and effluent standards. Second, it may have no effect 
on the economic rent of the agent concerned as in the case of 
payments. 
The decrease of economic rent due to the application of 
treatment standards and effluent standards will be less than 
that due to the application of charges.^ In reference to 
equation (30), this difference is equal to P^q^2* the amount 
paid as a charge. This chauige in economic rent raises a question 
about the equity of the application of certain instruments, namely, 
does such a change constitute an interference with individual 
property rights? 
When an application of charges, treatment stemdards, or 
effluent stamdards are considered, then the ownership of the water 
qualities is vested in the public. These instruments represent 
rental costs paid by the economic agent under a tenure agreement. 
For the same reason, and in emalogy with the arguments 
presented earlier, it can also be argued that the level of water 
quality use may be lower under charges than under treatment or 
effluent standards assuming equal per unit treatment costs. 
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Payments represent rental costs paid by the public to the economic 
agent under a tenure agreement with the ownership rights vested 
in the economic agent.^ The application of instruments in the 
control of water quality do not represent a change in the owner­
ship status of the specific water quality but only a change in 
tenure agreement. The public cannot buy the right to a specific 
water quality with a specific payment to an economic agent. The 
physical and economic nature of the process of resource use 
precludes such a possibility. A change in the price of the final 
product or a change in production and abatement (treatment) tech­
nology may encite the economic agent to change the qualitative aaid 
quantitative aspects of resource use. The resource user cannot 
buy ownership rights to water qualities by means of charges or 
by abiding by the staindards. The need for future reallocations 
to alternative uses and users in order to optimize services ren­
dered by these water qualities precludes such a possibility. The 
first decision in developing structures for water quality management 
is, therefore, to specify the property rights to these water 
qualities either in the public or in the economic agents con­
cerned. 
The decision is clear from the arguments presented in 
Chapter III. Water quality is by its nature a public good. The 
^For an argument with respect to the management of natural 
resources through land tenure structures see Timmons and Cormack 
(188). 
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property rights to this public good cannot be transferred, and 
payments are, therefore effectively ruled out as a feasible instru­
ment for water quality control. When aspects of planning and 
administrative efficiency are considered, then charges and treatment 
standards are the only feasible alternatives. Charges are optimal 
for all point sources of water quality use (pollution) and treat­
ment standards for diffused sources.^ 
An optimal strategy in the application of instruments for 
water quality control will, therefore, affect the economic 
viability of the economic agents concerned. A decrease in the 
economic rent of such economic agent may either be foreseen or 
unforeseen. It can be foreseen with certainty if the conditions 
smd term of tenure are specified accurately. Such a contract 
may lead to relative efficient or relative inefficient planning 
2 decisions depending on the planning horizon, which is associated 
with it. A feasible term for a contract represents a compromise 
between efficiency in resource allocation for the specific 
economic agent, amd efficiency in resource allocation for society 
The application of treatment staundards must by necessity be 
combined with zoning laws when diffused sources are controlled. 
In the case of sediment control, such zoning will in general be 
associated with the constants T, K, L, and S in equation (17). 
This observation is verified by the relative consistency of the 
optimal land treatment practices for each land characteristic as 
presented in Chapter VI, 
2 
"Planning horizon" refers to the time period in which the 
planner (economic agent) may consider the terms of the contract 
binding. Beyond this horizon, the plemner is faced with veirious 
degrees of uncertainty with respect to these terms. 
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as a whole; i.e., it should choose ii such as to maximize: 
where: 
TT s present value of value added of a society consisting 
of m + 1 members in n years; 
n = the term of contract which should be optimized; 
. 7^. , = value added for the economic agent on 
oj > ij 
whom the contract is served (j) for yeats o smd i 
up to n years; 
T T QJÇ, = value added for k economic agents (k = 
1 , . . m) which may exist at present or in the 
future up to n years, evaluated at year o; 
r = rate of interest. 
Such optimizing is accomplished by specifying the terms of 
contract such as to allow for cost minimizing capital investments 
subject to the need for mobility of the resource, i.e., the need 
for reallocating the resource between competing uses and users 
over time. 
If thejre is éui uncertainty associated vrith the tern of 
contract, it may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
Investment decisions by economic agents may be suboptimal in 
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order to hedge against the possibility of losing fixed invest-
1 
ments. Uncertainty can be associated with both the term of tenure 
as well as the general conditions of the contract. The general 
conditions should include qualitative and quantitative specifica­
tions of the water resources to be used. Water rights, as dis­
cussed in Chapter III, may serve as exeuaples of tenure contracts 
between the state and individuals. The shortcomings of these 
rights with respect to clear specifications of responsibilities, 
as well as qualitative specifications, are apparent. 
When the decrease in economic rent is not foreseen by the 
economic agent, the plauining considerations change. Assuming 
that the economic agent is informed amd rational, such unforeseen 
changes can be attributed either to an obscure specification of 
tenure rights or to a change in policy by the owner of the re­
source (i.e., the public). Both of these reasons can be grouped 
under arguments of equity. The first cause resembles the present 
situation in water quality management. The economic agent con­
cerned may have an idea of the content of his tenure rights which 
deviate from his actual rights as conceived by society. He plans 
according to these rights and develops a vested interest in them. 
An enforcement of his actuail rights is, therefore, from his 
point of view, exactly such a reallocative decision as a change 
^The term "suboptimal" refers to an operation which does not 
function at minimum long-run average cost. 
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in his actual rights, Reallocative decisions concern arguments 
of equity, i.e., fairness. The equitability of such decisions 
cannot be judged on moral or legal grounds but only by means of 
judging the decision-making process in a society. The power of 
the economic agent to influence the decision-maker will determine 
the outcome of decisions. Arguments of decision-making in society 
which were developed in Chapter III will consequently be expanded 
in the next section of this chapter. 
The Structuré of Decision-making 
in a Democratic Society 
Chapter III introduced certain arguments concerning a 
feasible decision-making structure. The discussions on control 
instruments exposed certain problems concerning the equity of 
control. These discussions draw attention to two elements of 
decision-making in a democratic society. First, reallocative 
decision-making, which centers around, problems of equity, and 
second, regulatory decision-making, which centers around the 
problems of day-to-day control.^ The following discussions 
concentrate first, on aspects of decision-making in general, 
emd second, on aspects of social decision-making. 
Musgrave introduced decisions on so-called services for 
"merit Wcints" as one aspect of governmental decision. These 
services, i.e., education, low-cost housing, and health care, 
will also be grouped under aspects of reallocative decision­
making for the purpose of this study (Musgrave, 141, pp. 13-14). 
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Decision-making and cybernetics 
Decision-making is the core of the control process. The 
fundamental element of decision-making is a norm. The relation 
of the decision-making process to this norm is discussed in, for 
example, aspects of adaptive systems in a study of cybernetics 
(140, pp. 12-31). Cybernetics is a science where information 
theory, feedback theory, and control theory are combined into 
interrelated structures which may provide continuous control 
over time (169, pp. 3-33), 
Boulding illustrates the role of the decision-making process 
in a cybernetic system as follows (22, pp. 20-21) : 
Consider for a moment how a thermostat operates. 
It consists essentially of three parts: a receiver (the 
thermometer on the wall), a control (at the furnace), 
and em effector (the furnace and the pipes which lead 
from it). The receptor has the property that it can 
detect a divergence, positive and negative, between the 
temperature recorded in its thermometer and some "ideal" 
temperature at which the thermostat is set. A channel 
of communication (which in this simple case need be 
capable only of one bit of information, that is, it can 
say either yes or no) feeds from the receptor to a 
control mechanism. If the message says "minus", that 
is to say, if the recorded temperature is less them 
ideal, the control interprets this and sends out a 
message to the furnace which does, in effect, turn on 
the heat. 
The functioning of a decision-making system is analogous 
to the "receptor" in the abovementioned example. The instruments 
of control (the institutional means by which the decision is 
enforced) are analogous to the "control" of the thermostat. The 
technological means for control, for example, in water quality 
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management, is analogous to the effector described above. Water 
quality is analogous to the air temperature in the example of 
the thermostat. The whole control system functions by means of 
a set of structures which supplies communication; i.e., information 
about decisions and feedback about the results of these decisions. 
The basic elements of a cybernetic system should be present 
in all social control systems. Social control systems may, how­
ever, be considerably more complex than the simple example as 
discussed. There may be different levels of decision-making with 
each level prescribing norms to the next level. In other words, 
each level may consist of a complete cybernetic system, thus 
structuring society in a hierarchy of control systems where meams 
and ends interlink in a contiriuum toward ultimate ends. 
A social system for reallocative 
and regulatory decision-making 
Certain arguments with respect to decision-making in a 
constitutional democracy were presented in Chapter III. These 
arguments are now combined with arguments of a cybernetic system, 
as presented in the previous section, in order to construct a 
system for social decision-making. 
It is assumed that the structuring of a social control 
system is aimed at manipulating the environment of a SCM (the 
subject of control) toward a situation of maximum satisfaction. 
This is the situation for both a democratic society where the 
SCM represents society in interaction, as well as for an autocratic 
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government vAiere the SCM represents a dictator. 
The levels of decision-making^ in a democratic society can 
broadly be defined into four groups; namely, the social choice 
mechemism, the decision-maker, the administration, and the person 
(legal or natural persons) (Figure 9). These are discussed in turn. 
(1) The social choice mechanism (in a democratic society): 
As was previously stated, the social choice mechanism represents 
the decision-making fabric of society. The nature of this 
fabric is determined by tradition (rules of life which are not 
questioned) which supplies society with norms, history vAiich 
supplies society with the l^its of its expectations and a 
historical dialectic (59, pp. 221-226; 140, pp. 105) which 
supplies society with adaptive characteristics. It is at the 
level of the social choice mechanism where the concept "interest 
of the public" is qualified. An image of the social choice 
mechanism in operation can be found in the "outer circle", 
as presented by Maass, of ". . . discussion in the community 
vAiere the broad standards are agreed upon" (Maass et , 121, 
pp. 568-569). 
The forward linkages, connecting the SCM with the other 
levels of dec is ion-msLking, are those of informal controls, a 
choice of constitution and a choice of an economic system. 
For another argument concerning the notion of different 
levels of decision-making, also see Marschak, J: Economics of 
engineering, communicating, deciding (123). 
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Figure 9. A system for social decision-making 
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The feedback (backward linkages) are the signals received from 
the personal level of decision-making and from the "subject of 
control". 
(2) The decision-maker in a democratic process: The nature 
of the decision-maker in a democratic society is determined by 
the choice of constitution. Its functioning is tempered by in­
formal controls and the specific economic system. An image of 
the decision-maker in a democratic process is to be found in the 
electoral process and legislative process as described by Maass 
(121, p. 569). The norms to be used by the decision-maker are 
presented through the linkages with the SCM, These norms are used 
to guide the selection of specific mesms subject to restricted 
resources. The means as decided upon serve as a forward linkage 
to the administration in the form of governmental directives, 
rules, constitutional law and statutory law. 
(3) The administration: The nature of an administrative 
level of decision-making is determined by the forward linkages 
from the decision-maker and is also tempered by informal controls 
and the economic system. The content of these linkages serve as 
a norm for administrative decisions when deciding between alter­
native courses of action. A backward linkage from the administra­
tive decision-maker supplies information with respect to inconsis­
tencies and infeasibilities in directives, rules aoid laws forwarded 
to him, as well as data about relevant subject matter. A forward 
linkage toward the individual decision-maker and the "subject of 
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control" is supplied in the form of information, rules, regulations 
(including laws)standards, payments (including certain services), 
taxes, and the construction of physical structures (i.e., reservoirs). 
(4) The person (legal or natural): The individual person 
formulates his norms in the light of informal controls and the 
economic system. The alternative means of achieving these norms 
is delimited in the light of the administrative sind physical 
restrictions he is confronted with. Backward linkages are supplied 
to the administration in the form of information, to the national 
decision-maker in the form of lobbying, ^ d to the SCM in the form 
of communal discussions. Forward linkages are supplied to a 
"subject of control" as well as a feedback from this source. 
The social decision-meiking system, as presented above, is 
2 
an open system which is capable of self-maintenance and growth. 
Energy and ideas are imported from the social and physical environ­
ment. This energy and these ideas are transformed into services 
which keep the system going aoid in an output which interacts with 
the social and physical environment. The problem of water quality 
mainagement is an example of an interaction between the physical 
environment (i.e., the resource base) and the social decision­
making structure. 
^Including case law and administrative law (Harl, 73, p. 1). 
2 For discussions on the characteristics of an "open system", 
see Boulding, K, E., General systems theory, in Beyond Economics 
(20, pp. 91-92), and Katz and Kahn, The social psychology of 
organizations (96, pp. 19-26). 
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Decisions about reallocations in a democratic society are 
formulated by the social choice mechanism. Certain procedures 
• for facilitating and establishing workable decision rules were 
mentioned. Two procedures; namely, logrolling amd taxing, are 
of importance in facilitating a majority decision rule in a specific 
constitutional structure. A third, the assumption of homogeneity of 
interests, is of importance in establishing a constitutional structure. 
The formulation of a constitutional structure is mainly con­
cerned with establishing the voting procedure for specific issues 
and with establishing the constituency to be served by the constiu-
tion.^ Some factors of importance in establishing relevsmt borders 
for a constituency are the elimination of perpetual conflict and 
the resolving of conflict. A potential for perpetual conflict 
exists when decisions by means of voting cover mutually exclusive 
areas of interest; i.e., there is no common interest between the 
opposing groups. Such a situation may either result in dictatorial 
decisions by a stronger group or it may result in indecisiveness by 
^Certain issues may require a simple majority vote, others 
two-thirds majority or a unemimous vote, amd other issues need not 
be subject to voting. Under a specific constitution it may even 
be possible that a unanimous vote may be unconstitutionéU.; i.e., 
the amendments to the Constitution of the United States. These 
voting rules are specified for a specific constituency. 
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. ^  1 
society. 
An illustration of a potential result of dictatorial rule 
in the case of water quality management is as follows; 
A government agency decided to enforce a 95% BOD removauL 
treatment standard on all factories of type A. A factory of type 
A in region Upper River Basin is the main employer in a town with 
a population of X people. Spinoffs from the factory effect about 
every person in Upper River Basin. After caoreful assessment, the 
management of the factory decides that they will have to close 
down if the standard is enforced. At some lower standards, they 
will have to reduce their operations. 
The company (legal person) and the employees and other people 
in the region (natural persons), interact through these decisions 
of the management (see Figure 9) because it carries with it the 
potential for a loss in jobs or salaary. This decision is, there­
fore, of crucial importance for the region. It may result in a 
round of power play eind lobbying between the people and the 
mainagement of the firm, and between the State, the people, and 
the maoiagement. The decision of the agency may be reversed by 
these activities or it may be enforced against the wishes of the 
Logrolling cainnot serve as a marketing procedure for issues 
because opposing groups do not have an issue of acceptable value 
(acceptable for the other group) to exchange. Taxing procedures 
may facilitate a decision by allocating the costs where the benefits 
are received. If the stronger group decides to be a "free rider", 
i.e., not to follow the above-mentioned taxing procedure, then in-
decisiveness may result. 
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region,^ In the first instance, the decisions by the agency (and, 
2 
therefore, the control system) were not functional, and in the 
second, they are dictatorial. Such a situation within an institu­
tional structure indicates the presence of either inefficiency 
or inequity, or both. 
The next section of this chapter considers certain aspects 
of designs in organizing and coordinating water quality management 
systems toward facilitating norms of efficiency and equity. 
Orgaaiization in Water Quality Management 
A variety of elements associated with water quality management 
have been identified in this study. The physical aspects of the 
problem and the available technology to attack this problem were 
delimited. The institutional and economic aspects were identified 
as well as procedures in planning and controlling water quality. 
These elements are now combined and coordinated in a proposal for 
a water quality management organization. 
An organization is, according to Warren and Massie (210, 
p. 92), ". . . concerned with channels of communication, with 
patterns of influence and with lines of authority eind loyalty." 
^Wishes defined by a decision rule which is acceptable to 
the region. 
•^The two decisions within the controlling structure, namely, 
that of the government (legislature and administration) and the 
agency cancel each other. 
229 
The relevsmce of a specific organization can be defended on the 
basis of a purpose, am objective, aoid the role of substructures.^ 
The purpose of a social organization is to serve the society which 
it represents. The objective of a social orgemization is defined 
by the norms of the society which it serves. The role of the sub­
structures can be judged on the basis of their efficiency in 
facilitating the achievement of the objectives. In order to judge 
an organization on the basis of norms and objectives, the social 
group (i.e., constituency) which it should serve must be identified. 
Social groups aind conditions 
A social group is defined by Roberts and Holdren as . . all 
individuals who interact with one another " (162, p. 96). Social 
interaction is defined by them as a situation in which the activi­
ties of one individual. A, affect aoiother individual, B, and B can 
influence A. A spillover, therefore, may result in social inter­
action if individual B (the recipient),, can bargain with A (the 
originator). In the case in which no bargaining (or threats) 
exist, there is no social interaction. In terms of problems of 
water quality, this will mean that B has to adapt continuously to 
changes in the water quality. 
Group formation may start when individuals consider themselves 
For another argument about a basis for social orgemizations, 
see Katz auid KaJin (96, p. 37). 
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better off within the group than outside. A group formed out of 
free individuals (free to enter or to exit) represent a uniformity 
of purpose. This uniformity represents a compromise between the 
members of the group. This compromise is established as each 
member of the group weighs the pro's and con's of entering the 
group. The uniformity of purpose is sanctioned by a constitution 
which describes the voting procedure and constituency. 
This procedure of group formation is also valid for a deci­
sion by am individual to live in a specific country (under the 
national constitution), in a specific state or province (under the 
constitution of the State), in a specific region amd town (under 
constitutions governing these groups), and for a specific firm 
(under the conditions of employment). 
An individual, A, in a society must, therefore, make decisions 
about groups at different levels of a hierarchy of groups (see 
Figure 10). Once a decision about the relevant hierarchy is 
made, the individual must abide by the rules he accepted. These 
rules confine his choice set between the universe of alternatives 
in a specific subset. His social activities in general and his 
economic activities specifically are organized around this sub­
set, amd he develops vested interests in the rules. A relaxation 
of the rules may bring him windfalls and a contraction may bring 
him losses. It can be expected that every member of a subgroup 
to which individual A belongs (i.e., his colleagues at the same 
firm), may develop the same vested interest. Such development 
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ensures a cohesivencss in the structure of groups. This cohesive-
ness may be found at each level in the hierarchy of groups, but 
to varying degrees depending to which subgroup an individual belongs 
Specific subgroups may interact with other subgroups to form 
coalitions (162, pp. 107-115), A group will enter into a coalition 
with another group when conditions inside the coalition are pre­
ferable to such a group than being outside. Such a coalition 
represents a uniformity of purpose which is a result of a compromise 
between groups. Such a compromise can be formalized in a formal 
agreement. 
The content of constitutions serving groups at various levels 
of a hierarchy is that of moving from general all-comprising rules 
at the national level to specific rules at the regional level. The 
aim is to define the area of responsibility and power of each 
decision-maker serving a specific constitution in the hierarchy. 
Group formation for water quality management 
The delineation of a water quality management entity pre­
sents a problem of finding the borders of the relevant group 
which such an organization must serve. Hoiden (80, p. 50), ex­
presses the problem as follows: 
An individual may be totally unconcerned about developments 
at the national level which do not affect his specific hierarchy 
of subgroups. He may be violently opposed to developments at that 
level which affect his hierarchy of subgroups, i.e., a national war. 
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The conception of systems analysis as thus far developed, 
is extremely limited and naive in a social sense—for all its 
sophistication in other respects—because it neglects one 
simple fact. The river basin, if we take that context, is 
not a system but a complex of systems. It is a hydrologie 
system and it seems reasonable to suppose that designs and 
programs which tsJce account of its hydrologie unity may 
have more to commend them than designs and programs which 
do not. It is also an ecological system in that the move­
ment of persons and good follows a specifiable pattern. 
It is further a political system in the sense that the 
territorial region bounded by the basin constitutes an 
ordering of influence and power. 
Hamilton et ad. reflected the same opinion and expanded the 
argument by pointing out the importance of economic systems con­
centrated in and around river basins (72, p. 49). 
The management of water qualities interlinks with other 
aspects of water management such as flood control, water supplies 
for irrigation and urbsm uses, and hydroelectricity. Aspects of 
water quality management also touch the management of other re­
sources . Land treatment practices may affect the sediment yield 
with the associated effect on water quality. The disposal of 
wastes in watercourses may be reduced in certain circumstances by 
incineration, thus aiffecting the air resources. It is clearly a 
complex affair to establish a relevant social group for the manage­
ment of water quality. 
A proposal for the formulation of a social group for water 
quality management will consequently be made on the basis of two 
premises. First, problems of water mainagement in general eind water 
quality in particular are of a regional nature. Problems may vary 
from region to region depending on the hydrological, economic, and 
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sociological characteristics of specific regions. Second, water 
quality management should be viewed as a part of a broader water 
management problem. Water quality problems as defined in this 
study, are a special case of quantitative water problems. The 
"removal" of a specific quality of water is also a quantitative 
problem. The consumptive use of water is in effect the consumptive 
use of all qualities of water. 
The formation of a group for water quality management (and, 
therefore, water management) should, according to the above 
premises, start with the physical specification of a watershed 
at a sub-basin.^ The borders of this area will be dependent on 
the most obvious physical interlinkages of a special character. 
In this way, for example, regions with an industrial base will be 
identified from regions with a residential base aoid rural base. 
After these regions are established said the borders are delineated, 
the specification of a social group must follow. 
Whereas the physical specification of the borders of a water 
quality mainagement entity should be the result of objective re­
search concerning interlinking physical systems, the choice of 
a social group for the control of such a system should be free. 
Each individual should make a free choice concerning which 
management entity to join. The reason for such an approach was 
presented in the previous subsection of this chapter. 
^Such specification may be enforced through zoning. 
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Consider now the following approach in establishing a relevamt 
social group for water management. As a first step the responsibility 
of each citizen of the country for the mzmagement of natural re­
sources should be established by a group in a higher hierarchy, i.e., 
in the national or state constitutions. As a second step, it must 
be required from each citizen that he join a group (with a specific 
constitution) in control of a water management region. The choice 
of a specific group is free and it may be anywhere in the country; 
i.e., in his home town, at some holiday resort, or in a park. As 
a third step, the citizen must be taxed to supply funds for the 
management entity of his choice. This tax may be in the form of 
am appropriation made by the Federal or State Government; i.e., 
it need not be an increase in tax but a reallocation of public 
funds which is noted on his tax form. The purpose of this taxing 
procedure is to make the taxpayer conscious of costs in resource 
management. As a fourth step, am orgemizational structure must 
be developed for each management entity which must serve the ob­
jectives of the social group under which it resorts. In other 
words, the citizen should receive some return for his tax dollar 
vdiich is allocated to the management of a resource. 
This same procedure can also be followed in the management 
of other natural resources. According to this procedure, a system 
of free social groups is established for resource management at 
a regional level. The choice of an individual to join such a 
group will be analogous to a decision to join a firm, a church. 
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or the Isaac Walton League except that a certain participation 
in resource maoiagement would be enforced under a constitutional 
specification from a higher level. 
Social groups in the management of natural resources may 
form coalitions in order to facilitate problems of mutual con­
cern. Such coalitions may be between adjacent water management 
entities and/or between land- and air-resource management entities 
and water resource msinagement entities. Through the means of 
such coalitions, a network of natural resource management systems 
I 
is ensured. 
The above proposal represents a broad framework for natural 
resource management. The power of each social group with respect 
to a natural resource is not specified because such power will 
depend on constitutional specifications at a higher level. There 
may also be variations on these proposals depending on such aspects 
as the structure of the physical systems under consideration and 
administrative problems in taxing. It may be possible to identify 
a natural resource management region, for example, in the place of 
a water resource, air resource, and leund resource management region. 
The decision to specify a natural resource management region will 
depend upon the extent to which the relevant natural resource 
systems are incorporated in such a region. Individuals may also be 
taxed for natural resources as a whole rather than for a subset 
of natural resources. 
The purpose amd objective of an organizational structure 
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for water quality management arc identified by the procedure for 
group formation as discussed in this subsection. The role of 
subsystems is discussed next. 
The structure of a water management organization 
The previous subsection argued in favor of resource msmage-
ment entities typified by a specific and identifiable physical 
structural subsystem. According to this approach, a smaller sub-
region rather than, in the case of water management, the total 
basin system, is accepted as the basic management unit. Msmagement 
units for basins can still develop from such an organization, but 
only as a result of identifiable mutual interests between groups 
maoaaging these subsystems. It may be conceptualized that such 
developments will follow a pattern whereby first the groups of 
subsystems in a basin will form coalitions and then new and 
bigger groups may be formed out of such coalitions. The essence 
of such a procedure is that basin organizations will be the result 
of recognized social interaction by individuals concerned with the 
management of such basins rather than by em a priori specification 
of the borders of the region. 
Timmons recognized the importance of subregions in water 
management almost two decades ago (183). He stated (183, pp. 
1170-1171): 
There is a rapidly growing recognition by Congress, 
State Legislatures, Federal cind State natural resource 
agencies and interested citizens, of the necessity for 
developing further a third approach to Ismd and water 
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use problems, oriented between firms and within sub-
areas of river basins. This third approach, known as 
"watershed development" rests squarely upon the physical 
and economic character of the nature and consequences of 
the joint behavior of land and water within watersheds. 
Actually the watershed approach is complementary both to 
the firm and the river basin techniques for improving 
land and water resources. For without the watershed ap­
proach, a serious hiatus exists within our public programs 
of land and water resource development. 
Pavelis discussed various attempts by the Federal and State 
Governments to enforce small unit management entities in the area 
of water and lamd resource maoiagement (152, pp. 13-33). Examples 
of such attempts in the past are the Weeks Forest Purchase Act 
(1924, 197), the Ohio Conservancy Act (1914 amended 1954, 148), 
and Public Law 566 (1954 amended 1956, 198). The idea of small 
unit entities is clearly not new in the area of natural resources 
management. This idea was carried forward by the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers in the 1971 economic report of the 
President, They argued as follows (38, p. 121); 
As rules for the use of common property are developed, 
whether these are embodied in Government standards, emission 
charges, or usage certificates, several problems will have 
to be resolved. We shall, for example, have to decide at 
what level of Government the rules will be made. Since these 
rules require that the gains aoid losses entailed by different 
levels of environmental quality be weighed, the Government 
agency making the rules must be responsive to those who bear 
the gains and losses. This is especially important because 
part of the damage from pollution cannot be measured directly 
but depends on such things as the aesthetic preferences of 
those affected. As a practical matter, much of the damage 
from pollution will be "aêasurêd" by political pressuras 
from those damaged. Many, though not all, pollution prob­
lems are local in character, and therefore determination 
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of the appropriate level of environmental quality in these 
cases is likely to more accurate if it is done locally 
rather than by the Federal Government.^ 
The above exposition may create the impression that the 
initiation of local group participation in the area of water 
resources management is at the governmental level. Spontaneous 
local group participation is, however, an important factor in 
water resources management. Bromley et stated (26, pp. 1-2); 
The vast majority of federal water projects grow out 
of the interaction of a local water-related problem and a 
local office of one of the federal water agencies. The 
problem to be addressed is usually seen in a quite limited 
geographical contact . . . for example, a specific community 
experiences a destructive flood, a particular taxing dis­
trict feels that its tax base is too limited and seeks 
industrial development, a harbor is too small or too shallow 
to accommodate commercial vessels, or an irrigation district 
finds that its financial capabilities are inadequate to pro­
vide desired water supplies. 
They continued their argument about the importance of 
local groups in natural resource planning by stating that (26, 
p. 3): 
Government agencies, at every level, now survive aaid 
grow because they are able to serve the needs of particular 
interest groups. These groups, in turn, provide the 
political support which an agency must have in order to ob­
tain the legislation upon which it depends. 
This statement of the Council created a controversy with 
respect to the efficiency of a decentralized decision-making 
structure' for natural resources. Stein (179) argued that local 
autonomy in the setting of charges will lead to different charges 
which will violate conditions for a Pareto optimum. Peltzman and 
Tideman (154) then correctly pointed out that spatial differences 
should be recognized (i.e., rural, urban smd industrial regions) 
if a correct pricing procedure for the environment is to follow. 
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The role of the local interest group is, therefore, already 
institutionaJLized in certain areas of natural resources management. 
The proposition as presented in the previous subsection may only 
facilitate this characteristic by enhancing individual participa­
tion and individual responsibility. A certain portion of the 
decision-making powers of the national group (national constitu­
tion) and state group (state constitution) is transferred to the 
1 
local water management group. Such a procedure may alleviate 
certain problems of centralized decision-making. For example: 
(1) The power of pressure groups: If costs are borne by 
tax payers generally the natural tendency will exist for local 
constituents to support politically a proposed development even 
though such a project may show a benefit-cost ratio of less thsm 
one. An extension of this problem is pressure groups. Davies 
gave an ample account of the role of interest groups in national 
decision-making and in pollution control (50, pp. 77-97). Pressure 
groups arc important in the translation of individual wants into 
group demaaids, but there are no guaraintees for their proposals to 
be either economically sound or equitable. The chances that a 
distorted image of the needs of certain sections of the society 
may be enforced on the executive bremch are real. Pressure groups 
need only to carry a fraction of the costs of the 
^For am argument to this effect see the report of U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers (38, p. 121). 
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benefits they accrue. 
(2) Problems of project evaluation: The problems associated 
with public project evaluation as exposed in benefit-cost analysis 
presented an air of uncertainty in public decision-making. This 
situation may lead to a negation of economic rationale in resource 
plemning decisions (Maass, as cited in 121, pp. 311-328; and Hinrichy 
in Hinrichs and Taylor, 79, pp. 9-20). 
(3) The adaptation lag: The problem of allocating resources 
optimally over time is closely related to the effectiveness of the 
information flow. When the decision-maker emd the object of planning 
are separated in time and space, the following lags may occur 
(Brown and Mar, 27, p. 1158): 
An information lag may occur between the time a change 
occurs and the time information becomes available. 
A recognition lag intervenes between the arrival of the 
information and the recognition of the need for action. 
An evaluation lag exists because of the time required 
to evaluate aind to decide on a course of action. 
An application lag exists due to the time required to 
implement a chemge in policy. 
A lag between action auid consequences may exist. 
It can be expected that, depending on the quality of informa­
tion flow, the first, second aoid third lags will increase with 
centralization of decision-meJcing amd the structuring of resource-
planning in terms of governmental (public) responsibility. This 
process results in a two-level control mechemism (see Figure 8) 
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where first, the decision-making in legislative chambers (evad-ua-
tion), and second, the information gathering, recognition and ap­
plication (i.e., the executive and administrative branches) on 
problems are carried out by different institutional bodies. The 
adaptive lag in such a situation is clearly larger than that for 
the situation where resource planning is structured on an individual 
or personal base (see Figure 8), assuming good coordination and 
information flow in both instsmces. 
(4) The wide range of uncoordinated institutions involved: 
The adaptation lag is worsened by the variety of institutions 
concerned with the plemning aoid development of water resources. 
Schad and Boswell supply a list of 37 Bureaus, Offices, and 
Agencies, operating independently autid at the federal level under 
six departments, all with interests in the planning and development 
of water resources (170, pp. 858-859). The plsmning is carried out 
under the jurisdiction of a variety of House and Senate committees. 
Add to this list the various state and local agencies concerned 
with water resources planning, and a very complex institutional 
structure is pictured. This complexity adds to the problem of 
adaptation, also a problem of coordination. 
The proposal for a reorganized water management structure 
implicates a movement away from the relative informal local group 
organizations to formal loceU. group orgsinizations. Each such 
social group will be represented by the SCM (see Figure 9) in a 
hierarchy of decision-makers. The administrative structure in 
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this hierarchy should serve the objectives of such a group. The 
type of decisions to be made by each level in this hierarchy is 
as follows: 
(1) The SCM; The power of the SCM in a social group is 
restricted by the SCM in the National or State group and specified 
in the constitutions of these higher groups. The SCM of the local 
group specifies a constitution for this group and this constitution 
will again specify conditions for resource reallocation. 
(2) The decision-maker; The decision-maker of the local 
group (i.e., an elected board), decides on problems which may appear, 
subject to the norms auid limitations as presented by the constitu­
tion of the group. 
(3) The administration; The administration of the local 
group decides on routine problems subject to the norms of the 
decision-maker (i.e., the board). 
(4) The individual; The individual in the memagement region 
formulates his decisions about resource use subject to the 
limitations expressed upon him by decision-makers at a higher 
level.^ 
The management structure within the group is coordinated by 
linkages as described by Figure 9 aind the discussions which ac­
companied it. 
It should be noted that the individual who is affected by 
these decisions may or may not be a member of the group. If not, 
then this individual decided freely to be under the rules of this 
group. 
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Concluding observation with respect 
to the institutional, design . 
In summary, a proposal for eoi organizational, design is 
presented in Figure 12, This proposal should be compared with 
Figure 11, which presents certain lines of authority as they may 
exist today. The basic difference between these expositions is the 
allocation of certain aspects of the decision-making powers (and, 
therefore, spending power) to local groups. The proposal of an 
organizational design follows the pattern of a functional organiza­
tion as discussed, for example, by Warren and Massie (210, pp. 94-
115). Such an organization not only allows for a hierarchy of 
decision-makers, but also accommodates advisors to the decision­
maker and linkages between advisors who serve decision-makers at 
different levels. This procedure may serve better coordination 
between the different levels of decision-making. 
The interrelationships between the instruments and institu­
tions of water quality management can now be summarized. It was 
argued in this chapter that only two instruments, namely, charges 
aind treatment standards, can be viewed as efficient in terms of 
plamning and administering water qualities. Charges are the most 
For a discussion on the benefits and costs associated with 
centralization and decentralization in government, see McKean 
(130, pp. 146-173). The crux of the argument against decentraliza­
tion in this aoiailysis is the problem of interdependencies between 
between regions. This can be alleviated by means of coalitions as 
described in Figure 12. 
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NATIONAL RESOURCE 
CONSTITUTIONS: 
National Constitution: 
Covers aspects of natural 
resource management 
in order to resolve 
interstate conflicts 
(including aspects of 
broad national importance, 
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Covers aspects of 
natural resource 
management in order 
to resolve interpersonal 
conflict within the 
state. 
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= Feedback or information flow 
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NATIONAL RESOURCE 
CONSTITUTIONS: 
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management of natural 
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of conflict for the 
nation as a whole. 
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for the management 
of natural resources 
in order to control 
areas of conflict for 
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state as a whole. 
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natural resources by means of local groups and re­
source management regions 
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efficient for point sources of water quality use, said treatment 
standards are the only available instrument for plsmning aind ad­
ministering diffused sources. These two instruments may be used 
in combination where constituents of diffused and point sources 
interact; i.e., sedimentation and BOD in the specification of 
turbidity staaidards.^ 
It was also indicated that the nature of rights in water 
qualities should resemble tenure contracts. These contracts should 
enhautice efficiency through an accurate specification of the context 
as well as through a specification of an optimal term. The question 
of efficiency and equity was then related to aspects of decision­
making and organization in water quality management. The only way 
to judge the equity of decisions is to judge the procedure whereby 
the decision-maker is elected. The idea of free group formation 
was presented as an argument for equitable procedures in delineating 
a regional decision-making structure. These groups were then used 
as the basis of an institutional structure for water quality 
management. 
An adaptive procedure is required in this instance. The aim 
should be to apply a charge equal to the shadow price of a turbidity 
standard. The real world situation is then compared with the pro­
posals of a model, such as presented in Chapter VI. If they differ, 
the model needs restructuring, and the planning process is repeated 
until the real world situation coordinates with the plan. The aim 
v.'ith this procedure is to coordinate the planning of diffused 
sources and point sources within one system. 
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" CIIAI'TIÎU VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
From this study, certain conclusions and recommendations 
may be drawn with regard to the management of water quality. 
These conclusions and reconunendations include an assessment of 
findings evaluated in terms of the objectives formulated in the 
initial chapter. Those findings are gleaned from the study in 
the form of a summary from which the conclusions and recommenda­
tions are formulated. 
Summary 
The problem of water quality maaiagement was approached through 
inquiry into the origins and nature of the wa.ter quality problem 
in a rural area. Next, procedures for planning, controlling, 
and administering water qualities were considered. The analysis, 
including the procedures and findings are evaluated in terms of 
achievements smd limitations. 
Achievements of this study 
In order to understand the water quality problem as delimited 
and to discover emd develop alternative solutions through testing 
llic hypotheses as stated in Chapter I, this study was directed 
towards five objectives. The first objective was to identify 
ami evaluate effects of spillovers on water quality management in 
tc;rms of cfCioioiicy and equity. These effects were approached 
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through analysis of resource alJocation within market amd property 
systems. It was argued that the price system may serve as an 
institution for efficient resource allocation subject to the 
assumptions under which it operates or can be made to operate. 
Externalities were presented as market failure due to the existence 
of unpriced products. It was shown that the ultimate effect of 
spillovers could be accommodated in the creation of a "new" re­
source base, institutionalizing externalities. The institutionalized 
externality may be visualized through a tâtonnement procedure whereby 
the recipients adapt their production and consumption patterns to 
variable levels of water quality. This provides a new water quality 
situation which may result in losses to some users that may be in 
conflict with an equitable solution. The development of a public 
good concept of water quality use was then discussed in terms of 
a change in the quality of water when many users are affected. A 
need for measures of public control arises from such a situation. 
Such control may be achieved by applying charges and payments asso­
ciated with standards and effluents stands to water uses and users. 
The second objective of the study involved development of a 
model for maximizing social benefits subject to specified water 
quality restrictions. The crux of the application of this model 
was 1c) lost a procedure for optimizing water qualities in a region. 
Two constituents of water were used in applications of the model; 
namely, organic residuals as measured by BOD (biochemical oxygen 
demand) and suspended sediment. Construction of the model was 
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based on linear programming procedures. In developing and applying 
this model various economic agents were identified. The physical 
linkages between them were established by means of BOD progression 
and delivery ratios for sediment (from the Universal Soil Loss 
Equation) and by means of the specification of alternative tech­
niques for improving water quality. 
The third objective was to apply this model to the Upper 
Skunk River basin in Central Iowa. This was accomplished by 
using the land resources and the hydrologie situation in the sub-
basin as the basis of the analysis. Certain actual and hypothe­
sized situations with respect to the pattern of water quality use 
were then superimposed on hydrologie and land resource characteris­
tics of the region. This ainalysis included (1) parametric changes 
in both sediment emd DO levels, (2) changes in the size and number 
of participants and (3) a reservoir development in the basin area. 
Taking into account the assumptions incorporated in the model, 
the following results were obtained: 
(1) "Secondary" treatment of effluent was required from 
towns only when the most stringent stream standards were enforced; 
i.e., standards of 12.0 mg. DO per liter of water. These standards 
are near the saturation point for DO in streams, emd are, there­
fore, impractical to enforce. 
(2) The need to consider the broader hydrologie system 
(including basin areas outside the plamning region) was illustrated 
when the benefits of the Squaw Creek increased by $46,801 when 
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the most stringent standards were enforced and a reservoir north 
of Ames was constructed. This indicates the possibility for one 
region or Management District to sell rights to pollute (empty 
resource capacity) to other regions. 
(3) Minimum tillage predominated as cultivation and treat­
ment practice for agricultural lands when standards of 751 mg./l. 
suspended sediment were allowed. Minimum tillage plus contouring 
and permement pasture were the releveint cultivation and treatment 
practices when stringent standards were applied. 
(4) When turbidity, and not suspended sediment, was used as 
sui indicator for water quality, then minimum tillage was allowable 
up to 375 mg./l. suspended solids. This indicates a trade-off 
between lemd practices and the treatment or abatement of urban, 
feedlot, and meat-packing plant effluent. It illustrated the 
importance of including all the relevant economic agents into a 
water quality mainagement plain. 
(5) When certain developments (i.e., increase in the size 
of Ames or the number of economic agents) were programmed, the 
liabilities of individual economic agents chaunged. This illustrated 
the need for a mechanism in water quality management institutions 
which allows for optimal amd equitable changes of liabilities. 
Such a mechanism is important in a dynamic situation characterized 
by chemging demands, activities and technologies. It is not 
sufficient to force a specific economic agent (i.e., a "new 
arrival", one with changing cost structures, or one which is 
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changing the scale of operations) to adhere to a water quality 
standard. Regional economic efficiency requires a consideration 
of the total region when one participant changes operations. 
The fourth objective was to develop a framework for the 
control of water quality by meains of an institutional structure 
which will facilitate the norms of efficiency and equity. This . 
analysis started with a comparison of various water quality control 
instruments. The instruments were compared on the basis of planning 
efficiency, administrative efficiency, and equity. On the basis 
of this comparison it was concluded that only charges (for point 
sources) and treatment standards (for diffused sources) should be 
applied in the management of water quality. In this manner treat­
ment standards may be used in combination with zoning laws. In 
situations where diffused sources and point sources are inter­
related, as in the case of sediment auid organic residuals when 
turbidity stemdards are applied, it would appear necessary to 
program the treatment standards according to a procedure such as 
presented in this study. The application of charges to point 
sources, such as towns and feedlots, can then follow am adaptive 
procedure. This may be accomplished by first equating the charge 
to the shadow price of the turbidity standard, and then testing 
the effect on water quality. If there is a deviation, the 
qualities available to the diffused sources can be chainged, 
thereby chemging the relevant shadow price. The charges are 
again equated to the shadow price of the quality standard. This 
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adaptive process continues until the required stream quality is 
reached. 
The arguments with respect to instruments for control in­
troduced questions concerning the nature of water rights. It was 
shown that a water right could be of the nature of a contract 
rather than an ownership interest. The ownership of the water 
is then vested in the public. It is in such an instance the 
responsibility of the public to allocate the qualities of water 
efficiently and equitably over time. This reasoning introduced 
questions about a feasible orgsuiizational structure for water 
quality management. 
The question of equity was resolved by defining an equitable 
procedure for social group formation. It was argued that an in­
dividual should be free to choose between management groups in 
control of resource areas. These resource areas should be defined 
according to identifiable physical characteristics, such as an 
industrial area or rural area. After an individual has decided 
to join a specific group he has also accepted the rules and 
conditions for control of water quality. 
An organizational framework was developed from the concepts 
of levels of decision-making and hierarchy of social groups. It 
was argued that a certain part of the decisions should be trans­
ferred to the use regions. Such decision-making power could in­
clude taxing aaid spending powers in order to be functional. With 
this design for institutions, individual responsibility for control 
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of water quality is enhaoiced because each individual in the 
management group should know and accept his responsibilities to the 
rules of the group and would also be reflective to costs and 
benefits derived from the activities of the group. Efficiency 
in public decision-making is also enhaunced by the closer linkages 
between the individual amd decision-maker. 
The fifth objective related to recommendations for future 
research. Such recommendations originate from the limiting 
assumptions which were incorporated during the process of inquiry 
as well as from the conclusions which may be abstracted from this 
study. These recommendations are discussed in a later section. 
Limitations of this study 
Various simplified situations were used in the development 
and application of the model for water quality planning. These 
are summarized as follows: 
(1) The hydrologie system in which the design stream flow of 
the stream was accepted without proof for the various.participating 
economic agents. The opportunity cost of various design flows 
should be investigated before it is applied in a management system. 
(2) The design rainfall analogous to the design stream flow 
was also assumed. 
(3) The simplified model for BOD progression (oxygen sag 
model) and its limitations were presented in Chapter IV. The 
need for certain adaptations to the model when applied to various 
planning conditions were underlined by these arguments. 
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(4) The use of the Universal Soil Loss Equation in predicting 
the sedimentation of streams necessitates important assumptions in 
its application; namely (i) an "average" suspended silt delivery 
ratio was assumed, and (ii) bedload was ignored in the calculations. 
(5) Only two constituents, BOD and suspended sediment, were 
considered. These constituents were used as indicators of the 
potential presence of other associated pollutants. Some situations 
in the real world may be considerably more complex, for example, 
there may be more constituents of importance (depending on the 
qualitative demands) and these constituents may react with each 
other. 
(6) Assumptions concerning the processes available for 
pollution abatement consisted of the raoige of physical structures 
for the abatement of pollution. This was clearly manifested in 
the presentation of the alternative processes for the control 
cattle feedlot runoff. 
(7) Calculation of the costs of treatment for effluent from 
urban areas and meat-packing plauits were discussed in Chapter V. 
The existence of a linear relation between the level of treat­
ment said the costs of treatment may be questioned. It can be 
expected that considerable variations from this assumption may 
manifest itself in the real world situation. 
(8) The implicit assumption that all treatment costs are 
variable is subject to modification through additioneJ. data. 
Towns emd meat-packing plants may have facilities for effluent 
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treatment, and ein optimal planning strategy will require an 
investigation into the possibility for adaptations to existing 
facilities as one of the alternatives for treatment of effluent. 
(9) The assumption of constant prices is also subject to 
modification from further information. Prices were used in the 
calculation of the gross margins "as if" the shift in production 
patterns (as on farms) will have no effect on the market prices. 
This may be correct for a theory of the firm under perfect competi­
tion, but shifts in production patterns for a region may well 
be expected to affect the price structure of products and services. 
Conclusions 
This study aimed at finding the means for reconciling con­
flicts between public emd private interests in the area of water 
quality mcinagement, A specific pi sinning situation, the Upper 
Skunk River basin, was used to study aspects of the water quality 
problem. The Upper Skunk River basin is rural in character and 
certain problems of water quality management as identified in 
this study are limited to such a setting. 
Three hypotheses served as framework for the aoialysis. First, 
it was hypothesized that a problematic gap exists due to the 
growing occurrence of technological spillovers in rural areas. 
According to this hypothesis spillovers should not be viewed as 
a freak occurrence but as a function of the day-to-day activities 
of economic agents in the area. Such persistence calls for special 
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institutions to manage the occurrence of spillovers. The 
potential impact of the application of modern technology on water 
quality was discussed in Chapter II. The effects of sediment, 
pesticides, herbicides and fertilizer on water quality were 
described. From these discussions it can be concluded that water 
quality should be managed as a persistent rather them an ^  hoc 
problem. 
A second hypothesis diagnosed the problem as a vague specifi­
cation of the responsibilities of the water users and an estrange­
ment of certain aspects of the management from the users. In a 
discussion on water rights (Chapter III) it was pointed out that 
qualitative specifications are absent in these rights. In addi­
tion the burden of proof is placed on the daonaged party in the 
case of court actions on pollution. In order to control the in­
flow of residuals into watercourses certain instruments (charges, 
payments, treatment standards and effluent standards) are used by 
agencies in control. It was pointed out (in Chapter VII) that in 
general these agencies are functioning under instructions of 
central decision-making units such as the Federal government or 
the states, rather than under instruction of local groups. It 
cam therefore be concluded that the responsibility of the individual 
economic agent for the mamagement of water quality are vague or 
absent. This may enhance a tendency to "freeride" the use of 
water qualities. 
A third hypothesis proposed a solution to the problem of water 
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quality management through the application of two means. First, 
human activities should be made reactive to interrelationships by 
orgainizing and coordinating these activities into entities which 
will internalize the interrelationships as well as to facilitate 
efficient application of modern technology. The logic of and 
a procedure for this proposal were discussed in the development 
emd application of a model for regional water quality planning in 
Chapters IV, V and VI. The relevamce of a regional approach in 
water quality management was defended in Chapter VII, It was 
shown in this chapter that it may be possible to use physical 
interrelationship as a basis for regional delineation and still 
to accommodate other interrelationships, i.e., economic and 
political systems. The mechanism of this proposal is incorporated 
into the second part of the third hypothesis. It was hypothesized 
that human activities should be coordinated into an institutional 
structure which places a special emphasis on individual responsi­
bility. The logic of such a structure was presented in Chapter 
VII. It was concluded that individual resp>onsibility may be en­
hanced by free group formation. These groups may serve as the 
relevant decision-méiking entities in control of water quality 
management regions, and will have both taxing and spending power 
as well as the power to enhaince and allocate water qualities. 
In conclusion certain implications of the findings in this 
study are summarized: 
(1) The planning of water qualities may be simplified by the 
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application of charges to point sources rather them standards. 
Treatment standards should only be used in the control of diffused 
resources of pollutants and it may be affected by means of zoning 
laws. The application of charges may be questioned on the basis 
of equity considerations. Such a question should be resolved by 
means of the specification of water rights aoid by means of the 
specification of equitable rules for decision-meiking, i.e., the 
free group formation rule. 
(2) In order to allow for optimal plaoining and allocation 
of water qualities over time it may be necessary to specify rights 
in water qualities in terms of a tenure contract between the public 
and the user. This contract should be defined in both the terms 
of tenure as in terms of qualities. 
(3) Water quality management, as proposed in this study, 
is the responsibility of regional plamning groups. An inter­
linking national structure for water quality méinagement will con­
sist of two major levels. First, the responsibilities reserved for 
the Federal auid State governments will delineate the areas of 
interest of the nation in general. An example of an interest with 
a national impact is the public health. Second, local groups may 
interlink to form coalitions. An example of a situation where such 
a coalition may be feasible is the construction of a reservoir 
which may benefit more thsm one region. 
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Reconmendations for Further Study 
Most of the limitations of the study are associated with data 
problems. Therefore, further research is needed to provide data 
for relaxing the assumptions imposed on the analysis. Also, further 
research is needed in proceeding with the institutional design for 
the water quality management entity including the matter of legal 
contracts with individual water users pertaining to water quality 
management. 
The fullest impact of shortcomings associated with the assump­
tions will be experienced when treatment stemdards are used as 
instruments for controlling qualities of water. It was proposed 
that charges should be used as an instrument to control point 
sources of pollutants. The application of charges should relax 
the importance of such aspects as the specification of alternative 
treatment processes, the costs of these processes and even the 
importemce of studies concerning BOD progression. A charge 
however is connected to a specific design flow. It is recommended 
that studies be instigated with the aim at finding a procedure 
whereby am optimal relationship between charges aind design flows 
can be established. 
Research on tenure contracts is importaoit in order to establish 
procedures whereby qualitative specifications eind the term of con­
tract can be coordinated to ensure efficiency of resource use in 
the long run. The complexity of such research is memy sided. 
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Consider, for example, a situation where resource use by one 
economic agent results in eui external economy on the other users 
in the region. If such an economic agent stops the use of the 
resource, this may, in effect, result in external diseconomies for 
the other users. Other problems concern the optimal term of 
contract amd the uncertainty about future technological and economic 
developments. 
The importance of the third group of investigations lies in 
the development of a procedure to help with the establishment of 
"functional resource management regions." The success of an in­
stitutional structure as presented here is highly dependent on 
the relevsmce of the norms used in the establishment of the borders 
of resource management districts. A second field of study cam 
also resort under this category. This second field of study is 
legal research on the constitutional and tenant rights vested in 
different people, agencies, amd other entities. The object is to 
establish a constitutional hierarchy for natural resource mamage-
ment as well as to facilitate any changes necessary. A third 
field of study within this group is in connection with the financ­
ing of local groups in control of the management regions. Such 
research should include such aspects as Federal and State participa­
tion, taxing of individuals in the maoiagement group amd the rela­
tionships between funds received from Federal, State and individual 
sources and those received from charges. 
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APPENDIX A: PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL 
DATA FOR SEDIMENT CONTROL 
Table 1. Development of cropping management factors (C) for conventional tillage of corn 
corn-soybean rotation^ 
Operation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Date Readings Crop Erosion Soil loss Cols. C-value 
curve stage index^ ratio 4 x 5  (sum of 6) 
. 14^ period 
percent percent percent 
Corn after soybeans 
Turnplow corn 4/10 6 Sb4 — _d 
Plant corn 5/1 10 F 4 43^ .0172 
6/1 20 Cl 10 76 .0760 
7/1 38 C2 18 60 .1080 
Harvest corn 11/1 96 C3 58 31 .1798 
Turnplow corn 4/10 106 C4 10 36 .0360 .4170 
Corn after corn 
Turnplow corn 4/10 6 C4 « 
Plant corn 5/1 10 F 4 36® .0144 
6/1 20 CI 10 63 .0630 
7/1 38 C2 18 50 .0900 
Harvest corn 11/1 96 C3 58 26 .1508 
Turnplovf beans 4/25 106 C4 10 30 .0300 .3482 
Soybeans after corn 
Turnplow beans 4/25 9 C4 - -
Plant beans 5/15 14 F 5 36^ .0180 
6/15 27 Sbl 13 63 .0819 
7/15 50 Sb2 23 50 .1150 
Harvest beans 10/15 94 Sb3 44 26 .1144 
Plow corn 4/10 106 Sb4 12 30 .0360 
follows 
h 
example in (214, Table 5, p. 35) . 
^Source; (214, Figure 11, p. 24). 
^Column 4 established by sequential subtractions,in Column 2. ^ 
Ui 
Values from (214, Table 2, line 36, p. 12) x 120%. Adjustments based on ( 137) 
and (174, p. 135) to reflect higher soil loss when corn follows soybeans. 
^Source: (214, Table 2, line 36., p. 12). 
^Source: (214, Table 2, line 36, p. 12). 
Table 2, Development of the cropping management factors (C) for minimum tillage of a 
corn-corn-soybean rotation^ 
Operation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Date Readings Crop Erosion Soil loss Cols. C-value 
curve stage index^ ratio 4 x 5  (sum of 6) 
14^ period 
percent percent percent 
Corn after soybeans (residue: 1500-2000 Ib/ac^ 
Plant corn 5/1 10 Sb4 
6/1 20 CI 10 48 .0480 
7/1 38 C2 18 38 .0684 
Harvest corn ll/l 96 C3 58 22 .1276 
Plaint corn 5/1 110 C4 14 30 .0420 .2860 
Corn after corn (residue: 3000-4000 Ib/ac) 
Plant corn 5/1 10 C4 M 
6/1 20 CI 10 20 ® .0200 
7/1 38 C2 18 16 ,0288 
Harvest corn 11/1 96 C3 58 9 .0522 
Plant beans 5/15 114 C4 18 15 .0270 .1280 
Soybeans: after corn (residue; 3000-4000 Ib/ac) 
Plant beans 5/15 14 C4 -
6/15 27 Sbl 13 20 .0260 
7/15 50 Sb2 23 16 .0368 
Harvest beans 10/15 94 Sb3 44 09 .0396 
Plant corn 5/1 110 Sb4 16 15 .0240 
^Pollows example in (214, Table 5, p. 35). 
^Source: (214, Figure 11, p. 24). 
^Column 4 established by sequential subtractions in Column 2. to 
w 
^falues from (214, Table 2, 1500 lb. residue level, p. 52) x 120%. Adjustment 
based on (137) and (174, p. 136) to reflect higher soil loss when corn follows soybeans. 
^Values from (213, Table 1, 3000 lb. residue level, p. 52) for corn after corn, 
^Soybeaui soil-loss ratio assumed to be equal to that for corn after corn (174, 
p. 136).. 
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Table 3. Computed erosion rates for lands with different slope 
lengths and gradients for two tillage systems, Upper 
Skunk River Basin 
Slope 
length 
Slopo 
gradient LS P C A=FLKSIT 
rotation 
ft. percent tons/ac 
average 
tons/ac 
Conventional tillage 
130 1.0 165 .32 .156 .37683 3.104 
250 1.0 165 .32 .216 .37683 4.298 
450 1.0 165 .32 .290 .37683 5.770 
130 3.0 165 .32 .345 .37689 6.864 
250 3.0 165 .32 .479 .37683 9.530 
450 3.0 165 .32 .643 .37683 12.793 
130 6.5 165 .32 .847 .37683 16.853 
250 6.5 165 .32 1.175 .37683 23.378 
130 11.0 165 .32 1.800 .37683 35.814 
250 11.0 165 .32 2.497 .37683 49.682 
130 15.5 165 .32 3.106 .37683 61.800 
250 15.5 165 .32 4.307 .37683 85.695 
Minimum tillage 
.18013 1.484 
.18013 2.054 
.18013 2.758 
.18013 3.281 
.18013 4.556 
same as above .18013 6.116 
.18013 8.056 
.18013 11.175 
.18013 
.18013 
17.120 
23.749 
,18013 
,18013 
29.541 
40.964 
^Source: Reading from map. interpolated (214, p. 6). 
^Source: Soil survey information smd interpretation (202) 
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Table 4. Computed erosion rates for contoured lands with different 
slope lengths and gradients for two tillage systems. 
Upper Skunk River Basin 
Slope 
length 
ft. 
Slope 
gradient 
percent 
K LS P C A=RKLSPC 
tons/ac tons/ac 
Conventional tillage 
130 1.0 165 .32 .156 0.60 .37683 1.862 
250 1.0 165 .32 .216 0.60 .37683 2.579 
450 1.0 165 .32 .290 0.60 .37683 3.462 
130 3.0 165 .32 .345 0.50 .37683 4.119 
250 3.0 165 .32 .479 0.50 .37683 5.718 
130 6.5 165 .32 .847 0.50 .37683 10.111 
250 6.5 165 .32 1.175 0.50 .37683 14.027 
Minimum tillage 
same as above 
.18013 
,18013 
,18013 
.18013 
.18013 
. 18013 
. 18013 
0.890 
1.233 
1.655 
1.969 
2.733 
4.834 
6.705 
^Source: Reading from map, interpolated (214, p. 6). 
^Source: Soil survey information and interpretation (202), 
^Source; (214, Table 6, p. 36). 
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Table 5. Computed erosion rates for terraced leinds with different 
slope lengths and gradients for two tillage systems. 
Upper Skunk River Basin 
Slope Slope b d length gradient R^ LS C° A=RKLSPC 
feet percent tons/ac 
Conventional tillage 
130 3.0 165 .32 .346 .04 .37683 0.275 
250 3.0 165 .32 .480 .04 .37683 0.381 
450 3.0 165 .32 .644 .04 .37683 0.512 
130 6.5 165 .32 .847 .04 .37683 0.674 
250 6.5 165 .32 1.175 .04 .27683 0.935 
130 11.0 165 .32 1.800 .04 .37683 1.433 
250 11.0 165 .32 2.497 .04 .37683 1.987 
130 15.5 165 .32 3.105 .04 .37683 2.472 
250 15.5 165 .32 4.307 .04 .37683 3.428 
Minimum tillage 
130 3.0 .18013 0.131 
250 3.0 .18013 0.182 
450 3.0 .18013 0.245 
130 6.5 .18013 0.322 
250 6.5 .18013 0.447 
130 11.0 .18013 0.685 
250 11.0 .18013 0.950 
130 15.5 .18013 1.182 
250 15.5 .18013 1.638 
^Source; Reading from map, interpolated (214, p. 6). 
^Source: Soil survey information and interpretation (202). 
Laflen, John; A.R.S., U.S.D.A., Ames, Iowa. Trap efficiency 
of level terraces with tile outlets. Private communication, June 
1971. 
"^Averages of C-factors, calculated in Table 1 aind Table 2, 
Appendix A. 
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Table 6. Computed erosion rates for pasture lemds with different 
slopes and gradients, Upper Skunk River Basin 
Slope Slope 
length gradient R K LS P C* A=RKLSPC 
ft. percent tons/ac 
130 1.0 165 .32 .156 1 .004 0.033 
250 1.0 165 .32 .216 1 .004 0.046 
450 1.0 165 .32 .290 1 .004 0.061 
130 3.0 165 .32 .345 1 .004 0.073 
250 3.0 165 .32 .479 1 .004 0.101 
450 3.0 165 .32 .643 1 .004 0.136 
130 6.5 165 .32 .847 1 .004 0.178 
250 6.5 165 .32 1.175 1 .004 0.248 
130 11.0 165 .32 1.800 1 .004 0.380 
250 11.0 165 .32 2.497 1 .004 0.527 
130 15.5 165 .32 3.106 1 .004 0.656 
250 15.5 165 .32 4.307 1 .004 0.910 
^Cropping management factor assumed to that of a grass-
legume mix with yield more than 3 tons per acre (214, Table 2, 
p. 14). 
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APPENDIX B: COST AND RETURN DATA 
FOR SEDIMENT CONTROL : 
Table 1. Variable costs associated with row-cropping for two tillage systems and 
different treatment practices 
Operation expenditures 
Labor Fuel, oil, ^ Repairs Seed, fert. Haul. & Ins. Depr, Total 
costs^ lubrication herbicides, , drying^ for taxes & prod. 
insecticides 
$/ac 
crops ins. cost 
Conventional tillage 
Flatlauids amd 
terraces 
Uplaind £Oid 
contours 
Minimum tillage 
Flatlands and 
terraces 
Upland and 
contours 
3.28 2.17 
4.33 2.86 
2.20 1.08 
2.90 1.43 
3,97 
5.24 
2.44 
3.22 
25.06 
25.06 
25.06 
25.06 
4.6 1.43 17.13 57.64 
4.6 1.43 17.13 60.65 
4.6 1.43 12.70 49.51 
4.6 1.43 12.70 51.34 
w 
^Source: (174, Table 19a, Table 19b, pp. 145-148) 
^Source; (91, Table 8.1, Table 8.2, pp. 213-216). 
Table 2. Cost of terrace with grassed backslopes said underground 
outlets, by slope gradient 
Slope in 
percent 
Terrace 
interval^ 
Terrace 
footage 
Unita 
cost 
Construct, 
cost of 
terrace 
Intakes 
& con­
duit®-
Total 
capital 
expendi­
ture 
ft. ft/ac $/ft $/ac $/ac $/ac 
3.0 245 178 0.18 32.04 30.00 62.04 
6.5 130 335 0.30 100.50 30.00 130.50 
11.0 140 310 0.37 114.00 30.00 144.00 
15.5 120 360 0.55 198.00 30.00 228.00 
^Source: Laflen, John, A.R.S., U.S.D.A., Ames, Iowa. Un­
published material on terraces. Private communication, June 1971. 
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Ann, Ann. 
Production foregone to land in backslope 
chrg, 
@7^ 
(a) 
maint, 
costa 
(b) 
Gross 
revenue 
Prod*n. 
cost 
Net 
revenue 
$ land 
in bk.-
slope 
Net 
revenue 
loss(c) 
Total 
cost 
a+b+c 
$/ac $/ac $/ac $/ac $/ac % $/ac $/ac 
4.65 0.50 113.30 57.64 55.66 2.0 1.11 6.26 
9.79 0.50 107.30 57.64 49.66 7.7 3.82 14.11 
10.80 0.50 101.96 57.64 44.32 13.0 5.76 17.06 
17.10 0.50 97.30 57.64 39.66 23.7 9.40 27.00 
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Table 3. Permanent pasture renovation and maintenance variable 
costs 
$/acre 
Annual renovation cost^ 4.88 
Annual maintenauice cost^ 14.28 
Annual hay harvesting and storing^ 13.80 
Total variable costs 32.96 
^(174, Table 21, p. 150). 
^(91, Table 8.4, p. 219). 
Table 4. Productivities auid gross revenues for Clarion-Webster soils in Central Iowa 
Slope Gross revenues 
gradient Yields^ Crop prices Rota­
Corn Soybeans Hay Corn Soybeans Hay Corn Soybeans tion Hay 
aver. 
bu/ac bu/ac ton/ac $/bu $/bu $/ton $/ac $/ac $/ac $/ac 
0-2% 110 42 4.4 1.10 2.50 20.00 121.00 105.00 115.66 88.00 
3-5% 108 41 4.5 
o
 
H
 
H
 2.50 20.00 118.80 102.50 113.30 90.00 
6-8% 102 39 4.2 1.10 2.50 20.00 112.20 97.50 107.30 84.00 
11% 97 37 4.0 1.10 2.50 20.00 106.70 92.50 101.96 80.00 
15.5% 93 35 3.9 
o
 
H
 
H
 2.50 20.00 102.30 87.50 97.37 78.OO 
^Source; (64, p. 12). 
^Source: (81, p. 3), 
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APPENDIX C: THE INITIAL 
FEASIBLE PROGRAM 
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EXECUTOR. HPS* RELEASE 1 MOO LEVEL 2 
NAME BQODOPLN 
ROWS 
N C 
L OOAGG 
L 0CA02 
L 0CA04 
L 0GA06 
L DQA08 
L OOAIC 
L DCA12 
L DCA14 
L DQA16 
L DCA18 
L DQA2G 
L DGA22 
L 0GA24 
L D0A26 
L DGA28 
L DCA30 
L D0A32 
L DCA34 
L D0A36 
L DGA38 
L 0CA40 
L 0QA42 
L DCA44 
L DGA46 
L 0CA48 
L DGA50 
L DCA52 
L 0CA54 
L DCA56 
L DQA58 
L DCA60 
L DCA62 
L DGA64 
L DGA66 
L 0GA68 
L DCA7G 
L DCA72 
L 00A74 
L DCA76 
L D0A78 
L DGA8G 
L ÛCA82 
L D0A84 
L D0A86 
L DCA88 
L D0A90 
L DCA92 
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L DCA94 
L 0C60G 
I DCB02 
L 0CB04 
L 0GB06 
L 0GB08 
L OCBIC 
L 0CB12 
L DCB14 
L DC816 
L 00BI8 
L DCB2C 
L 0CB22 
L 0QB24 
L 0CB26 
L 0CB28 
L DCB30 
L 0CB32 
L DCB34 
L 0CB36 
L 0CB38 
L DGB4C 
L DQB42 
L DCB44 
L DCB46 
L DGB48 
L DCB5C 
L DCB52 
L DCB54 
L 0CB56 
L ncBse 
L DCB6C 
L DCB62 
L 0GB64 
L 0CB66 
L 0CB68 
L 0CB70 
L 0CB72 
L DCB74 
L DCB76 
L 0CB78 
L D0B80 
L 0CB82 
L 0CB84 
L DCB86 
L CCB88 
I nnRçr 
I DCB92 
L DCB94 
L SOI 
L S02 
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L S 03 
L TOI 
L T02 
L T03 
E RBLSG 
E RBLSA 
E RFLAL 
E RFLAA 
E RFLBL 
E RFLBA 
E RFLCL 
E RFLCA 
E RELLW 
E RELLA 
L RELLB 
E RMPAC 
E RMPAA 
E RFLDL 
E RFLCA 
E RKAMR 
E RKAMA 
E RJEML 
E RJFWA 
E RFLEL 
E RFLEA 
E RRANO 
E RRANA 
E RSTCC 
E RSTOA 
E RFLFL 
E RFLFA 
E RROLD 
E RROLA 
E RSTAN 
E RSTAA 
E RGILT 
E RGILA 
E RJORC 
E RJORA 
E RAMES 
E RAMEA 
E RKELL 
E RKELA 
E RI-UXL 
E RHUXA 
E RCA M G 
E RC 
E RPPPC 
E RMPPA 
E RELKH 
E RELKA 
E RVALE 
E RVALA 
E RCOLF 
E RCOLA 
RBLSB 
RFLAB 
RFLBB 
RFLCE 
RMPAB 
RFLOfi 
RKAME 
RJEWe 
RFLEB 
RRANE 
RSTCB 
RFLFB 
RROLE 
RSTAB 
R6ILB 
RJORE 
PAMEE 
RKELE 
RHUXE 
RCAHE 
RMPPE 
RELKE 
RVALE 
RCOLE 
E ROIAX 
E ROIAY 
E ROIAZ 
E ROIBX 
E ROIBY 
E ROIBZ 
E RQICX 
E ROICY 
E ROIOX 
E ROIDY 
E ROIEX 
E ROIEY 
E R02AX 
E R02AY 
E R02AZ 
E R02BX 
E R02BY 
E RC2BZ 
E R02CX 
E. RC2CY 
E R020X 
E R020Y 
E R02EX 
E R02EY 
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E RC3AX 
E RQ3AY 
E R03A2 
E RG3B> 
E RG3BY 
E R03B2 
E R03C% 
E R03CY 
E RC30X 
E R030Y 
E R03EX 
E RC3EY 
E R04A* 
E R04AY 
E RC4B)( 
E R04BY 
E R04CX 
E RC4CY 
E RC4DX 
E R040Y 
E RC4EX 
E R04EY 
COLUMNS 
BLSG C 16859.00000 00A02 11.59000 
BLSG 00A04 11.92000 D0A06 10.10000 
BLSG 00A08 9.00000 DOAIO 8.15000 
BLSG 0CA12 6.50000 OOA14 5.16000 
BLSG 00AI6 4.10000 00A18 3.25000 
BLSG 0GA20 2.57000 DOA22 2.04000 
BLSG 00A24 2.00000 D0A26 1.61000 
BLSG 0GA28 1.28000 D0A30 1.02000 
BLSG 00A32 .80000 D0A34 .64000 
BLSG 0GA36 .50000 D0A38 .43000 
BLSG 00A40 .40000 DGA42 .32000 
BLSG 0GA44 .25000 D0A46 •20000 
BLSG D0A48 .16000 00A50 .13000 
BLSG 00A52 .11000 D0A54 .10000 
BLSG 00A56 .08000 DGA58 •06000 
BLSG 0GA60 •05000 DO A 62 .04000 
BLSG 0GA64 .03000 OOA66 .02000 
BLSG 0GA68 •02000 DOA70 .01000 
BLSG 0QB02 6.00000 OOB04 8.34000 
BLSG 0CB06 9.25000 DOB 08 10.69000 
BLSG OOBIO 10.50000 DOB 12 10.48000 
BLSG 0GB14 10.00000 00B16 9.28000 
BLSG 0CB18 8.50000 D0B20 7.84000 
BLSG CCcZ2 C C/^riAA w# * www 
BLSG 0G626 5.22000 DOB 28 4 . 70 000 
BLSG OGB30 4.20000 D0B32 3.80000 
BLSG 00B34 3.35000 OOB36 2.92000 
BLSG 0GB38 2.67000 OOB40 2.38000 
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BLSG 00842 2.12000 00B44 1.68000 
BLSG 00846 1. 50000 00848 1.34000 
BLSG 00650 1.19000 00852 1.06000 
BLSG 00854 1.45000 00856 .84000 
BLSG 00658 .76000 00860 .66000 
BLSG 00662 .58000 00B64 .53000 
BLSG 00866 •42000 00868 .37000 
BLSG D0B70 .33000 00872 .30000 
BLSG 00674 .26000 00876 .28000 
BLSG 00678 .21000 008 80 .18000 
BLSG 00682 .16000 00884 .12000 
BLSG 00886 .13000 00888 . 10000 
BLSG 00890 .09000 D0B92 .08000 
BLSG DO 894 .07000 TOI 3.89000 
BLSG T02 2.98000 T03 2.98000 
BLSG RBLSG 1.00000 
BBRG C 16859.00000 0OA02 11.59000 
BBRG 00A04 11.92000 DOA06 10.10000 
BBRG 00A08 9.00000 OOAIO 8.15000 
BBRG D0AI2 6.50000 DO A14 5.16000 
BBRG DCA16 4.10000 00A18 3.25000 
BBRG 00A2O 2.57000 00A22 2.04000 
BBRG 00A24 2.00000 D0A26 1.61000 
BBRG 0CA28 1.28000 00A30 1.02000 
BBRG 00A32 .80000 00 A 34 .64000 
BBRG 0QA36 .50000 00A38 .43000 
BBRG 0QA40 .40000 D0A42 .32000 
BBRG 00A44 .25000 00 A 46 .20000 
BBRG 0CA48 .16000 DO A 50 .13000 
BBRG D0A52 •11000 DO A 54 .10000 
BBRG D0A56 .08000 00A58 .06000 
BBRG DQA60 .05000 D0A62 .04000 
BBRG D0A64 .03000 D0A66 .02000 
BBRG C0A68 .02000 D0A70 .01000 
BBRG 00802 6.00000 D0B04 8.34000 
BBRG C0B06 9.25000 DOB08 10.69000 
BBRG 00810 10.50000 D0B12 10.48000 
BBRG 00614 10.00000 DOB 16 9.28000 
BBRG 00618 S.50000 00820 7.84000 
BBRG 00822 6.44000 DOB 24 5.50000 
BBRG 00626 5.22000 D0B28 4.70000 
BBRG 00830 4.20000 D0B32 3.80000 
BBRG 00634 3.35000 D0B36 2.92000 
BBRG 00638 2.67000 D0B40 2.37000 
BBRG 00642 2.12000 D0B44 1.68000 
BBRG 0C646 1.50000 00848 1.34000 
S5RG D0550 » * c l^W W > 4L » n^nnn 
BBRG 00654 1.45000 DQB56 .84000 
BBRG 0CB58 .76000 00B60 .66000 
BBRG 00862 .58000 00864 .53000 
BBRG 00666 .42000 00868 .37000 
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BBRG 00870 .33000 008 72 .30000 
BBRG 00874 •26000 00676 .28000 
BBRG 0GB78 .21000 0OB80 .18000 
BBRG 00B82 .16000 006 84 .14000 
BBRG 0CB86 .13000 00688 .10000 
BBRG 00690 •09000 00692 .08000 
BBRG 0CB94 •07000 TOI 2.92000 
BBRG TC2 2.23000 T03 2.23000 
BBRG RBLSG 1.00000 
FLAL C 970.00000 00606 129.36000 
FLAL 00808 147.50000 OOBIO 165.78000 
FLAL 00812 164.26000 00614 162.54000 
FLAL 00816 150.04000 00618 143.87000 
FLAL 00820 133.85000 00622 121.50000 
FLAL 00824 99.88000 00826 90.37000 
FLAL 0C828 81.00000 00630 73.10000 
FLAL 00832 65.09000 D0B34 58.59000 
FLAL 0C836 51.95000 00638 46.89000 
FLAL 00840 41.39000 00642 37.36000 
FLAL 00844 32.92000 00646 26.15000 
FLAL 0CB48 23.50000 00650 20.77000 
FLAL 0QB52 18.96000 00654 16.46000 
FLAL DC 856 19.50000 00658 13.05000 
FLAL D0B6G 11.68000 D0B62 10.32000 
FLAL 00864 9.25000 00666 8.23000 
FLAL 0C868 6.52000 00670 6.02000 
FLAL 00872 5.12000 00874 4.55000 
FLAL 00876 4.06000 00678 3.72000 
FLAL 00880 3.22000 00682 2.92000 
FLAL 0C884 2.56000 00686 2.28000 
FLAL 0CB88 2.03000 00890 1.61000 
FLAL 00892 1.41000 00894 1.28000 
FLAL TOI 218.00000 RFLAL 1.00000 
FLAL T02 137.00000 T03 137.00000 
FLBL C 1546.00000 00612 258.78000 
FLBL 00 814 293.78000 00616 331.62000 
FLBL 00818 328.50000 00620 325.00000 
FLBL 00822 306.00000 00624 287.82000 
FLBL 00826 265.00000 00628 243.06000 
FLBL 00830 199.80000 00632 183.30000 
FLBL 00834 162.05000 00636 146.00000 
FLBL 00838 130.22000 00640 115.72000 
FLBL 00842 103.92000 00644 93.50000 
FLBL 00646 82.81000 00648 74.02000 
FLBL 0C850 65.84000 00652 52.31000 
FLBL 00854 46.62000 00656 41.56000 
FLBL CGB5S 37.45000 GGBôC 32.94CCG 
FLBL 00862 29.52000 00664 26.11000 
FLBL 00866 23.43000 00668 20.64000 
FLBL 00870 18.55000 00872 16.46000 
FLBL 00874 13.06000 00676 11.70000 
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FIBL 00878 
FLBL 0CB82 
FLBL DO 886 
FLBL 00690 
FLBL 00894 
FLBL T02 
FLBL RFLBL 
FLCL C 
FLCL 00818 
FLCL 0GB22 
FLCL 00826 
FLCL 00830 
FLCL 00834 
FLCL 00838 
FLCL D0B42 
FLCL 00846 
FLCL 00850 
FLCL 00854 
FLCL 00858 
FLCL 00862 
FLCL CCB66 
FLCL DCB70 
FLCL 00874 
FLCL DGB78 
FLCL 00882 
FLCL 00886 
FLCL 00890 
FLCL 00894 
FLCL T02 
FLCL RFLCL 
ELLW C 
ELLU 0CA24 
ELLW 0GA28 
ELLW 0CA32 
ELLW D0A36 
ELLW D0A40 
ELLW 0CA44 
ELLW D0A48 
ELLW 0CA52 
ELLW 00A56 
ELLU 0CA6O 
ELLW 0CA64 
ELLW , 00A68 
ELLW DCA72 
ELLW 0CA76 
ELLW 0CA80 
c LLm r\n A o A U W#* 4J*T 
ELLW 00A88 
ELLW 0CB24 
ELLW 00828 
ELLW 0CB32 
10.26000 
8.14000 
6.46000 
5.12000 
4.06000 
275.00000 
1.00000 
970.00000 
147.56000 
164.56000 
150.08000 
131.19000 
99.72000 
81.00000 
65.09000 
51.95000 
41.39000 
32.92000 
23.21000 
le.50000 
14.76000 
11.44000 
fi.95000 
6.52000 
5.12000 
4.06000 
3.22000 
2.56000 
137.00000 
1.00000 
2000C.00000 
2C.41000 
13.96000 
9.90000 
7.02000 
4.40000 
3.00000 
2.19000 
1.38000 
.90000 
.69000 
•43000 
.27000 
.21000 
.13000 
.08000 
*C3000 
.03000 
16.01000 
18.18000 
16.59000 
00880 
D0B84 
DOB 88 
00892 
TOI 
T03 
00816 
00820 
00824 
00828 
D0B32 
00836 
00840 
00844 
00848 
00852 
00856 
00860 
00864 
00868 
00872 
00876 
00880 
00884 
00888 
00892 
TOI 
T03 
00A22 
OOA26 
D0A30 
00 A 34 
00A38 
00A42 
00A46 
00A50 
00 A 54 
00A58 
00A62 
00A66 
00A70 
00A74 
D0A78 
00A82 
CwASw 
00822 
00826 
DOB 30 
00834 
9.20000 
7.24000 
5.80000 
4.56000 
436.00000 
275.00000 
129.36000 
165.78000 
162.54000 
143.87000 
121.50000 
90.44000 
73.21000 
58.88000 
5.28000 
37.40000 
26.15000 
20.77000 
16.46000 
23.05000 
10.32000 
8.23000 
5.82000 
4.60000 
3.64000 
2.90000 
218.00000 
137.00000 
19.85000 
13.30000 
11.14000 
8.83000 
5.56000 
3.49000 
2.77000 
1.74000 
1.09000 
.80000 
.55000 
.34000 
.23000 
.17000 
.11000 
.07000 
aaaaa 
14.29000 
18.18000 
16.59000 
14.62000 
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ELLW 00B36 14.62000 DOB 38 11.03000 
ELLW D0B40 11.03000 DOB 42 8.90000 
ELLW D0B44 8.90000 00B46 7.19000 
ELLW 00648 7.19000 00850 5.74000 
ELLW 00652 5.74000 00B54 5.15000 
ELLW 00856 5.15000 00B58 3.62000 
ELLW 00660 3.62000 00662 2.89000 
ELLW 00664 2.89000 00666 2.29000 
ELLW 00668 2.29000 00670 1.82000 
ELLW 0GB72 1.82000 00874 1.44000 
ELLW 00676 1.44000 00678 1.14000 
ELLW 0C680 1.14000 00682 .81000 
ELLW 00684 .81000 D0B86 .64000 
ELLW 00688 .64000 DOB 90 .51000 
ELLW 00692 .45000 OOS94 .35000 
ELLW TOI 8.23000 T02 6.67000 
ELLW T03 5.12000 RELLW 1.00000 
ESWT C 20000.00000 OOA22 19.85000 
ESWT DCA24 20.41000 DO A 26 13.30000 
ESWT C0428 13.96000 D0A30 11.14000 
ESWT DCA32 9.90000 00 A 34 8.83000 
ESWT D0A36 7.02000 DQA38 5.56000 
ESWT OOA40 4.40000 D0A42 3.49000 
ESWT 0GA44 3.00000 00A46 2.77000 
ESWT 00A48 2.19000 00A50 1.74000 
ESWT DCA52 1.38000 00A54 1.09000 
ESWT 0GA56 .90000 00A58 .80000 
ESWT CCA60 .69000 OOA62 .55000 
ESWT D0A64 .43000 0QA66 .34000 
ESWT CGA68 .27000 00A70 .23000 
ESWT 0GA72 .21000 OOA74 .17000 
ESWT D0A76 .13000 D0A78 .11000 
ESWT OCABO .08000 D0A82 .07000 
ESWT 00A84 .05000 D0A86 .04000 
ESWT 0QA88 .03000 00622 14.29000 
ESWT 00624 16.01000 D0B26 18.18000 
ESWT 00628 18.18000 006 30 16.59000 
ESWT DCB32 16.59000 OOB34 14.62000 
ESWT 00636 14.62000 D0B38 11.03000 
ESWT 00640 11.03000 OOB42 8.90000 
ESWT 00644 8.90000 00846 7.19000 
ESWT 00648 7.19000 00650 5.74000 
ESWT 00652 5.74000 OOB54 5.15000 
ESWT 00656 5.15000 D0B58 3.62000 
ESWT 00660 3.62000 C0B62 2.89000 
ESWT 00664 2.89000 00866 2.29000 
e  C U T  DG96B 2.29000 OOB70 1.82000 
ESWT 00672 1.82000 00874 1.44000 
ESWT DC876 1.44000 00B78 1 « 14000 
ESWT CCB80 1.14000 00882 .81000 
ESWT 00884 .81000 D0B86 .64000 
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ESWT 00688 .64000 DOB 90 .51000 
ESWT DGB92 •45000 OOB94 .35000 
ESWT TOI 6.17000 T02 5.00000 
ESWT T03 3.84000 RELLW 1.00000 
MPAC C 1981G.C0000 D0A22 19.55000 
MPAC 00A24 2C.10000 D0A26 17.04000 
MPAC D0A28 13.75000 0OA30 11.87000 
MPAC D0A32 IC.97000 D0A34 8.70000 
MPAC 0CA36 6.91000 00A38 5.48000 
MPAC D0A40 4.33000 OOA42 3.85000 
MPAC DGA44 3.44000 OCA 46 2.72000 
MPAC 0GA48 2.16000 0OA50 1.72000 
MPAC D0A52 1.36000 00A54 1.07000 
MPAC 0CA56 .95000 00A58 .85000 
MPAC 00A60 .68000 00A62 .54000 
MPAC 0CA64 .42000 00A66 .33000 
MPAC 0CA68 .27000 0GA70 .21000 
MPAC 00A72 •18000 00A74 .17000 
MPAC DCA76 .13000 00A78 .10000 
MPAC 0OA8O •08000 00822 14.07000 
MPAC DCB24 14.07000 D0B26 18.03000 
MPAC 0GB28 18.03000 00B30 17.62000 
MPAC DCB32 17.62000 00834 15.55000 
MPAC D0B36 15.55000 D0B38 13.22000 
MPAC 0OB4O 13.22000 00842 10.81000 
MPAC DGB44 8.81000 00846 8.81000 
MPAC 0GB48 7.08000 00850 7.08000 
MPAC DGB52 5.65000 00854 5.65000 
MPAC 00656 4.50000 00858 4.50000 
MPAC 0CE60 3.58000 00862 3.58000 
MPAC DGB64 2.89000 00866 2.26000 
MPAC 00868 2.26000 D0B70 1.79000 
MPAC 0GB72 1.79000 00874 1.42000 
MPAC 0GB 76 1.42000 00B78 1.12000 
MPAC DCB80 1.12000 00882 .89000 
MPAC 0GB 84 .89000 00886 .71000 
MPAC 0GB88 .56000 00890 .56000 
MPAC D0B92 .44000 DOB 94 .44000 
MPAC TCI 142.56000 T02 71.64000 
MPAC T03 45.36000 RMPAC 1.00000 
MPKX C 19810.00000 00A22 19.55000 
MPKX DCA24 2C.10000 D0A26 17.04000 
MPKX DGA28 13.75000 D0A30 11.87000 
MPKX 0GA32 IC.97000 OOA34 8.70000 
MPKX DGA36 6.91000 00A38 5.48000 
MPKX DCA40 4.33000 00A42 3.85000 
MOV y 3=44000 00446 2.72000 
MPKX 0QÂ48 2.16000 00A50 1.72000 
MPKX DCA52 1.36000 00A54 1.07000 
MPKX 0GAS6 .95000 D0A58 .85000 
MPKX 0CA60 .68000 00A62 .54000 
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MPKX OOA64 •42000 00A66 .33000 
HPKX 00A68 .27000 OOA70 •21000 
MPKX 0CA72 .18000 D0A74 .17000 
MPKX 0GA76 .13000 00A78 .10000 
MPKX D0A80 .08000 00822 14.07000 
MPKX 00B24 14.07000 00826 18.03000 
MPKX 0GB28 18.03000 00830 17.62000 
MPKX DCB32 17.62000 00834 15.55000 
MPKX 00636 15.55000 00838 13.22000 
MPKX 00840 13.22000 00842 10.81000 
MPKX 00844 8.81000 00846 8.81000 
MPKX 00B48 7.08000 00850 7.08000 
MPKX 00852 5.65000 00854 5.65000 
MPKX 00856 4.50000 00858 4.50000 
MPKX 00860 3.58000 00862 3.58000 
MPKX 00864 2.89000 00866 2.26000 
MPKX 0CB68 2.26000 00870 1.79000 
MPKX 00872 1.79000 00874 1.42000 
MPKX 00876 1.42000 00878 1.12000 
MPKX 00880 1.12000 00882 .89000 
MPKX 0C684 .89000 00886 .71000 
MPKX 00888 .56000 00890 .56000 
MPKX DC 892 .44000 00894 .44000 
MPKX TCI 106.92000 T02 53.73000 
MPKX T03 34.02000 RMPAC 1.00000 
FLOL C 970.00000 00826 129.36000 
FLOL 00828 147.50000 00830 165.78000 
FLOL 0CB32 164.26000 00834 162.54000 
FLOL 0CB36 150.04000 00838 143.87000 
FLOL 00840 133.85000 00842 121.50000 
FLOL 00844 99.88000 00846 90.37000 
FLOL DCB48 81.00000 00850 73.10000 
FLOL 00852 65.09000 00854 58.59000 
FLOL 00856 51.95000 00858 46.89000 
FLOL 00860 41.39000 00862 37.36000 
FLOL DC864 32.92000 00866 26.15000 
FLOL 00868 23.50000 00870 20.77000 
FLOL 00872 18.96000 00874 16.46000 
FLOL 00876 19.50000 00878 13.05000 
FLOL 00880 11.68000 00882 10.32000 
FLOL DCB84 9.25000 00886 8.23000 
FLOL 00888 6.52000 00890 6.02000 
FLOL 00892 5.12000 00894 4.55000 
FLOL TOI 259.00000 T02 137.00000 
FLOL T03 137.00000 RFLOL 1.00000 
KAMR C 16520.00000 00A34 2.39000 
l(  AMD DC.A36 1=09000 00A39 1.50000 
KAMR 0QA40 1.19000 00A42 .95000 
KAMR DCA44 .75000 00A46 .59000 
KAMR D0A48 .47000 O0A50 •38000 
KAMR 00A52 .30000 00 A 54 .23000 
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KAMR D0A56 •18000 D0A58 .15000 
KAMA 00A60 •12000 D0A62 .09000 
KAMR D0A64 •07000 D0A66 .06000 
KAMR 00A68 .05000 D0A70 .04000 
KAMR DCA72 •03000 00832 5.99000 
KAMR 00834 5^99000 D0B36 4.86000 
KAMR 00638 4.86000 00840 3.90000 
KAMR DCe42 3.90000 00844 3.11000 
KAMR 00846 3.11000 DOB 48 2.48000 
KAMR DGBSO 2.48000 00852 1.97000 
KAMR 00854 1.57000 00856 1.57000 
KAMR 00658 1.24000 00860 1.24000 
KAMR 00862 .99000 00864 .99000 
KAMR 00666 .78000 00868 .78000 
KAMR 00670 •62000 00872 .49000 
KAMR 00874 .49000 00876 .39000 
KAMR 0G678 •39000 00880 •31000 
KAMR 00682 •31000 0QB84 •24000 
KAMR 00686 •24000 00888 • 19000 
KAMR 00690 •19000 00892 .15000 
KAMR 00894 .15000 TOI 4.47000 
KAMR T02 2.78000 T03 2.78000 
KAMR RKAMR 1.00000 
KMMR C 1652C.COOOO 00A34 2.39000 
KMMR 0CA36 1.89000 OOA38 1.50000 
KMMR 00A40 1.19000 00A42 .95000 
KMMR 0GA44 .75000 00A46 .59000 
KMMR 00A48 .47000 0OA5O .38000 
KMMR D0A52 .30000 00A54 .23000 
KMMR C0A56 .18000 00A58 .15000 
KMMR 0OA6O •12000 00A62 .09000 
KMMR 00A64 .07000 00A66 .06000 
KMMR 0CA68 .05000 0GA70 .04000 
KMMR 0QA72 .03000 00B32 5.99000 
KMMR 00834 5.99000 00836 4.86000 
KMMR 00638 4.86000 00840 3.90000 
KMMR 00642 2.90000 00844 3.11000 
KMMR 00646 3.11000 00848 2.48000 
KMMR 00650 2.48000 00852 1.97000 
KMMR 00654 1.57000 00856 1.57000 
KMMR 00858 1.24000 00860 1.24000 
KMMR 00662 .99000 00864 .99000 
KMMR 00666 .78000 00B68 .78000 
KMMR 00870 .62000 00B72 .49000 
KMMR 00874 .49000 D0B76 .39000 
KMMR 00678 .39000 00880 .31000 
KMMR 00682 .31000 00884 .24000 
KMMR 00686 .24000 00B88 .19000 
KMMR 00890 .19000 00892 .15000 
KMMR 00694 • 15000 TOI 3.35000 
KMMR TG2 2^08000 T03 2.08000 
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KMMR RKfMR 1.00000 
JEWL C 25541.00000 00A34 31.54000 
JEWL 00A36 25.16000 OOA38 19.95000 
JEWL D0A40 18.85000 D0A42 12.56000 
JEWL D0A44 9.93000 00A46 7.88000 
JEWL D0A48 6.25000 0OA50 5.55000 
JEWL DCA52 4.95000 D0A54 4.50000 
JEWL 0GA56 3.94000 D0A58 3.12000 
JEWL 0CA60 2.47000 D0A62 1.94000 
JEWL DGA64 1.56000 DGA66 1.23000 
JEWL OOA68 .96000 OOA70 .77000 
JEWL DCA72 .61000 00A74 .49000 
JEWL 0GA76 .38000 D0A78 .30000 
JEWL 0GA80 .24000 00A82 .19000 
JEWL D0A84 .15000 00A86 .12000 
JEWL 0GA88 .10000 0GA90 .07000 
JEWL 0GA92 .06000 00A94 .05000 
JEWL 0GB 34 35.90000 DOB 36 35.90000 
JEWL 0G838 30.32000 00B40 30.32000 
JEWL 00B42 24.92000 DGB44 24.92000 
JEWL 00B46 2C.21000 D0B48 20.21000 
JEWL 0CB50 16.24000 00B52 16.24000 
JEWL 0GB54 12.91000 DOB 56 10.3300C 
JEWL 0GB58 8.21000 D0B60 8.21000 
JEWL 0G662 6.52000 00664 6.52000 
JEWL DC 666 5.18000 D0668 5.18000 
JEWL DCe70 4.11000 0GB72 4.11000 
JEWL 0GB74 3.25000 00676 2.5200C 
JEWL 0CB78 2.52000 00880 2.0500C 
JEWL 0GB82 2.05000 DOB 84 1.63000 
JEWL DOB 86 1.63000 DOB88 I.OIOOG 
JEWL D0B90 1.01000 00892 .81000 
JEWL D0B94 .64000 TOI 32.6000C 
JEWL T02 18.58000 T03 11.5700C 
JEWL RJEWL 1.00000 
JWLL C 25541.00000 D0A34 31.5400C 
JWLL 0GA36 25.16000 00A38 19.95000 
JWLL OGA40 18.85000 00A42 12.56000 
JWLL 0GA44 9.93000 D0A46 7.88000 
JWLL 0CA48 6.25000 D0A50 5.55000 
JWLL DCA52 4.95000 D0A54 4.50000 
JWLL 0CA56 3.94000 00A58 3.12000 
JWLL OGA60 2.47000 D0A62 1.94000 
JWLL 0GA64 1.56000 00 A 66 1.23000 
JWLL DCA68 .96000 D0A70 .77000 
JWLL 0QA72 .61000 OCA 74 .49000 
aWLL DCf76 rsr% A TO anmnn 
JWLL DGA80 .24000 D0A82 .19000 
JWLL DCA84 .15000 D0A86 .12000 
JWLL 00A88 .10000 DOA90 .07000 
JWLL D0A92 .06000 00 A 94 .05000 
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JWLL DCB34 35.90000 00836 35.90000 
JWLL 00838 30.32000 00840 30.32000 
JWLL 0C842 24.92000 00844 24.92000 
JWLL D0B46 20.21000 00848 20.21000 
JWLL 0OB50 16.24000 00852 16.24000 
JWLL 0CB54 12.91000 00856 10.33000 
JWLL D0658 8.21000 00860 8.21000 
JWLL DCB62 6.52000 00864 6.52000 
JWLL 00866 5.18000 00868 5.18000 
JWLL DC870 4.11000 00872 4.11000 
JWLL DOB 74 3.25000 00876 2.52000 
JWLL 0GB78 2.52000 00880 2.05000 
JWLL 0CB82 2.05000 00884 1.63000 
JWLL DC 6 86 1.63000 00888 1.01000 
JWLL 0CB90 1.01000 00892 .81000 
JWLL DOB 94 .64000 TOI 24.45000 
JWLL T02 13.94000 T03 8.67000 
JWLL RJEWL 1.00000 
FLEL C 970.00000 00836 129.36000 
FLEL 00B38 147.50000 00840 165.78000 
FLEL D0B42 164.26000 00844 162.54000 
FLEL 00846 150.04000 00848 143.87000 
FLEL 0GB50 133.85000 00852 121.50000 
FLEL DCB54 99.88000 00856 90.37000 
FLEL D0B58 81.00000 00860 73.10000 
FLEL DGB62 65.09000 00864 . 58.59000 
FLEL 0GB66 51.95000 00868 46.89000 
FLEL DGB70 41.39000 00872 37.36000 
FLEL DCB74 32.92000 00876 26.15000 
FLEL 00878 23.50000 00880 20.77000 
FLEL DGB82 18.96000 00884 16.46000 
FLEL DCB86 19.50000 00888 13.05000 
FLEL 00890 11.68000 00892 10.32000 
FLEL DCB94 9.25000 TOI 341.00000 
FLEL T02 137.00000 T03 137.00000 
FLEL RFLEL 1.00000 
RAND C 15132.00000 OOA36 8.29000 
RAND DGA38 7.03000 0OA40 5.67000 
RAND 0CA42 4.52000 OOA44 3.59000 
RAND CCA46 2.85000 OOA48 2.26000 
RAND 0GA50 1.79000 00A52 1.42000 
RAND 0CA54 1.20000 00 A 56 1.00000 
RAND 0CA58 .89000 D0A60 .71000 
RAND 0GA62 .56000 00 A 64 .44000 
RAND 0GA66 .35000 D0A68 .28000 
RAND DQA70 .22000 00A72 .20000 
RAND DCA74 .17000 D0A76 .14000 
RAND 00A78 .11000 00 A 80 .09000 
RAND 00A82 .07000 D0A84 .05000 
RAND 0CA86 .04000 00836 7.44000 
RAND 00B38 7.44000 00840 7.28000 
RAND 00842 7.28000 00844 6.4^000 
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RAND 00846 6.45000 D0B48 5.45000 
RAND 00650 5.45000 DOB 52 4.48600 
RAND 00654 4,48000 00856 3.63000 
RAND 00658 2.62000 00860 2.62000 
RAND 00B62 2.33000 00864 2.33000 
RAND 00B66 1.85000 00868 1.85000 
RAND 00670 1.47000 00872 1.47000 
RAND 00674 1.12000 00876 1.12000 
RAND 00678 .93000 00880 .74000 
RAND 00682 •74000 00884 .58000 
RAND 00886 .58000 00888 .46000 
RAND 00690 .46000 00892 .37000 
RAND 00694 .37000 TOI 5.49000 
RAND T02 4.16000 T03 2.18000 
RAND RRANO 1.00000 
ROLL C 15132.00000 00A36 8.29000 
ROLL 00A38 7.03000 00A40 5.67000 
ROLL D0A42 4.52000 D0A44 3.59000 
ROLL D0A46 2.85000 00A48 2.26000 
ROLL D0A50 1.79000 D0A52 1.42000 
ROLL D0A54 1.20000 D0A56 1.00000 
ROLL D0A58 .89000 DOA60 .71000 
ROLL 00A62 .56000 00A64 .44000 
RCLL D0A66 .35000 D0A68 .28000 
ROLL 0CA7O •22000 D0A72 .20000 
ROLL D0A74 .17000 00A76 .14000 
ROLL DCA78 .11000 0OA80 .09000 
ROLL 00A82 .07000 00A84 .05000 
ROLL D0A86 .04000 00836 7.44000 
RCLL 00638 7.44000 00840 7.28000 
ROLL 00842 7.28000 00844 6.45000 
ROLL 00646 6.45000 00848 5.45000 
ROLL 00850 5.45000 00852 4.48000 
ROLL 00654 4.48000 00856 3.63000 
ROLL 00658 2.62000 00860 2.62000 
ROLL 0CB62 2.33000 00864 2.33000 
ROLL 00666 1.85000 00868 1.85000 
ROLL 00670 1.47000 00872 1.47000 
ROLL 00674 1.12000 DOB 76 1.12000 
RCLL 00678 .93000 00880 .74000 
ROLL 00882 .74000 00884 .58000 
ROLL 00886 .58000 00888 .46000 
ROLL 00690 .46000 D0B92 .37000 
RCLL 00894 .37000 TOI 4.12000 
ROLL TQ2 3.12000 T03 1.60000 
ROLL RRAND 1.00000 
STDC C 29494.00000 DO A 46 71.45000 
STGC uC*4S 73.47CGC CGASC it M. fSfS /% 
STOC 00A52 5C.25000 00 A 54 40.08000 
STDC 00 A 56 31.79000 OOA58 25.25000 
STOC 0CA60 20.02000 D0A62 15.82000 
STOC OOA64 12.56000 D0A66 10.80000 
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STOC DCA68 9.95000 00A70 7.89000 
STOC 00A72 6.27000 OOA74 4.96000 
STOC CC476 3.93000 00A78 3.10000 
STOC DCA80 2.70000 D0A82 2.30000 
STOC 00A84 1.96000 00A86 1.53000 
STOC DCA88 1.22000 00A90 .97000 
STOC DGA92 • 77000 00A94 .61000 
STOC 00846 51.44000 00848 51.44000 
STOC 00B50 65.42000 00852 65.42000 
STOC 00854 64.60000 00856 64.60000 
STOC 00858 57.21000 00860 57.21000 
STOC 00862 48.31000 00864 48.31000 
STOC 00866 39.71000 00868 32.21000 
STOC 00870 32.21000 00872 25.88000 
STOC D0B74 25.88000 00876 20.65000 
STOC 00878 20.65000 00880 16.46000 
STOC 00882 16.46000 00884 13.09000 
STOC 00886 13.09000 00B88 10.39000 
STOC 00890 8.76000 00B92 8.76000 
STOC 00894 6.55000 T02 46.25000 
STOC T03 29.37000 RSTOC 1.00000 
STCY C 29494.00000 00 A 46 71.45000 
STCY 00A48 73.47000 00 A 50 62.26000 
STCY 00A52 5C.25000 00A54 40.08000 
STCY 00A56 31.79000 00A58 25.25000 
STCY D0A60 2C.02000 00A62 15.82000 
STCY 0CA64 12.56000 00A66 10.80000 
STCY 00A68 9.95000 D0A70 7.89000 
STCY DQA72 6.27000 D0A74 4.96000 
STCY D0A76 3.93000 D0A78 3.10000 
STCY DCA80 2.70000 00A82 2.30000 
STCY 00A84 1.96000 D0A86 1.53000 
STCY 0CA88 1.22000 00A90 .97000 
STCY D0A92 .77000 00 A 94 .61000 
STCY 00846 51.44000 00848 51.44000 
STCY 00850 65.42000 00852 65.42000 
STCY 00854 64.60000 00856 64.60000 
STCY 00858 57.21000 00860 57.21000 
STCY 00862 48.31000 00864 48.31000 
STCY 00866 39.71000 00868 32.21000 
STCY 00870 32.21000 00872 25.88000 
STCY 00874 25.88000 00876 20.65000 
STCY 00878 2C.65000 00880 16.46000 
STCY 00882 16.46000 00884 13.09000 
STCY 00886 13.09000 00888 10.39000 
STCY 00890 8.76000 00892 8.76000 
STCY 00094 6.55000 T02 34.69000 
STCY TO 3 22.03000 RSTOC 1.00000 
FLFl C 1546.00000 00852 258.78000 
FLFL 0GB54 293.78000 00856 331.62000 
FLFL 00858 328.50000 00860 325.00000 
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FLFL DGB62 306.00000 OOB64 287.82000 
FLFL 0QB66 265.00000 00B68 243.06000 
FLFL DCB70 199.80000 D0B72 183.30000 
FLFL 00874 162.05000 DOB 76 146.00000 
FLFL 0GB78 130.22000 00880 115.72000 
FLFL DCB82 103.92000 DQB84 93.50000 
FLFL 00886 82.81000 00888 74.02000 
FLFL 00890 65.84000 00892 52.31000 
FLFL DCB94 46.62000 T02 436.00000 
FLFL T03 275.00000 RFLFL 1.00000 
RCLD C 22606.00000 DO A 54 16.90000 
ROLO 00*56 13.41000 00A58 10.65000 
RCLD 00A60 e.44000 00A62 6.67000 
RGLO 0CA64 5.30000 OOA66 4.20000 
ROLO OOA68 3.33000 00A70 2.65000 
RCLD 00A72 2.09000 DO A 74 1.86000 
ROLO 0CA76 1.66000 D0A78 1.31000 
RGLO 00A8O 1.05000 DOA82 .83000 
RCLD 0CA84 .65000 00A86 .51000 
ROLO 00A88 •41000 D0A90 .33000 
RCLD 0CA92 .26000 DGA94 .20000 
RCLD 00854 2 7.24000 00856 27.24000 
RGLO 00B58 24.12000 00860 24.12000 
RGLO 00662 20.37000 00864 20.37000 
ROLO 00866 16.20000 00868 16.20000 
RCLD 00870 13.53000 00872 13.53000 
RCLD 00874 IC.91000 00876 8.21000 
RCLD 00878 8.21000 DOB 80 6.94000 
RCLD 00882 6.94000 00884 5.52000 
ROLO OOB86 5.52000 00B88 4.38000 
RCLO DC 890 4.38000 00B92 3.48000 
RCLD 00894 3.48000 T02 17.20000 
RCLO T03 7.78000 RROLD 1.00000 
RLNO C 22606.00000 00 A 54 16.90000 
RLND D0A56 13.41000 D0A58 10.65000 
RLND 0QA60 8.44000 D0A62 6.67000 
RLNO 0GA64 5.30000 D0A66 4.20000 
RLNO 0CA68 3.33000 00 A 70 2.65000 
RLND 0CA72 2.09000 OOA74 1.86000 
RLNO 00 A 76 1.66000 D0A78 1.31000 
RLNO 0QA80 1.05000 D0A82 .83000 
RLNO 0GAS4 .65000 D0A86 .51000 
RLND 0QA88 .41000 00A90 .33000 
RLNO D0A92 .26000 00A94 .20000 
RLNO 00854 27.24000 00856 27.24000 
RLNO 00858 24.12000 00860 24.12000 
RLND 0G862 20.37000 00864 20.37000 
RLND 00866 16.20000 00868 16.20000 
RLND 00870 13.53000 00872 13.53000 
RLNO 00874 IC. 91000 00876 8.21000 
RLND 00 878 8.21000 00880 6.94000 
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RIND 00882 6.94000 00B84 5.52000 
RLNO 00686 5.52000 DOB 88 4.38000 
RLNO DC 690 4.38000 00692 3.48000 
RLNO 00694 3.48000 T02 12.90000 
RLNO T03 5.84000 RROLO 1.00000 
STAN C 1949I.00000 D0A62 .32000 
STAN 0GA64 •25000 00 A 66 .20000 
STAN DGA66 .16000 00A70 .13000 
STAN 00A72 .10000 OOA74 .08000 
STAN 0GA76 .06000 OOA78 .05000 
STAN 0GA8O .04000 D0A82 .03000 
STAN OOA84 .02000 00662 2.70000 
STAN 0G864 2.70000 00666 2.14000 
STAN 00668 2. 14000 00670 1.70000 
STAN 00672 1.70000 00674 1.34000 
STAN 0CB76 1.34000 00678 1.06000 
STAN 00680 1.06000 00682 .85000 
STAN 00684 •85000 00686 .67000 
STAN 00688 .53000 00690 .53000 
STAN 00692 .42000 00694 .42000 
STAN T02 6.20000 T03 4.80000 
STAN RSTAN 1.00000 
STHP C 19491.00000 OOA62 .32000 
STHP D0A64 .25000 OOA66 .20000 
STHP 00A68 .16000 0OA7O .13000 
STHP 00A72 .10000 00A74 .08000 
STHP 00A76 .06000 D0A78 .05000 
STHP 00A80 .04000 OOA82 .03000 
STHP 00 A 84 •02000 00662 2.70000 
STHP 00664 2.70000 00666 2.14000 
STHP 00668 2.14000 00670 1.70000 
STHP 00672 1.70000 00674 1.34000 
STHP 00676 1.34000 00678 1.06000 
STHP 00680 1.06000 00682 .85000 
STHP 00684 .85000 00686 .67000 
STHP 00688 .53000 00690 .53000 
STHP C0692 .42000 00694 .42000 
STHP TC2 4.65000 T03 3.60000 
STHP RSTAN 1.00000 
GILT C 17402.00000 D0A62 5.21000 
GILT 00A64 3.59000 D0A66 2.83000 
GILT 00A68 2.25000 0OA70 1.78000 
GILT 0CA72 1.41000 OOA74 1.12000 
GILT 00A76 .89000 00A78 .70000 
GILT DGA80 .55000 D0A82 .45000 
GILT 00A84 .35000 00A86 .27000 
GILT ÛCASG •2ZGC0 GGAYC 1 Ann 
GILT 00A92 .14000 00A94 I i iooo 
GILT 00662 IC.25000 00664 8.65000 
GILT 00666 8.65000 00668 7.11000 
GILT 00670 7.11000 00672 5.77000 
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GILT 00874 5.77000 00876 4.63000 
GILT OOB78 4.63000 00880 3.70000 
GILT 0CB82 2.95000 00884 2.95000 
GILT 00B86 2.34000 00888 2.34000 
GILT DO 890 1.86000 00892 1.86000 
GILT 00894 1.48000 T02 8.31000 
GILT T03 4.29000 RGILT 1.00000 
GLRT C 17402.00000 00462 5.21000 
GLRT 0CA64 3.59000 00466 2.83000 
GLRT 00^68 2.25000 00470 1.78000 
GLRT 0CA72 i.41000 00474 1.12000 
GLRT D0A76 .89000 00478 .70000 
GLRT DCA80 .55000 00482 .45000 
GLRT 00484 .35000 00486 .27000 
GLRT 00488 .22000 00490 .17000 
GLRT 00492 .14000 00494 .11000 
GLRT 00862 10.25000 00864 8.65000 
GLRT 00866 8.65000 00868 7.11000 
GLRT 00870 7.11000 00872 5.77000 
GLRT 00874 5.77000 00876 4.63000 
GLRT 00878 4.63000 00880 3.70000 
GLRT 00882 2.95000 00884 2.95000 
GLRT 00886 2.34000 00888 2.34000 
GLRT 00890 1.86000 00892 1.86000 
GLRT 0C894 1.48000 T02 6.23000 
GLRT T03 3.22000 RGILT 1.00000 
JCRO C 9908.00000 00462 .45000 
JORO 00464 .35000 00466 .28000 
JGRO 0C468 .22000 00470 .18000 
JORD DCA72 .14000 00474 .11000 
JORO 00476 .09000 00478 .07000 
JCRD DC 4 80 .06000 00482 .04000 
JCRD 00862 1.12000 00864 .91000 
JGRO CO 866 .91000 00868 .73000 
JCRD 00870 .73000 00072 .58000 
JORD 00874 .58000 00876 .46000 
JORD 00878 .46000 00880 .37000 
JORD 00882 .29000 00884 .29000 
JCRD 00886 .23000 00888 .23000 
JCRO 0CB90 .18000 00892 .18000 
JORO 00894 .14000 T02 .99000 
JORO T03 .51000 RJORO 1.00000 
JRON C 9908.00000 00462 .45000 
JRON 00464 .35000 00466 .28000 
JRON 0G468 .22000 00470 .18000 
JRON 00472 .14000 00474 .11000 
-JODN DC476 .09000 00478 .07000 
JRON 0CA8G .06000 00482 .04000 
JRON 00862 1.12000 00864 .91000 
JRON DC 866 .91000 00868 .73000 
JRON 00870 .73000 00872 .58000 
JRON 0CB74 .58000 00876 .46000 
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JRON 0GB78 .46000 00880 .37000 
JRDN 00682 .29000 00884 .29000 
JRDN 0GB86 .23000 00888 .23000 
JRDN 00890 .18000 00892 .18000 
JRDN 00894 .14000 T02 .74000 
JRON T03 •38000 RJORO 1.00000 
AMES C 7031^.00000 00A64 1088.42000 
AMES DQA66 1119.10000 00A68 948.46000 
AMES 0CA70 765.40000 D0A72 610.52000 
AMES 00 A 74 484.27000 D0A76 384.59000 
AMES DGA78 304.88000 00A80 241.06000 
AMES b0A82 191.27000 DO A 84 151.63000 
AMES 00A86 120.20000 00A88 95.58000 
AMES D0A90 75.60000 00A92 59.83000 
AMES DGA94 47.20000 00864 783.61000 
AMES 00866 783.61000 00868 1004.22000 
AMES DC 870 1004.22000 00872 984.13000 
AMES 00874 984.13000 00876 871.03000 
AMES 00878 871.03000 00880 735.93000 
AMES 00882 735.93000 00884 605.02000 
AMES 00886 490.69000 00888 490.69000 
AMES 00890 394.29000 00892 391.29000 
AMES 0CB94 314.69000 T03 450.81000 
AMES RAMES 1.00000 
AMSS C 70319.00000 OOA64 1088.42000 
AMSS 00A66 1119.10000 00A68 948.46000 
AMSS CCA70 765.40000 00A72 610.52000 
AMSS 00A74 484.27000 00A76 384.59000 
AMSS 00A78 304.88000 OOA80 241.06000 
AMSS 0GA82 191.27000 OOA84 151.63000 
AMSS 00 A 86 120.20000 00A88 95.58000 
AMSS 00A90 75.60000 00A92 59.83000 
AMSS 0CA94 47.20000 00864 783.61000 
AMSS 00866 783.61000 DOB 68 1004.22000 
AMSS 00870 1004.22000 00872 984.13000 
AMSS 00874 984.13000 00876 871.03000 
AMSS 00878 871.03000 00880 735.93000 
AMSS 00882 735.93000 DOB 84 605.02000 
AMSS 00886 49C«69000 00888 490.69000 
AMSS 00890 391.29000 00892 391.29000 
AMSS 00894 314.69000 T03 338.11000 
AMSS RAMES 1.00000 
KELL C 15955.00000 OOA72 5.43000 
KELL 0QA74 4.30000 OOA76 3.42000 
KELL 00A78 2.71000 00A80 2.14000 
KELL 00A82 1.70000 00A84 1.35000 
KELL DC A 86 1.07000 OOA88 .85000 
KELL 0OA90 .67000 D0A92 .53000 
KELL 00A94 .42000 OOB72 8.79000 
KELL 0G874 7.58000 OOB76 7.58000 
KELL 00878 6.40000 DOB 80 6.40000 
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KELL 00882 
KELl 00686 
KELL 00890 
KELL 00694 
KELL RKELL 
KLLY C 
KLLY 00A74 
KLLY 0GA78 
KLLY 00A82 
KLLY 00A86 
KLLY 0OA9O 
KLLY D0A94 
KLLY 00874 
KLLY 00878 
KLLY DCB82 
KLLY DOB 86 
KLLY 00690 
KLLY 00894 
KLLY RKELL 
HUXL C 
HUXL 00A78 
HUXL 00A82 
HUXL 00A86 
HUXL 0CA90 
HUXL D0A94 
HUXL 00B78 
HUXL D0B82 
HUXL 00886 
HUXL D0B9O 
HUXL 00894 
HUXL RHUXL 
HXLY C 
HXLY 00A78 
HXLY D0A82 
HXLY 0CA86 
HXLY 00A90 
HXLY 00A94 
HXLY 00878 
HXLY 00882 
HXLY 00B86 
HXLY 00890 
HXLY 00694 
HXLY RHLXL 
CAMG C 
CAMG D0A78 
CAMG 00A82 
CArîG mm A o 
CAMG 0OA9O 
CAMG DCA94 
CAMG 00678 
CAMG 00882 
CAMG 00686 
5*37000 D0B84 
4,36000 00B88 
3.50000 00B92 
2m79000 T03 
1.00000 
15955.00000 D0A72 
4.30000 D0A76 
2.71000 D0A80 
1.70000 00A84 
1.07000 D0A88 
.67000 00A92 
.42000 00872 
7.58000 00876 
6.40000 D0B80 
5.37000 00884 
4.36000 00888 
3.50000 D0B92 
2.79000 T03 
1.00000 
19810.00000 00A76 
6.91000 D0A80 
4.33000 00A84 
3.44000 00A88 
2.16000 D0A92 
1.36000 D0B76 
15.55000 00880 
13.22000 00884 
8.81000 00888 
7.08C(!0 00892 
5.65000 T03 
1.00000 
19810.00000 D0A76 
6.91000 D0A80 
4.33000 00A84 
3.44000 D0A88 
2.16000 D0A92 
1.36000 00876 
15.55000 00880 
13.22000 00884 
8.81000 00888 
7.08000 00892 
5.65000 103 
1.00000 
20981.00000 D0A76 
24.35000 OOA80 
16.65000 D0A84 
10c54000 00488 
6.63000 D0A92 
4.16000 00876 
17.05000 00880 
21.85000 00884 
21.41000 00888 
5.37000 
3.50000 
2.79000 
3.24000 
5.43000 
3.42000 
2.14000 
1.35000 
.85000 
.53000 
8 . 79000 
7.58000 
6.40000 
5.37000 
3.50000 
2.79000 
2.43000 
8.70000 
5.48000 
3.85000 
2.72000 
1.72000 
15.55000 
13.22000 
10.81000 
8.81000 
7.08000 
6.68000 
8.70000 
5.48000 
3.85000 
2.72000 
1.72000 
15.55000 
13.22000 
10.81000 
8.81000 
7.08000 
5.01000 
23.68000 
20.64000 
13.28000 
8.37000 
5.25000 
17.05000 
21.85000 
21.41000 
18.96000 
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CAMG 0G690 18.96000 D0B92 16.01000 
CAMG 00894 16.01000 T03 11.6500C 
CAMG RCAMG 1.00000 
CMBG C 20981.00000 0QA76 23.68000 
CMBG 00A78 24.35000 00 A 80 20.6400C 
CMBG 0CA82 16.65000 0QA84 13.28000 
CMBG 00A86 IC.54000 0QA88 8.37000 
CMBG 00A90 6.63000 00A92 5.25000 
CMBG 0CA94 4.16000 00676 17.05000 
CMBG 0GB78 17.05000 00680 21.85000 
CMBG 0C682 21.85000 00684 21.41000 
CMBG 0GB86 21.41000 00688 18.96000 
CMBG D0B90 18.96000 00692 16.01000 
CMBG 00694 16.01000 T03 8.73000 
CMBG RCAMG 1.00000 
MPPC C 19810.00000 00A76 19.55000 
MPPC 0CA78 20.10000 0GA80 17.04000 
MPPC 0GA82 13.75000 00A84 11.87000 
MPPC 00A86 1C.97000 0GA88 8.70000 
MPPC 00A90 6.91000 00A92 5.48000 
MPPC D0A94 4.33000 00676 14.07000 
MPPC CCB78 14.07000 00B80 18.03000 
MPPC DOB 82 18.03000 00684 17.62000 
MPPC 00686 17.62000 00688 15.55000 
MPPC 00690 15.55000 00692 13.22000 
MPPC DC 694 13.22000 T03 165.24000 
MPPC RMPPC 1.00000 
MPKY C 19810.00000 OOA76 19.55000 
MPKY 00A78 20.10000 0OA80 17.04000 
MPKY 00A82 13.75000 OOA84 11.87000 
MPKY 0CA86 10.97000 D0A88 8.70000 
MPKY 0GA90 6.91000 0QA92 5.48000 
MPKY 00A94 4.33000 00676 14.07000 
MPKY 00678 14.07000 00680 18.03000 
MPKY 00682 18.03000 00684 17.62000 
MPKY DC 6 86 17.62000 00688 15.55000 
MPKY 00690 15.55000 00692 13.22000 
MPKY DC 694 13.22000 T03 123.93000 
MPKY RMPPC 1.00000 
ELKH C 16381.00000 00A80 10.86000 
ELKH 0GA82 9.13000 00A84 7.37000 
ELKH 00A86 5.88000 00A88 4.66000 
ELKH CGA90 3.70000 00A92 2.94000 
ELKH D0A94 2.32000 00680 9.67000 
ELKH 00682 9.67000 00684 9.47000 
ELKH 0CB86 9.47000 00688 8.39000 
ELKH 00690 8.39000 00692 7.08000 
ELKH DCB94 7.08000 TÛ3 4.idûûù 
ELKH RELKH 1.00000 
ELKT C 16387.00000 D0A80 10.86000 
ELKT D0A82 9.13000 00A84 7.37000 
ELKT 00Ad6 5.88000 D0A88 4.66000 
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ELKT 0GA90 3.70000 D0A92 2.94000 
EUT 0GA94 2.32000 D0B80 9.67000 
ELKT DCB82 9.67000 DOB 84 9.47000 
ELKT DCB86 9.47000 00B88 8.39000 
ELKT 00890 8.39000 00B92 7.08000 
ELKT 00B94 7.08000 T03 3.13000 
ELKT RELKH 1.00000 
VALE C 11255.00000 00A90 3.11000 
VALE 00A92 2.63000 D0A94 2.13000 
VALE DCB90 2.79000 OOB92 2.79000 
VALE D0B94 2.73000 T03 2.42000 
VALE RVALE 1.00000 
VLRI C 11255.00000 00A90 3.11000 
VLRI CCA92 2.63000 D0A94 2.13000 
VLRI 00B90 2.79000 0QB92 2.79000 
VLRI 0GB94 2.73000 T03 1.82000 
VLRI RVALE 1.00000 
COLF C 3211C.00000 D0A94 93.93000 
CCLF 0C694 67.61000 T03 73.43000 
CCLF RCCLF 1.00000 
CLFX C 32110.00000 00A94 93.93000 
CLFX D0B94 67.61000 T03 55.07000 
CLFX RCOLF 1.00000 
BLSA C - 3540.00000 RBLSG .20000 
BLSA RBLSA .20000 
ELLA C - 420C.00000 RELLW .20000 
ELLA RELLA .20000 
KAMA C - 3469.00000 RKAMR •20000 
KAMA RKAMA •20000 
JEWA C - 5364.00000 RJEUL .20000 
JEWA RJEWA .20000 
RANA C - 3177.00000 RRANO .20000 
RANA RRANA .20000 
STOA C - 6193.00000 RSTOC .20000 
STOA RSTOA .20000 
RCLA C - 4747.00000 RRGLD .20000 
ROLA RROLA .20000 
STAA C - 4093.00000 RSTAN .20000 
STAA . RSTAA .20000 
GILA C - 3654.00000 R6ILT .20000 
GILA RGILA .20000 
JQRA C - 208C.00000 RJORO .20000 
JGRA RJCRA .20000 
AMEA C -14767.00000 RAMES .20000 
AMEA RAMEA .20000 
KELA C - 3351.00000 RKELL .20000 
KELA RKELA .20000 
HUXA C - 416C.00000 RHUXL •20000 
HUXA RHUXA .20000 
CAM A C - 4407.00000 RCAMG .20000 
CAMA RCAMA .20000 
ELKA C - 3441.00000 RELKH .20000 
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EIKA RELKA .20000 
VALA C — 2364.00000 RVALE •20000 
VALA RVALA •20000 
COLA C - 6743.00000 RCOLF .20000 
CCLA RCCLA .20000 
Bise RBLSA — .10000 RBLSB .10000 
ELLE REllA - .10000 RELLB .10000 
KAMB RKAMA - .10000 RKAMB .10000 
JEWB RJEMA - .10000 RJEUB •10000 
RANB RRANA - •10000 RRANB .10000 
STOB RSTOA — .10000 RSTOB .10000 
RQLB RROLA — . 10000 RROLB .10000 
STAB RSTAA — .10000 RSTAB .10000 
GILB RGILA — .10000 RGILB .10000 
JORB RJGRA - •10000 RJORB .10000 
AMEB RAMEA — . 10000 RAMEB •10000 
KELB RKELA - .10000 RKELB .10000 
HUXB RHUXA — .10000 RHUXB •10000 
CAMB RCAMA - . 10000 RÙAMB .10000 
ELKB RELKA - •10000 RELKB .10000 
VALB RVALA — .10000 RVALB .10000 
CCLB RCOLA — . 10000 RCOLB .10000 
MPAA C - 4160.00000 RMPAC .20000 
MPAA RMPAA •20000 
MPPA C - 4160.00000 RMPPC .20000 
MPPA RMPPA .20000 
FLAA C - 931.00000 RFLAL .85000 
FLAA RFLAA .85000 
FLBA C - 139G.00000 RFLBL .85000 
FLBA RFLBA .85000 
FLCA C - 931.00000 RFLCL .85000 
FLCA RFLCA .85000 
FLOA C - 931.00000 RFLOL .85000 
FLDA RFLCA .85000 
FLEA C - 931.00000 RFLEL .85000 
FLEA RFLEA .85000 
FLFA C — 1390.00000 RFLFL .85000 
FLFA RFLFA .85000 
MPAB RMPAA - .10000 RMPAB .10000 
MPPB RMPPA — .10000 RMPPB .10000 
FLAB C 83.53000 RFLAA - •10000 
FLAB RFLAB .10000 
FLBB C 35.00000 RFLBA - .10000 
FIBB RFLBB .10000 
FLCB C 83.53000 RFLCA - .10000 
FLCB RFLCB •10000 
FLDB Ç 83.53000 RFLDA - .10000 
FLOB RFLCB • 10000 
FLEB C 83.53000 RFLEA — .10000 
FLEB RFLEB .10000 
FLFB C 35.00000 RFLFA - .10000 
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FIFB RFLFB .10000 
BLSAX C - 3539.00000 RBLSA .20000 
ELLAX C - 4199.00000 RELLA .20000 
KAMA* C - 346E.00000 RKAMA .20000 
JEWAX C - 5363.00000 RJEWA .20000 
RAN AX C - 3176.00000 RRANA .20000 
STOAX C - 6192.00000 RSTOA .20000 
RGLAX C - 4746.00000 RROLA .20000 
STAAX C - 4092.00000 RSTAA .20000 
GILAX C - 3653.00000 RGILA .20000 
JQRAX C - 2079.00000 RJORA .20000 
AMEAX C -19433.00000 RAMEA .20000 
KELAX c - 3350.00000 RKELA .20000 
HUXAX c - 4159.00000 RHUXA •20000 
CAMAX c - 4406.00000 RCAMA .20000 
ElKAX c - 344C.00000 RELKA .20000 
VALAX c - 2363.00000 RVALA .20000 
CGLAX c - 6742.00000 RCOLA .20000 
MPAAX c - 4159.00000 RMPAA .20000 
MPPAX c - 4159.00000 RMPPA •20000 
FLAAX c - 930.00000 RFLAA .85000 
FLBAX c - 1389.00000 RFLBA .85000 
FLCAX c - 930.00000 RFLCA .85000 
FLOAX c - 930.00000 RFLDA .85000 
FLEAX c - 930.00000 RFLEA .85000 
FLFAX c - 1389.00000 RFLFA .85000 
MNOIAX c 1293191.420 SOI 1791.39000 
HNOIAX S02 1791.39000 S03 1791.39000 
MNOIAX TOI 1791.39000 T02 1791.39000 
MNOIAX T03 1791.39000 ROIAX 1.00000 
MCOIAX C 1248891.590 SOI 1089.36000 
MCOIAX S02 1089.36000 S03 1089.36000 
MCOIAX TOI 1089.36000 T02 1089.36000 
MCOIAX T03 1089.36000 ROIAX 1.00000 
PPOIAX C 489728.2300 SOI 484.16000 
PPOIAX S02 484.16000 S03 484.16000 
PPOIAX TCI 484.16000 T02 484.16000 
PPOIAX T03 484.16000 ROIAX 1.00000 
MNOIAY C 2719666.420 SOI 5243.83000 
MNOIAY S02 5243.83000 S03 5243.83000 
MNOIAY TOI 5243.83000 T02 5243.83000 
MNOIAY T03 5242.83000 ROIAY 1.00000 
MCOIAY C 2626498.590 SOI 3156.48000 
MCOIAY S02 3156.48000 S03 3156.48000 
MCOIAY TOI 3156.48000 T02 3156.48000 
MCOIAY T03 3156.48000 ROIAY 1.00000 
ppniây C 1029930.000 SOI 101.82000 
PPOiAY S02 101.82000 S03 101.82000 
PPOIAY TOI 101.82000 T02 108.82000 
PPOIAV T03 101.82000 ROIAY 1.00000 
MhOlAZ C 453269.0000 501 1170.93000 
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MNOIAZ SO 2 1170.93000 S03 1170.93000 
MNOljkZ TOI 1170.93000 T02 1170.93000 
MNOIAZ T03 1170.93000 ROIAZ 1.00000 
MCOIAZ C 437741.0000 SOI 702.45000 
MCOIAZ S02 704.25000 S03 702.45000 
MCOIAZ TOI 704.25000 T02 704.25000 
MCOIAZ T03 704.25000 ROIAZ 1.00000 
PPOIAZ C 171652.0000 SOI 25.45000 
PPOIAZ S02 25.45000 S03 25.45000 
PPOIAZ TOI 25.45000 T02 25.45000 
PPOIAZ T03 25.45000 ROIAZ 1.00000 
Mhoiex C 6163S6.0000 SOI 1979.81000 
MNOIBX S02 1979.81000 S03 1979.81000 
MNOieX TOI 1979.81000 T02 1979.81000 
MNOieX T03 1979.81000 ROIBX 1.00000 
MCOIBX C 5943C5.0000 SOI 1183.06000 
MCOIBX S02 1183.06000 S03 1183.06000 
MCOIBX TOI 1183.06000 T02 1183.06000 
MCOIBX T03 1183.06000 ROIBX 1.00000 
MTOIBX C 540826.0000 SOI 72.43000 
MTOIBX S02 72.43000 S03 72.43000 
MTOIBX TOI 72.43000 T02 72.43000 
MTOIBX T03 72.43000 ROIBX 1.00000 
PPOIBX C 534910.0000 SOI 36.21000 
PPOIBX S02 36.21000 S03 36.21000 
PPOIBX TOI 36.21000 T02 36.21000 
PPOIBX T03 36.21000 ROIBX 1.00000 
MNOIBV C 1478391.000 SOI 6601.51000 
MNOIBY S02 6601.51000 S03 6601.51000 
MNOIBY TOI 6601.51000 T02 6601.51000 
MNOIBY T03 6601.51000 ROIBY 1.00000 
MCOIBY C 1425405.000 SOI 3966.70000 
MCOIBY S02 3966.70000 S03 3966.70000 
MCOIBY TOI 3966.70000 T02 3966.70000 
MCOIBY T03 3966.70000 ROIBY 1.00000 
MTOIBY C 1297139.000 SOI 260.59000 
MTOIBY SQ2 26C.59000 S03 260.59000 
MTOIBY TOI 260.59000 T02 260.59000 
MTOIBY T03 26C.59000 ROIBY 1.00000 
PPOIBY C 1282952.000 SOI 144.70000 
PPOIBY S02 144.70000 S03 144.70000 
PPOIBY TOI 144.70000 T02 144.70000 
PPOIBY T03 144.70000 ROIBY 1.00000 
MNOIBZ C 369215.0000 SOI 2212.68000 
MNOIBZ S02 2212.68000 S03 2212.68000 
MNOIBZ TOI 2212.68000 T02 2212.68000 
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MTOIBZ C 323949.0000 SOI 86.77000 
MTOIBZ S02 86.77000 S03 86.77000 
MTOIBZ TOI 86.77000 T02 86.77000 
MTOIBZ T03 86.77000 ROIBZ 1.00000 
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HNOIEY C 77689.00000 SOI 4777.98000 
MNOIEV S02 4777.98000 S03 4777.98000 
MNOIEY TOI 4777.98000 T02 4777.98000 
HNOIEY T03 4777.98000 ROIEY 1.00000 
PPOIEY C 75379.00000 SOI 107.3800C 
PPOIEV TOi 107.38000 T02 107.38000 
PPOIEY S02 107.38000 S03 107.38000 
PPOIEY T03 107.38000 ROIEY 1.00000 
MN02AX C 461228.0000 S02 638.92000 
MN02AX S03 638.92000 T02 638.92000 
MN02AX T03 636.92000 R02AX 1.00000 
MC02AX C 445428.0000 302 388.53000 
MC02AX S03 388.53000 T02 388.5300C 
MC02AX TC3 388.53000 R02AX 1.00000 
PP02AX C 174666.0000 S02 17.2700C 
PP02AX S03 17.27000 T02 17.2700C 
PP02AX T03 17.27000 R02AX l.OOOOC 
MN02AY C 922403.0000 S02 1778.S000C 
MN02AY S03 1778.50000 702 1778.5000C 
MN02AY T03 1778.50000 R02AY l.OOOOC 
MC02AY C 8908C5.0000 S02 1070.55000 
MC02AV SC3 1070.55000 T02 1070.55000 
MC02AY T03 107C.55000 R02AY 1.00000 
PP02AV C 349311.0000 S02 34.53000 
PP02AY SC3 34.53000 702 34.53000 
PP02AY T03 34.53000 R02AY 1.00000 
MM02AZ C 496944.0000 502 397.16000 
MN02AZ S03 39 7.16000 T02 397.16000 
MN02AZ T03 397.16000 R02AZ 1.00000 
MC02A2 C 148476.0000 S02 238.87000 
MC02AZ S03 238.87000 702 238.87000 
MC02AZ T03 238.87000 R02AZ 1.00000 
PP02AZ C 58222.00000 502 8.60000 
PP02AZ S03 8.60000 702 8.60000 
PP02AZ T03 8.60000 R02AZ 1.00000 
MN02eX C 360943.0000 502 1159.32000 
MN02BX 503 1159.32000 702 1159.32000 
MN02BX T03 1159.32000 R02BX 1.00000 
MC02BX C 348007.0000 502 692.76000 
MC02BX SG3 692.76000 702 692.76000 
HC02BX T03 692.76000 R02BX 1.00000 
MT02BX C 316691.0000 502 42.41000 
MT02BX S03 42.41000 702 42.41000 
MT02BX T03 42.41000 R02BX 1.00000 
PP026X C 149933.0000 502 21.21000 
PP026X SC3 21.21000 702 21.21000 
PP02BX T03 21.21000 R02BX 1.00000 
Mk02BY C 865824.0000 502 3866.20000 
MN026Y S03 3866.20000 702 3866.20000 
MK02BY T03 3866.20000 R02BV 1.00000 
HC02BY C 834793.0000 502 2323.11000 
HC026Y 503 2323.11000 702 2323.11000 
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MC02BY TC3 2323.11000 R02BY 1.00000 
MTOZBY C 759674.0000 S02 152.61000 
HT028Y S03 152.61000 T02 152.61000 
MT02BY T03 152.61000 R02BY 1.00000 
PPOZBY C 751365.0000 S02 84.78000 
PP02BY S03 84.78000 T02 84.78000 
PP026Y T03 84.78000 R02BY 1.00000 
MK0262 C 432938.0000 S02 2594.57000 
MN02BZ S03 2594.57000 T02 2594.57000 
MN02e2 T03 2594.57000 R02BZ 1.00000 
MT02BZ C 379859.0000 S02 101.75000 
MT02BZ S03 101.75000 T02 101.75000 
MT02BZ T03 101.75000 R02BZ 1.00000 
PP02BZ C 375704.0000 S02 59.35000 
PP02BZ S03 59.35000 T02 59.35000 
PP02BZ T03 59.35000 R02BZ 1.00000 
MN02CX C 104962.0000 S02 978.48000 
MN02C)( S03 978.48000 T02 978.48000 
MN02CX T03 978.48000 R02CX 1.00000 
MC02CX C 104962.0000 S02 587.58000 
MC02CX S03 587.58000 T02 587.58000 
MC02CX TO 3 587.58000 R02CX 1.00000 
PP02CX C 93017.00000 S02 21.85000 
PP02CX 503 21.85000 T02 21.85000 
PP02CX T03 21.85000 R02CX 1.00000 
MN02CY C 194924.0000 S02 2520.53000 
MN02CY S03 2520.53000 T02 2520.53000 
MN02CY T03 2520.53000 R02CY 1.00000 
MC02CY C 194924.0000 S02 1510.52000 
«C02CY S03 1510.52000 T02 1510.52000 
MC02CY T03 151C.52000 R02CY 1.00000 
PP02CY C 172740.0000 S02 54.11000 
PP02CY S03 54.11000 T02 54.11000 
PP02CY TO 3 54.11000 R02CY 1.00000 
MN02DX C 26826.00000 S02 606.05000 
MN02CX S03 606.05000 T02 606.05000 
MN02DX T03 606.05000 R020X 1.00000 
PP02DX C 24291.00000 S02 1.42000 
PP02DX S03 1.42000 T02 1.42000 
PP02CX T03 1.42000 R020X 1.00000 
MN020Y C 62632.00000 S02 1962.11000 
MN02DY S03 1962.11000 T02 1962.11000 
MN02DY T03 1962.11000 R02DY 1.00000 
PP02DY C 56714.00000 S02 42.98000 
PP020Y S03 42.98000 T02 42.98000 
PP02DY T03 42.98000 R020Y 1.00000 
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MN02EX SG3 2180.05000 T02 2180.05000 
HN02EX T03 218C.05000 R02EX 1.00000 
PP02EX C 47690.00000 S02 48.71000 
PP02EX SO 3 48.71000 T02 48.71000 
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PP02EX T03 46.71000 R02EX 1.00000 
MN02EY C 49151.00000 S02 3022.85000 
MN02EY S03 3022.85000 T02 3022.85000 
MN02EV T03 3022.85000 R02EY 1.00000 
PP02EY C 4769C.00000 S02 67.89000 
PP02EY S03 67.89000 T02 67.89000 
PP02EY 103 67.69000 R02EY 1.00000 
MK03«X C 815456.0000 S02 1129.61000 
MN03AX S03 1129.61000 T02 1129.61000 
MN03AX T03 1129.61000 R03AX 1.00000 
MC03AX C 787521.0000 S02 686.92000 
MC03AX S03 686.92000 T02 686.92000 
MC03AX T03 686.92000 R03AX 1.00000 
PP03AX C 308811,0000 S02 30.53000 
PP03AX S03 30.53000 T02 30.53000 
PP03AX TC3 30.53000 R03AX 1.00000 
MN03AY C 1670337.000 S02 3220.60000 
MN03AY S03 3220.60000 T02 3220.60000 
MN03AY TC3 3220.60000 R03AY 1.00000 
MC03AY C 1613116.000 S02 1938.63000 
MCÛ3AY S03 1938.63000 T02 1938.63000 
MC03AY T03 1938.63000 R03AY 1938.63000 
PP03AY C 632552.0000 S02 62.54000 
PP03AV S03 62.54000 T02 62.54000 
PP03AY T03 62.54000 R03AY 1.00000 
MN03A2 C 278372.0000 S02 719.12000 
MN03AZ S03 719.12000 T02 719.12000 
MN03AZ T03 719.12000 R03AZ 1.00000 
MC03AZ C 268835.0000 S02 432.54000 
NC03AZ SG3 432.54000 T02 432.54000 
MC03AZ TC3 432.54000 R03AZ 1.00000 
PPQ3AZ C 105419.0000 S02 15.63000 
PP03AZ SC3 15.63000 T02 15.63000 
PP03AZ TC3 15.63000 R03AZ 1.00000 
MN03BX C 650504.0000 S02 2089.36000 
MN03BX S03 2089.36000 T02 2089.36000 
MN038X T03 2089.36000 R03BX 1.00000 
MC03BX C 627190.0000 S02 1248.52000 
MC03BX S03 1248.52000 T02 1248.52000 
MC03BX TC3 1248.52000 R03BX 1.00000 
MT036X C 570752.0000 S02 76 .44000 
MT036X S03 76.44000 T02 76.44000 
MT03BX TC3 76.44000 R03BX 1.00000 
PP03BX C 488069.0000 S02 38.22000 
PP03BX S03 38.22000 T02 38.22000 
PP03BX T03 38.22000 R03BX 1.00000 
MN03BY C 1560700.000 S02 6969.18000 
Mk03BY 503 6969.16000 ÎÔ2 .xouuu 
MN03BY T03 6969.18000 R03BY 1.00000 
MC03BY C 1504764.000 S02 4187.62000 
MC03BY S03 4187.62000 T02 4187.62000 
MC03BY T03 4187.62000 R03BY 1.00000 
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MT03BY C 1369357.000 S02 275.10000 
MT03BV S03 275.10000 T02 275.10000 
MT03BY T03 275.10000 R03BY 1.00000 
PP03BV C 1354379.000 S02 152.83000 
PP03BV S03 152.83000 T02 152.83000 
PP03BY T03 152.83000 R03BY 1.00000 
MN03BZ C 427423.0000 S02 301.35000 
MN03BZ SC3 301.35000 T02 301.35000 
MN036Z T03 301.35000 R03BZ 1.00000 
MT036Z C 375021,0000 S02 100.46000 
MT036Z S03 IOC.46000 T02 100.46000 
MT03BZ T03 IOC.46000 R03BZ 1.00000 
PP03BZ C 370919.0000 S02 58.60000 
PP03BZ sea 58.60000 T02 58.60000 
PP036Z T03 58.60000 R03BZ 1.00000 
MN03CX C 146420.0000 S02 1365.04000 
MN03CX SC3 1365.04000 T02 1365.04000 
NN03CX TC3 1365.04000 R03CX 1.00000 
HC03CX C 146420.0000 S02 819.70000 
MC03CX S03 819.70000 T02 819.70000 
MC03CX T03 819.70000 R03CX 1.00000 
PP03CX C 129756.0000 S02 30.48000 
PP03CX S03 30.48000 T02 30.48000 
PP03CX T03 30.48000 R03CX 1.00000 
MN03CY C 271917.0000 S02 3516.33000 
MN03CY S03 3516.33000 T02 3516.33000 
MN03CY T03 3516.33000 R03CY 1.00000 
MC03CY C 271917.0000 S02 2107.28000 
MC03CY S03 2107.28000 T02 2107.28000 
MC03CY T03 2107.28000 R03CY 1.00000 
PP03CY C 240970.0000 S02 75.48000 
PP03CY S03 75.48000 T02 75.48000 
PP03CV T03 75.48000 R03CY 1.00000 
HN03CX C 14512.C0000 S02 327.98000 
MN03CX S03 327.98000 T02 327.98000 
MN030X T03 327.98000 R030X 1.00000 
PP03CX C 12375.00000 S02 .77000 
PP03CX sea .77000 T02 .77000 
PP030X T03 .77000 R030X 1.00000 
MN030Y C 14512.00000 S02 1061.18000 
NN030Y SC3 1061.18000 T02 1061.18000 
MN03DY T03 1061.18000 R03DY 1.00000 
PP03DY C 12375.00000 S02 23.25000 
PP03DY soa 23.25000 T02 23.25000 
PP03CY T03 23.25000 R03DY 1.00000 
MN03EX C 68798.00000 S02 3051.16000 
Miunaey S03 3051^16000 T02 3051.16000 
MNoiix T03 3051.16000 R03EX 1.00000 
PP03EX C 66752.00000 S02 68.17000 
PP03EX S03 68.17000 T02 68.17000 
PP03EX T03 66.17000 R03EX 1.00000 
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MN03EV C 68798.00000 S02 4021.82000 
MN03EY S03 4021.82000 T02 4021.82000 
MN03EY T03 4021.82000 R03EY 1.00000 
PP03EV C 66752.00000 S02 90.33000 
PP03EY S03 90.33000 T02 90.33000 
PP03EV T03 9C.33000 R03EY 1.00000 
MN044X C 677152.0000 S03 3764.77000 
MN04AX TO 3 3764.77000 R04AX 1.00000 
MC04AX C 653955.0000 S03 2256.33000 
MC04AX T03 2256.33000 R04AX 1.00000 
PP04AX C 256435.0000 S03 88^73000 
PP04AX T03 88.73000 R04AX 1.00000 
MN04AY C 1374603.000 S03 10575.85000 
MN04AY T03 10575.85000 R04AY 1.00000 
MC04AY C 1327514.000 S03 6355.80000 
MC04AY T03 6355.80000 R04AY 1.00000 
PP04AY C 520558.0000 S03 231.59000 
PP04AY T03 231.59000 R04AY 1.00000 
MN04BX C 144806.0000 S03 1860.42000 
MN04BX T03 186C.42000 R04BX 1.00000 
MC04BX C 139616.0000 S03 1117.38000 
MC04eX T03 1117.38000 R04BX 1.00000 
PP04BX C 125663.0000 S03 42.54000 
PP046X T03 42.54000 R046X 1.00000 
MT04BX C 127053.0000 SO 3 73.74000 
MT04BX T03 73.74000 R04BX 1.00000 
HN046Y C 1924451.000 S03 34335.59000 
MN04BY T03 34335.59000 R04BY 1.00000 
MC04BY C 1855479.000 S03 20616.43000 
HC04BY T03 20616.43000 R04BY 1.00000 
MT04BY C 1688512.000 S03 1356.84000 
M704BY T03 1356.84000 R04BY 1.00000 
PP046Y C 1670044.000 S03 753.80000 
PP04BV T03 753.80000 R04BY 1.00000 
MM04CX C 267464.0000 S03 9967.26000 
HN04CX TO 3 9967.26000 R04CX 1.00000 
MC04CX C 267464.0000 S03 5982.83000 
MC04CX T03 5982.83000 R04CX 1.00000 
PP04CX C 237024.0000 S03 9967.26000 
PP04CX T03 9967.26000 R04CX 1.00000 
MN04CY C 267464.0000 S03 13827.94000 
MN04CY T03 13827.94000 R04CY 1.00000 
MC04CY C 267464.0000 SO 3 8296.77000 
MC04CY T03 8296.77000 R04CY 1.00000 
PP04CY C 237024.0000 S03 309.35000 
PP04CY T03 309.35000 R04CY 1.00000 
ni^w*vu 106168^0000 S03 9614.59000 
MN04CX T03 9614.59000 RÔ4DX 1.00000 
PP040X C 96137.00000 S03 213.40000 
PP040X T03 213.40000 R040X 1.00000 
MN040Y C 106168.0000 S03 13338.00000 
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MN040Y T03 13338.00000 R040Y 1.00000 
PP04CY C 96137.00000 S03 294.84000 
PP040Y T03 294.84000 R04DY 1.00000 
MN04EX C 84882.00000 S03 15059.49000 
MN04EX T03 15059.49000 R04EX 1.00000 
PP04EX C 82358.00000 S03 333.92000 
PP04EX T03 333.92000 R04EX 1.00000 
MM04EY C 84882.00000 S03 20883.96000 
MN04EY T02 20883.96000 R04EY 1.00000 
PP04EY C 82358.00000 S03 463.92000 
PP04EY T03 463.92000 R04EY 1.00000 
B OOAOO 64.70000 00A02 64.70000 
B 0QA04 89.59000 D0A06 114.47000 
B OOA08 144.33000 OOAIO 184.15000 
B 00A12 216.99000 00A14 253.83000 
8 00AL6 278.71000 00A18 303.60000 
B DQA20 328.48000 00A22 348.39000 
B D0A24 373.28000 00A26 398.16000 
B 0GA28 423.04000 D0A30 965.54000 
B 0QA32 102C.28000 D0A34 1035.22000 
B 0GA36 1047.17000 00A38 1060.10000 
B 0QA40 1084.99000 00A42 1114.85000 
B D0A44 1159.64000 D0A46 1169.60000 
B 00A48 1184.53000 D0A50 1194.48000 
B 0GA52 1259.18000 0QA54 2000.75000 
B 0GA56 2005.73000 00A58 2010.71000 
B 0CA60 2015.68000 00A62 3692.93000 
B 0GA64 3697.91000 D0A66 3782.35000 
6 00A68 3941.78000 D0A70 4066.21000 
B 0GA72 4255.34000 D0A74 4409.62000 
B D0A76 4573.86000 DQA78 4693.31000 
B 0GA80 4742.08000 D0A82 4842.62000 
B DGA84 4947.14000 DO A 86 5046.66000 
B 00A88 5146.22000 00A90 5245.76000 
B 0GA92 5245.76000 00A94 5245.76000 
B DO BOO 214.01000 DOB 02 214.01000 
6 0CB04 298.62000 00B06 383.23000 
B 00B08 492.72000 DOB 10 617.15000 
B 0CB12 746.55000 DOB 14 856.04000 
B 00B16 94C.65000 D0B18 1025.26000 
B 00620 1109.87000 00822 1174.57000 
B 00624 1259.18000 D0B26 1343.79000 
B 00628 1428.40000 D0B30 3235.05000 
B DC 832 3424.18000 00834 3468.97000 
B 00B36 3513.76000 D0B38 3553.58000 
B CGÔ4G  ^0 ^  m m C#A7UUU mmm #. £.OnAA # w w w
B 0GB44 3862.15000 D0B46 3906.94000 
B 00648 3946.76000 OOBSO 3991.55000 
B 00852 4031.37000 DOB 94 6704.02000 
B 0GB56 6723.93000 D0BS8 6738.86000 
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B 0CB60 6758.77000 00B62 12049.32000 
B 00B64 12223.51000 00666 12347.94000 
B 00668 12850.61000 00670 13308.50000 
B 00672 13950.53000 00874 14483.07000 
B DCB76 15020.59000 00878 15423.72000 
B 00680 15592.94000 00682 15936.35000 
B OC 684 1627S.77000 00686 16618.20000 
B 00688 16961.62000 00690 17220.42000 
B 00692 17220.42000 00B94 17220.42000 
B SOI 68650.80000 S02 213906.0000 
B S03 305706.0000 TOI 68560.00000 
B T02 2139C6.0000 T03 305706.0000 
B RBLSG 1.00000 RBLSA .20000 
B R6LSB .75000 RFLAL l.00000 
B RFLAA .85000 RFLAB .15000 
B RFIBL 1.00000 RFLBA .85000 
B RFIBB .15000 RFLCL 1.00000 
B RFICA .85000 RFLC6 .15000 
B RELLW 1.00000 RELLA .20000 
B RELIB •75000 RMPAC 1.00000 
B RMPPA .20000 RMPPe .75000 
B RFLDL 1.00000 RFLDA .85000 
B RFLDB .15000 RKAMR 1.00000 
B RKAMA .20000 RKAM6 .75000 
B RJEWL 1.00000 RJEWA .20000 
B RJEWB .75000 RFLEL 1.00000 
B RFLEA .85000 RFLEB .15000 
B RRAND 1.00000 RRANA .20000 
B RRANB .75000 RSTOC 1.00000 
B RSTOA .20000 RSTOe .75000 
B RFLFL 1.00000 RFLFA .85000 
B RFLF6 .15000 RROLD 1.00000 
B RRCLA .20000 RR0L6 .75000 
B RSTAN 1.00000 RSTAA .20000 
B RSTAB .75000 RGILT 1.00000 
B RGILA .20000 RG1L6 .75000 
B RJQRD 1.00000 RJORA .20000 
B RJGRB .75000 RAMES 1.00000 
B RAMEA .20000 RAMEB .75000 
B RKELL 1.00000 RKELA .20000 
fi RKELB .75000 RHUXL 1.00000 
B RHUXA .20000 RHUX6 .75000 
B RCAH6 1.00000 RCAMA .20000 
B RCAMB .75000 RMPPC 1.00000 
B RHPAA .20000 RMPA6 .75000 
B RELKH 1.00000 RELKA .20000 
B RELKB T75000 RVAIE 1.00000 
B RVÂlA .20000 RVAL6 .75000 
B RCOLF 1.00000 RCOLA .20000 
B RCCLB .75000 ROIAX .75400 
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B ROIAY 
•• t 
.75400 ROIAZ .75400 
B ROiBX .75400 ROIBY .75400 
B RGIBZ .75400 ROICX .75400 
B ROICY .75400 ROIDX .75400 
B RCiOY .75400 ROLEX .75400 
B ROIEY .75400 R02AX 1.12000 
8 R02AY 1.12000 R02AZ 1.12000 
B R026X 1.12000 R02BY 1.12000 
B R02BZ 1.12000 R02CX 1.12000 
B RC2CY 1.12000 R020X 1.12000 
B R02DY 1.12000 R02EX 1.12000 
B R02EY 1.12000 R03AX 1.22700 
B R03AY 1.22700 R03AZ 1.22700 
B R03BX 1.22700 R03BY 1.22700 
B RC3BZ 1.22700 R03CX 1.22700 
B R03CY 1.22700 R030X 1.22700 
B R030Y 1.22700 R03EX 1.22700 
B R03EY 1.22700 R04AX 1.44500 
B R04AY 1.44500 R04BX 1.44500 
B RC4BY 1.44500 R04CX 1.44500 
B R04CY 1.44500 R040X 1.44500 
B RC4DY 1.44500 R04EX 1.44500 
B R04EY 1.44500 
BOUNDS 
UP BNDl BBRG .80000 
UP BNDl ESWT .80000 
UP BNDl MPKX .80000 
UP BNDl JHLL .80000 
UP BNDl ROLL .80000 
UP BNDl STCY .80000 
UP BNOl RIND .80000 
UP BNDl STHP .80000 
UP BNDl GLRT .80000 
UP BNOl JRDN .80000 
UP BNOl AMSS .80000 
UP BNOl KLIY .80000 
UP BNDl HXLY .80000 
UP BNOl CMBG .80000 
UP BNDl MPKY .80000 
UP BNOl ÊLKT .80000 
UP BNDl VLRI .80000 
UP BNOl CLFX .80000 
ENOATA 
